



Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970

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Openings: Politics, Culture, and Activism in the 1960s

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Abstract and Keywords

By the middle of the 1960s, peace activists in Britain and West Germany had turned their attention away from issues of nuclear armaments and focused primarily on the United States' military engagement in Vietnam. Thus, when peace protesters came together in West Berlin in February 1968 to chastise the United States for its military intervention in Vietnam and for the brutality the country used to pursue its aims, their demands sounded quite different from the polite requests developed by the Easter Marchers. This chapter traces how this transition happened and why it occurred. It pays special attention to the cultural politics of protest in both countries in making this transition possible and highlights the importance of transatlantic links and attention to a global politics of security in enabling this transition.

Keywords: anti-Vietnam War protests, Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, politics of solidarity, direct action, SDS

In the wake of the 1963 treaty between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom that banned atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, the visual traces of nuclear weapons had been effectively eliminated. Governments 'no longer had to rationalize the constant production of mushroom clouds and the related health concerns over radioactive fallout'. Thus, the arms race also became less visible—official weapons statistics were now the only form of knowledge of the dangers that nuclear weapons still posed. This meant that the 'visual record of the bomb' was frozen 'into what had been created in the period 1945-1963'.¹ The mushroom cloud became a mere token for speaking about

nuclear war, but it had less direct resonance, especially as most of the ruins of the Second World War in British and West German city centres had by now been replaced with modern buildings, so that the material traces of the memories of mass destruction were also less directly accessible. In 1966, the West German writer Heinrich Böll reflected on the salience of nuclear weapons by highlighting their 'everydayness': 'we all have it [the Bomb] in our pockets, together with matches and cigarettes; with it, with the bomb, time has gained a new dimension that almost excludes duration.'²

By the mid-1960s, peace activists in Britain and West Germany had turned their attention away from the issue of nuclear armaments and focused primarily on the United States' military engagement in Vietnam. Thus, when peace protesters came together in West Berlin in February 1968 to chastise the United States for its military intervention in Vietnam and for the brutality the country used to pursue its aims, their demands sounded quite different from the polite requests developed by the Easter Marchers. In *On Violence*, a reflection on the protests of the 1960s, the **(p.231)** philosopher and cultural critic Hannah Arendt explained the revolutionary potential and some of the pathos of violence among the activists at the end of the 1960s by recourse to the existential trope of the 'uncanny, suicidal development of modern weapons'. Activists, she argued, had heard the 'silent ticking of the bombs in the noise of the present'. Nuclear weapons had turned the idea of progress on its head more generally because they revealed that 'there's no damn thing you can do that can't be turned into war'.³ But Arendt's existentialist analysis cannot convincingly account for the transformation of the politics of security and for the dynamics of historical activism.

Historians of British and West German protests movement have to account for one fundamental difference in perceptions, however. While British and West German activists had acquired a sense of being part of the same and directly connected historical conjuncture in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they gradually lost this sense over the course of the 1960s. For the cultural critic Jeff Nuttall, the beginning of détente meant that the 'ban-the-bomb movement' left activists 'stranded in the unbearable': while it had destroyed the illusion of security in a world framed by the nuclear arms race, it had left nothing in its place. Accordingly, the annual Aldermaston Marches took place, in a smaller format, for the last time in 1965, until they were rejuvenated in the early 1970s.⁴ The West German Easter March movement continued, by contrast, under a slightly amended name, highlighting its commitment to 'disarmament' more generally and becoming part of a larger 'extra-parliamentary opposition' that incorporated a number of campaigns, ranging from student protests, to protests against proposed emergency legislation, to the campaign against the Vietnam War.

Both societies saw a growing importance of subcultural layers of identification that came to be linked with political objectives. Yet the precise relationships between these layers differed between both countries and even within each country.⁵ The transnational and comparative perspective adopted here demonstrates especially clearly that the different British and West German developments did not simply indicate different national paths. As Alexander Sedlmaier and Stephan Malinowski have argued in a broader context, there was no one national characteristic, but there were many different experiences of protest even within individual national **(p.232)** contexts, depending on how activists made sense of the political relevance of culture.⁶

This chapter analyses how the seemingly fundamental differences between West German and British developments in the protesters' politics of security reflected the different nature of the politicization of culture in each movement. Nonetheless, both countries saw the emergence of a new form of the politics of security during this period that focused on the psychological constitution of individuals as the foundation for social and political change. At the same time, this was also a question about the level of organization required to sustain a movement: on one end of the spectrum were those who argued that a movement focused around counter-cultural developments was sufficient, while others campaigned for a political movement with a sustained organizational structure. For this, the different roles that the social-democratic parties played in each country were of crucial importance.

Looking back

The peaceful conclusion of the Cuban missile crisis in late autumn 1962 and the Treaty that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow in August 1963 in order to ban atmospheric nuclear tests meant that nuclear weapons lost their salience for the politics of security in both countries. The scenarios of accidental nuclear war that both movements had developed appeared to be less plausible in a climate of détente, and the Test Ban Treaty removed one of the direct concerns about the dangers from radiation that the protesters had raised. Moreover, above-ground nuclear tests had acted like simulations of nuclear war that made the unthinkable visible, meaning that the ban had made the dangers of nuclear weapons less clear. Not least, the charismatic young American President John F. Kennedy and especially the 'strategy for peace' that he outlined in a speech at American University in Washington, DC on 10 June 1963 fired the imaginations of the mainstream publics in both the United States and Western Europe. Indeed, Kennedy also galvanized the hopes and dreams of most activists in the peace movement.⁷

Kennedy's policies indicated broader transformations in cold war international relations. Around two months before his speech, on 11 April 1963, **(p.233)** Pope John XXIII had issued his encyclical *Pacem in terris* and thus indicated that the Catholic Church was willing to participate more actively than before in the

politics of peace. On 31 May 1963, the Finnish President Urho Kekkonen called for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Europe. This followed the declaration of such a zone on 29 April 1963 by Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. All signs, then, appeared to point towards *détente* and nuclear disarmament.

The peace movements attributed the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the concomitant period of *détente* to their own campaign efforts, while also applauding the Kennedy administration for its supposed restraint and wisdom. Paradoxically, therefore, they began to accept, at least implicitly, the key parameter of the cold war international system: it rested on a balance of power that was ultimately bought by mutually assured destruction. However, the protest movements in Britain and West Germany did not simply cease their campaigns. Instead, the protesters redefined what they meant by the politics of security. Their experiences of movement success enabled them to develop novel interpretations of the politics of security in the context of international relations.

Fundamentally, the developments in both countries were direct consequences of the ways in which the social-democratic and socialist parties and groups had adapted to the demands of cold war foreign and defence policies. The trajectory of the movements after their peak in the early 1960s was also a direct result of how the organized social-democratic and socialist left proposed to tackle the challenges of international relations. The movements in both countries had opened up a space for discussing these issues beyond the remit of the organized labour parties, as well as beyond the binary logic of the cold war that divided the world strictly into communist and non-communist camps. Nigel Young, one of the founder members of CND, at a conference in June 1963, was quite critical of the campaign's achievements. But he still pointed towards the importance of creating a 'new sort of politics'. While he admitted that CND had failed, in the five years of its existence, to spell out unilateralism to the British public, and while the campaign had failed in its educational activities and in its attempts to organize a central leadership, it had still succeeded in 'creating a "style"—a new kind of politics in which policy is not of paramount importance'. It had thus produced an atmosphere in which the bomb came to be related to other social and political issues, local and international.⁸ With hindsight, Sheila Rowbotham, who had made her first experiences with radical politics in the context of CND, **(p.234)** also observed that the campaign made it possible for her and other activists to 'invent an imaginary space out of our sense of displacement' in society and that it 'enlarged the space to be weird' in cold war political culture.⁹

Such developments were even more pronounced and politically important in the highly fractured context of Northern Irish society. The Northern Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament developed forms of political activism that transcended the seemingly straightforward descriptions of politics in religious or ethnic terms. Instead, protests there against the UK naval centre in Clooney near Derry that housed the control centre for nuclear Polaris submarines in the Atlantic

brought together people from both Catholic and Protestant communities in a pluralistic setting.¹⁰ Although they borrowed, like their friends in mainland Britain, religious forms of campaigning such as silent vigils, they were allowed to enter Derry city centre, which was a proscribed place for nationalist groups. There, on what they called 'Blitz Square', pacifists, Republicans, socialists, and communists protested against the dangers of a repeat of the Second World War bombing campaigns in the nuclear age. This created the networks of activists and the space for campaigning that undergirded the emerging protests against unfair housing policies, rent increases, and the nascent civil rights movement.¹¹

Similarly, when he looked back at his experiences in the 'extra-parliamentary opposition' in late November 1967, Klaus Vack, who had come to the Easter Marches through his involvement in socialist youth work, highlighted the transformative potential of the Easter Marches in the context of cold war politics. Reflecting on the role of communists in the Easter March movement, he observed the importance of implementing peaceful coexistence in direct personal relationships. While he entirely rejected the organizational conformism that he observed among communists, he nonetheless saw the life-changing potential of working together with them, implementing some of their ideas in the context of a West German politics of security from below.¹² Other West German activists also recounted how the Easter Marches enabled them to move from previously marginal, if not illicit, groups. For example, the Swabian communist Willy Hoss saw that the movement had allowed him to 'to come into the **(p.235)** open', and to live the life in public that he had previously campaigned for in the context of more clandestine political operations. While the cold war had 'nailed [activists] down in a group' and had endowed them with refutable political identifications, the contacts and networks in the Easter Marches in the context of détente helped to dissolve that compulsion.¹³

This meant that oppositional knowledge now also became available to those who had previously not been involved in protest politics. While Catholics in a society still characterized by confessional boundaries had been more or less absent from the early Easter Marches, they now joined in larger numbers, spurred on by the attempts at Church reform discussed at the Second Vatican Council that met in Rome from autumn 1962 to December 1965. Students, increasingly unhappy with their role in university governance as well as trends towards overcrowding, could also make use of the political space provided by the Easter March. Not least, the Easter Marches appeared to have shown that political mobilization could actually work.

Disappointments and politicization

These general assessments of the functions of the extra-parliamentary politics of security do not themselves explain the large degree of personal, social, and political continuities in West Germany between the Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents and what became the extra-parliamentary opposition that

campaigned against armaments, emergency legislation, and the Vietnam War, while also campaigning for higher education reform. Herbert Faller, Klaus Vack, Arno Klönne, Andreas Buro, Christel Beilmann, and Heiner Halberstadt continued to be involved in the campaign, and activists like Helmut Schauer provided important contacts to trade unions in the Frankfurt area in the protests against emergency legislation.¹⁴

These continuities, which did not exist to the same degree in Britain, can be explained only if we consider the dynamic relationship between the social-democratic party organization and some of the Easter March organizers. Rather than accepting the Easter Marches as a campaign that was independent of the party but attracted many *SPD* members and supporters, the mainstream reformist wing in the *SPD* criticized the Easter Marches as being too open towards communist subversion. An **(p.236)** *SPD*-sponsored brochure called 'Easter March Observations' rivalled official government statements in its condemnation of the protests: while Hans-Konrad Tempel and the other Easter March organizers might have been well-intentioned pacifists, their idealism, the brochure's author argued, had opened the floodgates to communist propaganda.¹⁵

Whereas the *SPD* never formally declared participation in the Easter Marches incompatible with party membership, its bureaucratic machinery exerted a high level of pressure on individual activists. Party organizers from Herbert Wehner's office visited Hans-Konrad Tempel and others several times to persuade them to abandon the campaign by threatening their eviction from the party. In a political system still dominated by the ideological binaries of the cold war, that eviction from a social-democratic party would have meant being cast outside the boundaries of respectable politics. Since the banning of the German Communist Party in 1956, the political space left of *SPD* was a political no-man's-land, a 'forbidden space'. People who found themselves in it had to fear for their jobs, especially if they worked in the civil service, including at schools and at universities, and for their reputation.¹⁶

The *SPD*'s pressure on individual activists and organizers led to a gradual process of politicization for most, although some, like Tempel, who could not bear the pressure, took a back seat.¹⁷ The perception that the *SPD*'s organizational power hampered the realization of the Easter Marches' ethico-political aims was given further plausibility by what was happening to the *SPD*'s own student organization, the *SDS*, at around the same time. In 1961, the *SPD* proscribed membership of the *SDS* because of allegations of communist subversion. This amounted to political ostracism, but it also cut the *SDS* off from the party's financial and organizational resources, making it necessary for activists to look for novel forms of political engagement. They continued to find this in the Easter March movement.¹⁸

It was this constellation of a perception of large organizational pressures exerted by the *SPD* and a social-democratic party that had, by reacting in that way, betrayed its own fundamental values that contributed to the foundation of the gradual politicization of the Easter March movement over the course of the 1960s. Accordingly, activists' critiques of the values **(p.237)** that defined the social-democratic party organization took aim at the 'hollowness of the new culture of public civility' that had emerged in West Germany by the early 1960s: while the Easter March activists accepted that there had been demonstrable progress towards a fundamental democratization of West German society, they argued that it had not gone far enough and was merely façade.¹⁹ From this perspective, the Grand Coalition that the *SPD* and the *CDU* formed in 1966 appeared to be the expression of what the activists regarded as a coalition of 'authoritarian forces', where two *SPD* mayors of Berlin, Heinrich Albertz and the former left-winger Klaus Schütz, tried to outbid conservative politicians in their attempts at the policing of public order.²⁰ With hindsight, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the French-German activist, identified the core of this quest as one that sought to highlight how 'a society that claimed to be democratic' was made to confront its hidden 'authoritarian structures'.²¹

This constellation prompted Easter March activists to develop a number of approaches to a politics of security that moved decisively beyond the remit of *SPD* party politics. Initially, this meant that the Easter Marches provided a political space in which different strands could exist side by side. Activists agreed that they, rather than the Social Democratic Party, had become the most important protector of the German constitution. The *SPD* and many of the trade unions, they argued, had by contrast become part of the organization of the West German state and were thus also tightly sutured to the 'military-industrial complex'.²²

What united these interpretations was that they tried to move beyond the organization and bureaucratic confines of 'democracy' that had been established in West Germany after 1945. Instead, they argued that security could be achieved only through the self-organization of society 'from below'. Although Hans-Jürgen Krahl was far from typical, most activists would have accepted his conclusion, in a speech in Frankfurt in 1968, that 'a social democracy lives only from the enlightened self-activity of mature human beings'. Organization then became a form of violence, the 'quotidian violence [*Gewalt*] of bureaucratic paternalism'.²³ Some, like the **(p.238)** Easter March veteran and *SDS* member Jürgen Seifert and the *SDS* activist Michael Vester, looked abroad for inspiration, initially to the British New Left, then to the American New Left and civil rights movement.²⁴ Jürgen Seifert, in particular, argued for a move towards theory in order to gain the analytical tools to address the situation in West Germany.²⁵ Michael Vester, by contrast, was inspired by the successes of the US civil rights movement and campus revolts that he had experienced first hand as a visiting student there. For him, 'organization' referred not to bureaucratic procedures,

but to providing a political space for what he called 'collective learning processes'.²⁶ Others, like the Marburg *SDS* activist Peter von Oertzen, argued for a more direct engagement with socialist ideas and practices outside the mainstream. Yet others, especially in the Munich and Berlin *SDS*, and most notably Rudi Dutschke, argued less in terms of traditional socialist ideas. Dutschke, in particular, worked through positions of dissident communism (such as Ernst Bloch's and Georg Lucács's ideas) that he had become acquainted with before he left the GDR for West Germany. But he gave them a voluntarist twist by combining them with ideas from Situationism, an international political and artistic movement that emphasized the performative nature of art and culture and sought to use it to develop forms of life beyond capitalism.²⁷ This implied a strategy of campaigning that, in the words of the Situationist activist Dieter Kunzelmann, disrupted the 'clockwork mechanisms that regulate contemporary living by provoking people into thinking about the meaning of industrial society'. 'Life', Kunzelmann maintained, 'must be the artistic product of the whole of society conceived in terms of human beings capable of communication and pleasure'.²⁸ The fact that the dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic routines of the social-democratic party organization lay, for many protesters, at the heart of their activism, made such conceptions especially attractive.

Britain did not see a similarly pronounced trend towards politicization. The CND continued to campaign into the late 1960s, now primarily **(p.239)** against the Vietnam War rather than nuclear weapons. Yet, a similar sense of betrayal by the social-democratic left did not exist in Britain, and CND could not emerge as the focus of an extra-parliamentary campaign; nor did any other movement emerge that continued the politics of security within a common cognitive framework. There are several explanations for this. On a purely political level, Britain did not see a grand coalition that would have lent such interpretations plausibility. Rather, in 1964, activists in Britain witnessed the coming-to-power of Harold Wilson's Labour government that had campaigned on a non-nuclear platform. To many contemporary observers, the new government seemed to reassert socialism against reformist trends in the British Labour Party.²⁹ Moreover, the British politics of the past did not work in the same way as in the Federal Republic: because of the National Socialist regime and many personal continuities within the police, the bureaucracy, and the government, the activists' accusation of witnessing a creeping resurgence of authoritarianism appeared especially acute in the Federal Republic.³⁰

And, although Wilson committed his own act of betrayal by not implementing his promise for nuclear disarmament, this did not lead to a fundamental rift between party and activism on the scale that could be observed in West Germany. This was due to the different experiences British activists had with the ways in which the British Labour Party dealt with dissidence. While some reformist politicians and trade unions had voiced their desire to proscribe CND, and while there were moves by Labour's National Executive Committee (NEC) to

constrain the pluralism within the party with regard to the contentious areas of social, foreign, and defence policies, the local party organizations never fully implemented the NEC's requests.

The experience of organizational exclusion and suppression of dissident voices was common primarily among the relatively small group of first-generation New Left activists such as E. P. Thompson, John Saville, Peter Worsley, and others. But the growth of a New Left movement out of socialist and social-democratic clubs at several universities made this experience rather marginal overall. For this reason, CND was never the central space for *political* experimentation that the Easter Marches had become in West Germany. It established a *cultural* framework of reference **(p.240)** that filtered into the plurality of protests in 1960s, Britain, rather than establishing one key focal point for debates.³¹

Politics and culture

These organizational developments provided the ground from which activists discussed how *political* culture should be and how *cultural* politics should look. This was the subject of fierce debates over the course of the 1960s. The SDS activist Elisabeth Lenk was highly critical of the turn towards cultural politics: 'They already think that they are revolutionary when they sit in jazz cellars and have a hairstyle à la Enzensberger. They already think that they are revolutionary because they smoke Roth-Händle cigarettes, read Konkret or Spiegel and, in order to shock the philistine environment, become members of the SDS.'³²

With their assessments, Lenk, and others overlooked that the dominant contemporary models for political organization in West German society no longer came from British incarnations of 'middle-class radicalism'. Instead, this form of social bonding reflected a specific blend of popular culture that merged working-class culture with elements of folk and jazz and was personified by bands like the Beatles. Britain remained, also in terms of fashion, a key reference point for the younger generation in Germany before they turned their attention increasingly to US popular culture or home-grown artists who imitated these trends.³³ But its contemporary relevance lay in the fact that it gave expression to a different form of cultural politics. The 'most exciting trait of our social situation', the psychologist Helmut Kentler wrote in 1964, was the fact that 'social initiative and activity no longer emerges to a large and decisive extent from the appropriate public institutions and organizations, but from private circles and privatist movements'.³⁴ The pluralization of the Easter March movement, together with the loss of organizational coherence within the SDS, accompanied by the emergence of more or less autonomous and highly localized centres of activism with different politics of security, was the functional equivalent to this general trend.

(p.241) This shift also implied a different perception that activists developed of themselves. Rather than regarding themselves merely as rational and disciplined actors, they now also began to stress their sociability and emotions. The perception of conscientious objectors as representing alternative models of masculinity was extremely important for this new culture of political activism—and it was perhaps not a coincidence in this context that some of the key Easter March organizers, such as Klaus Vack, Konrad Tempel, and Andreas Buro, had connections to conscientious objectors' organizations.³⁵ 'Toughness' and 'endurance' as ideals of masculinity did not disappear entirely, as the self-stylization as revolutionaries of activists like Dutschke showed. But it was now refracted differently, so that an anti-militarist *Sachlichkeit* (rationality) and sobriety went hand in hand with more explicitly emotional forms of bonding.³⁶

Such a transformation of the politics and practices of citizenship in the Easter March movements also found expression in the accelerated search for 'authentic' modes of interactions and 'authentic' culture. West German activists were especially fascinated by African Americans and their culture and political activism, as it seemed to reveal especially well the natural other to the tamed and civilized self. Blues, in particular, appeared to them to reveal problems of discrimination and exclusion in the modern civilized world, and African Americans in the black power movement had a particular appeal.³⁷

Such new models of an activist masculinity indicated a shift in the politics of security away from conceptions of 'injured citizenship' (Michael Geyer), which had expressed a strong distrust towards the West German state in the wake of the mass violence of the Second World War and thus a fundamental opposition to armaments.³⁸ By developing a conception of citizenship that contained within it notions of *individual* responsibility for non-violent conduct, activists severed this connection in conceptions **(p.242)** of citizenship between a 'yes' to military service and a 'no' to (nuclear) armaments. Instead, they developed ideas and practices of citizenship on the demonstrations that rejected military service, but tended to be oblivious to the specificities of nuclear weapons for conceptions of statehood and democratic governance.³⁹

The mid- to late 1960s witnessed a plethora of initiatives that sought to undergird the explicitly political work of the Easter March campaign with cultural foundations, and thus moved beyond an idea of politics that was focused on influencing policies alone. Fundamentally, all these attempts were about creating 'third ways', not only on the level of foreign and defence policy, as the previous campaigns had propagated, but to wedge open third spaces within West German society in order to overcome the bipolarities of the cold war from within. In this context, socialist ideas appeared to have the potential to drive this renewal, which could ultimately lead to the breakdown of capitalist democracies in the West and socialist dictatorships in the East. Indeed, the idea had already

been explored by the 'non-aligned' powers in world politics whose representatives had met at the 1955 Bandung Conference.⁴⁰

A wide spectrum of such initiatives existed within the wider circles surrounding the Easter March movement, even if the specific relationship between politics and culture varied from group to group. The most overtly political of these was the network of so-called Republican Clubs that flourished across the Federal Republic and West Berlin from spring 1964 in order to provide the Easter March movement with year-long support. By the beginning of 1969, there existed forty clubs across the Federal Republic, also in smaller cities. The initiative for the foundation of such clubs had primarily come from older *SDS* activists, such as Klaus Meschkat and Horst Mahler, who wanted to counter some of the attempts by Dutschke and others to establish a more explicitly cultural politics of security. The groups expanded rapidly when the Grand Coalition between the *CDU* and *SPD*, which included intellectuals and writers such as Wolfgang Neuss, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, and the young lawyer Otto Schily, was formed in December 1966.⁴¹ The Republican Clubs explicitly sought to broaden the remit of the Easter March movement by **(p.243)** incorporating questions of democracy into the campaign's arguments, perhaps most famously with a congress on 'Universities and Democracy' that took place in Hanover in June 1967.⁴²

An even earlier incarnation of such circles was Club Voltaire in Frankfurt. Carrying the enlightenment principles in its name, the club was set up as 'a site for encounter and information' by a group of activists around Heiner Halberstadt from socialist youth movements and the Easter Marches in the Frankfurt area in December 1962. Many of those who became involved, like Klaus Vack, had also been part of the campaign against French military intervention in Algeria. The groups sought to take some of the work of socialist youth organizations such as the Friends of Nature and the Falcons into new arenas, as the youth organizations were under increasing organizational pressure from the *SPD* to shed their core credentials. Similar clubs subsequently opened across the Federal Republic, with particular strengths in Lower Saxony, the Rhineland, and West-Berlin. The clubs started as reading circles that sought to promote 'practical socialist youth work' by studying the writings of nonconformist Marxists such as Ernst Bloch, Leszek Kołakowski, and Georg Lukács.⁴³ But when the first Club Voltaire opened its doors in Frankfurt and the sociology student Walmot Falkenberg began to chair the association that provided the financial backing in February 1963, the result was more than a revival of socialist youth movement activities. The club provided a café with a wide range of mainstream and counter-cultural newspapers and magazines. It organized dance events, folksong concerts, and poetry readings as well as theatre performances, especially by artists, poets, playwrights, and actors from East Germany and Eastern Europe, such as the singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann and the Soviet poet Yevgenij Yevtuchenko. In 1965, a similar club was founded in

Stuttgart, and, in 1967, clubs emerged in Marburg and Munich, together with a more short-lived venture in Hanover.⁴⁴ In early 1967, a similar coffeehouse-cum-cultural venue opened in West Berlin under the name of 'Ça ira'; it was an offspring of the local Falcon youth movement.⁴⁵ Its main emphasis was folk music, organizing concerts with Pete Seeger among others. Like the other clubs, it had close links to the Easter March association, providing a venue for networking, meeting, and cultural production besides the demonstrations.⁴⁶

(p.244) The Castle Waldeck folk festivals that took place from 1964 until 1969 in a rather remote patch of the Hunsrück area in West Germany highlighted another facet of this productive merger of politics and culture that began to underpin the politics of security from the mid-1960s onwards. Activist Diethart Kerbs was inspired by the life-reform movement of the early twentieth century and by anti-authoritarian pedagogics when he founded these festivals. He saw them as the expression of a movement back to nature into the countryside in order to allow a cultural radicalism to take hold unencumbered by the pressures and norms of city life.⁴⁷ Like the clubs, the festivals were a direct product of the cultural work that had accompanied the Easter Marches: the Waldeck festivals were closely linked to the journal *pläne* [plans]. With the journal and later a record company that was directly linked to it, Klönne (the journal's editor between 1959 and 1966), Michael Vester (co-editor of *pläne* and, from 1963 second federal chair of the SDS), as well as the activists Karl Hermann Tjaden and Carl and Erdmann Linde, sought to revive, in the context of an explicitly democratic politics of life reform, the quasi-fascist, yet left-wing youth movement d.j.1.11 around Eberhard Köbel 'Tusk' and its journal *Rotgraue Aktion* (Red-Grey Action). Vester, more than his colleagues, was also strongly influenced by E. P. Thompson's and Raymond Williams's work on the relationship between politics and culture with which he had become acquainted during his visit to the United States as an exchange student at Bowdoin College in Maine.⁴⁸ Changing the emphasis on the politics of deterrence and nuclear destruction could be successful, they argued, only if some of the key parameters of modern life—such as its emphasis on bureaucratic routines, on everyday rhythms, and on sterile and mediated social interactions—were replaced by more emotional, spontaneous, self-sustained modes of socialization. Their emphasis was primarily on the *production* of politics as a learning process, rather than on the implementation of specific policies on governmental level.

The most culturally-oriented strand of the politics of security that developed around the Easter March movement over the course of the 1960s was made up of those activists who were inspired by the Situationist transgressive practices of a group called 'Subversive Action' around the bohemian Dieter Kunzelmann in Munich. Its activists sought to reveal, through public spectacles and performance art, the manipulative techniques of **(p.245)** consumer society and the oppressive character of capitalist society. They did this also by incorporating mass culture, rather than relying on subcultural strands alone. Rather than

seeking to develop a fundamentally different vision of the politics of security and communicate it by means of rational arguments, activists believed that protests could work only if they showed the absurdity of the current power arrangements by using the very same means on which official and mainstream propaganda was based. Here, the politics of security took a form that relied primarily on cultural critique—and on deconstruction—at its central means of communication: the cold war arms race could become real only because of the images of destruction, spread through the mass media, on which it depended. It was, so the argument ran, only by trying to find a world beyond these images that security could be created. Frank Böckelmann singled out Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film *Dr Strangelove* as an ideal example of how this might be done: only through irony and subversion could the general population be made to see the absurdity of the nuclear arms race: people's consciousness had already been manipulated into believing in the avoidability of the cold war arms race and the logic of mutually assured destruction. Direct resistance, by contrast, would merely strengthen the existing power structures.⁴⁹ While accepting the arms race almost as an existential reality, Situationists were interested primarily in performative work that would come into its own in the nuclear criticism of the 1980s.⁵⁰

The specificities of this form of the politics of security become even clearer when we compare it with the strand within the Easter March movement that became dominant from 1965–66 onwards: the anti-authoritarian politics theorized and practised by Rudi Dutschke, Hans-Jürgen Krahl, and Bernd Rabehl in the West Berlin *SDS*. Although Rudi Dutschke was very much inspired by the anti-authoritarian elements of this critique and by its emphasis on transgression and playful rule-breaking, he—and most other activists—fundamentally disagreed with its emphasis on cultural critique and deconstruction. Although they could not agree on many other issues, Dutschke and most other Easter March activists still believed that consciousness was autonomous and that activism, carried by the right revolutionary consciousness, had the potential to change the world.⁵¹ Instead of emphasizing the politics **(p.246)** of spectacle, Dutschke and others developed voluntarist versions of the politics of security, in which the will of the individual subject was key for political and societal transformation.⁵² In his statement on organization (*Organisationsreferat*), student leader Rudi Dutschke argued that state violence (*Staatsgewalt*) in the Federal Republic functioned 'to a totalitarian extent psychologically' through internalized manipulation, so that the real violence remained invisible.⁵³ Violence at demonstrations appeared, therefore, merely as a symptom of the fundamental problem of the violence applied by government and present in West German society.⁵⁴

Dutschke was not the only one to discuss the phenomenon of structural and cultural violence that did not work solely through the physical attack on human bodies.⁵⁵

But Dutschke's suggested response was not cultural deconstruction and playful transgression. Instead, the fundamental problem of organization was that of 'revolutionary existence' that would realize security in a community of revolutionaries.⁵⁶ The two male groups that formed in the experimental *Kommune I* in West Berlin—one around Dieter Kunzelmann as the 'revolutionary bridgehead for invasion of everyday life', and the other around a concept of active solidarity in living together, represented these two versions of the most cultural forms of the politics of security.⁵⁷ A third model was provided by those with youth movement backgrounds, such as Klaus Vack and Arno Klönne, who wished to create a movement from below that provided a loose organizational context for what they called 'collective learning processes': spaces that allowed for the discussion and working-through of specific issues in order to change individuals through their engagement with each other in a group.⁵⁸

(p.247) In Britain, the ground for what counted as 'political' had itself shifted, too, as the politics of security had become more plural and had moved out of the remit of CND and the surrounding networks of activists. As no one cognitive frame emerged, however, British activists had to lead double lives in juggling cultural hippiedom and their membership in the revolutionary left.⁵⁹ But such assessments were also a sign that culture and politics did not fuse around one movement, as they did in West Germany. There was no one focus for a politics of security. In fact, the question of security had more or less faded entirely from discussions of most groups with the exception of CND. A plethora of groups that indicated different conceptions of politics and culture began to exist side by side, although their variety resisted efforts at neat and compact classification.

A first group consisted of novel forms of anti-war protests that wished to move beyond protest marches and towards more concrete forms of campaigning, such as sit-downs and blockades of military installations. The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, founded in June 1966 at a national conference supported by fifty organizations and groups at the initiative of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Trotskyite International Marxist Group, was one of these organizations. A second and closely related group converged around the revolutionary underground newspaper *Black Dwarf* that was edited by Tariq Ali, a former Oxford student from a Pakistani landowning family who wanted to bring the political and alternative left together in order to discuss common themes of the politics of security under the rubric of anti-imperialism. A third strand developed around university protests in the London area. The idea of an 'Anti-University' that sought to break down the divides between teachers and students was particularly appealing. New Left activists within CND tried to cultivate islands of authenticity at a local level, trying to create a new society free from alienation. They attempted to shift the balance of power in society by constructing new centres of power as in and through themselves in order to express their vision of a participatory democracy.

Throughout the 1960s, then, British society saw the emergence of a large variety of counter-cultural groups and trends that understood themselves as political ventures: 'issues of personal life, the way people live, culture, which weren't considered the topics of politics on the Left. We wanted to talk about contradictions of this new kind of capitalist society in which people didn't have a language to express their private troubles, didn't realize that these troubles reflected political and social questions that could be generalized.'⁶⁰ Many around the campaigns of the 1960s (**p.248**) began to regard the forms of conventional politics as too limited and goal oriented to promote 'real freedom'. They regarded the participation in artistic experiences or the expansion and transcendence of ordinary consciousness as beneficial social activities. Politics now came to be about friendship and music, mostly between men, with women present only in the background, thus transferring more traditional forms of labour movement sociability into new contexts.⁶¹

As in West Germany, politics in Britain could be found in many unexpected ways. Skiffle groups, inspired by Acker Bilk, Lonnie Donegan, and other folk musicians with their banjos, guitars, and washboards, as well as other forms of home-made music that had already been regular features at the Aldermaston Marches, now came to stand as symbols that worked against the perceived elitism of the jazz scene and embodied a set of broader egalitarian ideals.⁶² But, unlike in the Federal Republic, most of these trends never merged in a public and mass-medialized form of campaigning under a common frame of reference, precisely because the pressures towards conformity within organized Labour and cold war political culture had been less pronounced. But many of these developments occurred in highly localized sub- and counter-cultural contexts across the United Kingdom.⁶³ Activists around the C100 accordingly switched their key orientation towards creating a 'new non-violent society' rather than, like CND originally, campaigning for policy change.⁶⁴

The focus of this cultural politics therefore moved away from explicit political objectives and towards the self-transformation of (male) activists: it was essential to 'establish a new society that [would] allow men to talk about their souls', as the American academic John Gerassi put it at the 'Dialectics of Liberation' conference that took place in Camden Roundhouse, a converted railway depot and one of London's prime counter-cultural venues, during the 'Angry Arts Week', in July 1967.⁶⁵ The driving idea behind the conference was to unite different strands of the politics of (**p.249**) culture in order to highlight the systemic constraints and coercion in the absence of the use of material violence.⁶⁶

But the implementation of these politics took place within the highly differentiated context of local and not necessarily connected campaigns, such as the community struggles around housing that George Clark organized.⁶⁷ Similarly, Colin Ward's brand of anarchism focused on enhancing already

existing practical forms of self-organization by fostering housing and town planning and progressive education from below in forms of 'mutual aid through direct action'.⁶⁸ Counter-cultural papers such as *IT (International Times)*, which was published from October 1966 by the heroin addict Tom McGrath, who had been previously involved with *Peace News*,⁶⁹ Richard Neville's *OZ*, which began in January 1967 with a print run of 40,000 copies a week, the Trotskyite *Black Dwarf* and *Red Mole* as well as the Anarchist *Freedom* and *Anarchy* are the main examples for the proliferation of the politics of culture.⁷⁰ But many of CND's rank and file worried that this broadening of the agenda might mean losing the campaign's appeal, so that most CND activists did not readily embrace counter-cultural trends.⁷¹ In 1967, the black power activist Stokely Carmichael expressed, to much applause among the audience at the Roundhouse conference, his dissatisfaction with the turn towards psychology and counter-culture: 'I'm not a psychologist or psychiatrist, I'm a political activist and I don't deal with the individual. I think it's a cop out when people talk about the individual.'⁷²

Similar debates about the relationship between politics and culture had already been evident within British extra-parliamentary politics since the early 1960s, when they had still focused primarily on the nature of class in an increasingly affluent society and the implications of this for the organization of political campaigns. Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, and others had drawn the New Left's attention to issues of culture as a key component of politics.⁷³ In his work on the *Long Revolution*, Williams (**p.250**) had described a secular shift away from a specific working-class culture over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argued for an understanding of politics that sat oddly with traditional Marxist understandings: his interpretation of social organization assumed not one dominant force—social and economic structures—that drove political and social changes, but argued for the relative autonomy of the four different aspects of society: the levels of decision-making (politics), what he called 'maintenance' (economics), education, and learning, as well as 'generation and nurture'. Economistic understandings simplified, he argued, the complexity of experiences in society.⁷⁴ Similarly, Stuart Hall highlighted the importance of 'culture' for understanding contemporary British society and politics, but he faulted Williams for not paying sufficient attention to consumer capitalism, which had 'freed the working class only for new and more subtle forms of enslavement'.⁷⁵ E. P. Thompson, however, had been highly critical of this approach to politics: it had replaced, he argued, 'the whole way of struggle' for international and material security and socialism with references to culture as 'the whole way of life'. It therefore had the tendency to weaken the radical thrust of extra-parliamentary campaigns by making power invisible and thus weakening an understanding of 'struggle' and 'confrontation'.⁷⁶

Performances

The process of politicization in West Germany was not merely driven by activists' intellectual engagement with their experiences. It was also the result of the practices of protest and the ways in which they framed and reframed the activists' understanding of the politics of security. The process of switching from more general humanitarian objectives to specific political aims had already started in September 1962 when the Easter Marches gave themselves a new name: 'The Easter Marches—Campaign for Disarmament'. The new name meant that its various public interventions no longer merely included a general opposition to nuclear weapons, but listed concrete political demands, such as an end to nuclear testing and the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones.⁷⁷ In line with this politicization, the Easter March movement witnessed a constant rise in support **(p.251)** and membership. In 1964, there were 280 events (up from 130 in 1963) and around 100,000 participants on several rallies and marches (1963: 50,000). In 1965, the campaign organized 300 events with 130,000 participants. In 1966, 145,000 people participated in 600 demonstrations and other events around the country, and in 1967 there were 150,000 people in 800 events.⁷⁸

The fundamental factor in the rise of participation was, initially, the debates in the German parliament about an emergency law. Authority in the case of emergency, such as war or civil war, had, until 195, belonged to the Allied powers. But the Federal Republic's acquisition of at least partial sovereignty with its accession of NATO in that year meant that national legislation became necessary. Discussions about such a law had already begun in the late 1950s. But these plans were controversial when they became public and when it seemed as if the *SPD* would be willing to support at least some form of such legislation. The repercussions of such legislation had become especially clear when the weekly *Der Spiegel* published a leaked report on 10 October 1962 that described, in gruesome detail, the potential consequences of nuclear war on German soil that could result from the NATO combat exercise Fallex 62. The publication led to the arrest of several *Spiegel* journalists, including its editor Rudolf Augstein. Chancellor Adenauer called it 'treason'.⁷⁹

Given that several *SPD* politicians had themselves been the target of some of the government's recrimination, their U-turn in support of the emergency laws seemed to many Easter March activists a fundamental betrayal of their social-democratic credentials. Many activists had also diagnosed the growing autonomy of deterrence and security thinking in the West German armed forces, thus removing their democratic accountability.⁸⁰ When a novel draft of the emergency bill was discussed in parliament, Easter March activists belonging to the *SDS* detected a 'militarization of the basis', the 'militarization of the production process', and the growth of a 'direct political surveillance apparatus'. The *SPD*, by supporting such measures, would thus turn into a group of 'social fascists'.⁸¹

It was against this backdrop that 1,200 intellectuals and academics signed a declaration against the emergency legislation in an attempt to avoid the ‘total militarization of society’.⁸² Shortly before, in November 1964, the **(p.252)** Easter March movement had discussed its participation in some trade unions’ campaigns against the legislation. The issue became even more salient when it seemed possible that the bill would be passed by the German parliament in spring 1965.⁸³ The Easter March campaign thus became, from January 1965, directly linked to the campaign against the proposed emergency law; the very form and shape of democracy had become part of the activists’ politics of security: the emergency legislation threatened not only to make a quasi-dictatorship possible during war time; more importantly, it contained within it the ‘threat of total militarization in peace time’.⁸⁴

The term ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ was not merely a description of an opposition that voiced its claims on the streets rather than through an opposition party in parliament. Its immediate origins as a concept lay in its use by Rudi Dutschke in December 1966 to confront on the streets the Grand Coalition in parliament.⁸⁵ Yet, the term also contained a normative assessment. It applied a concept of the practice of democracy that did not see the opposition as part of the state institution, or even as one of its parts, a view that even social-democratic lawyers had developed in the early Federal Republic.⁸⁶ The idea of an ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ was therefore directly connected to a specific development in the politics of security that had already taken shape in 1965, when some Easter March activists founded the ‘Committee “State of Emergency of Democracy”’ (*Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie*) together with a number of academics and intellectuals.⁸⁷ Its proponents assumed that the security interests of the state could not merely be played out against pressures coming from the street—such a logic would, they argued, merely replicate the structures of authoritarian thinking that the activists wished to criticize.⁸⁸

The protesters’ framing of their activism as a danger to democracy was so persuasive in West Germany because it referred to a common *national* **(p.253)** past. The protests’ opponents highlighted the similarities with the street battles of the Weimar Republic and saw the forms of activism—highly emotional gatherings as opposed to more orderly demonstrations—as a revival of totalitarian forms of mass mobilization that had the potential to undermine the rational discourse on which democracy should be based.⁸⁹ The protesters countered by highlighting, in stark colours and polemical forms, similarities between the US war effort in Vietnam, which the West German government supported, and the Holocaust: ‘MURDER. Murder through napalm bombs! Murder through gas? Murder through atomic bombs? ... How long will we allow murder to be committed in our name? AMIS GET OUT OF VIETNAM!’⁹⁰ The flyer, distributed across the campus of the Free University Berlin on 3 and 4 February 1966 provoked by the new US bombing campaign in Vietnam in January 1966, had been drafted by activists close to Subversive Action and was

one of the first attempts to fuse the politics of security with the deconstruction of consciousness through irony and sarcasm that the group propagated. It marked one of the first occasions for a novel politics of security that focused on 'international liberation' and zeroed in on the United States' policies as the main culprit.

The West German politics of the past thus assumed an importance in the politics of the present that they could not have in Britain, as protesters there lacked an awareness of such clear caesuras and ruptures in national history. On 3 April 1967, the *Kuratorium* further escalated its language by warning of the potential 'practice of a dictatorship' and a continuous 'psychological mobilization of the whole population' under a state of emergency.⁹¹ The military putsch in Greece, a NATO country, and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967 appeared to lend such an interpretation even more plausibility. In this context, Easter Marchers regarded the eventual support by the Federation of German Trade Unions for the emergency legislation as a further act of betrayal that made more direct and practical steps of resistance necessary.⁹² When West German activists engaged with the brutal and violent crushing of the 'Prague Spring' by the Soviet Army on 21 August 1968, they used the very same framework of interpretation. Heinz Beinert of the Falcons exclaimed: **(p.254)** 'Who has betrayed us? Red bureaucrats!' ('Wer hat uns verraten, rote Bürokraten!').⁹³

Especially those activists who had joined the Easter March movement from the SDS argued forcefully that the issue of emergency legislation should become the key focus of the campaign, and they suggested another name change to 'Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament'.⁹⁴ The group therefore sought to mobilize more activists and move beyond the traditional marches and demonstrations over the Easter weekend, on Hiroshima Day in August and on Anti-War Day in early September. In a letter to all members of the Campaign's executive committee, Andreas Buro argued in January 1967 for activities all year round, not least to avoid being trumped by the increasingly popular events of the anti-authoritarian wing of the student movement.⁹⁵ However, some of the original Easter Marchers like Heinz Kloppenburg and Rudolf Schulz, a doctoral student in theology, disagreed: they sought to continue to alert the West German population of the dangers of nuclear war.⁹⁶ Ultimately, however, the reformers won the debate, especially because linking the discussions about the emergency law with general defence policy issues and the politics of NATO was increasingly plausible. When NATO forces participated in the Fallex combat exercise on 12 October 1966, the participants simulated the impact of a 'substitution of parliamentary representation in case of war'. This involved scenarios that saw the complete takeover of politics by the executive, the imposition of curfews, and expanded powers for the armed forces for public-order policing.⁹⁷

Conflicts about the precise shape and form of the politics of security in the context of democracy informed discussions at a meeting that the *Kuratorium* had organized in Frankfurt on 30 October 1965 which brought together the representatives from the Easter March movements, trade-union activists from the metal workers' union IG Metall, as well as SDS activists.⁹⁸ Those activists like Michael Vester who advocated a more traditional socialist **(p.255)** politics were highly sceptical of a strategy of direct action that Dutschke, Krahl, and others advocated. Vester argued that sit-ins and other novel forms of protest would only serve to self-mobilize those who already believe in the cause, rather than tap new groups of supporters. It worked primarily through symbols, Vester pointed out, rather than being based on what he regarded as 'real argumentation'.⁹⁹ The editor of the Catholic newspaper *Rheinischer Merkur* Anton Böhm, in a letter to Arno Klönne from April 1963, had already ridiculed protests with 'pushchairs and toy balloons' as 'foolish', while admitting that the boundaries and parameters of politically considerate were about to change.¹⁰⁰ The designer Otl Aicher, one of the key proponents of architectural modernism in the Federal Republic, applied the principles of modernist design to his rather critical analysis of the appearance of the 1966 Easter March: a unified design rather than improvisation should determine the marches' visual appearance in the future, and the youth movement spirit and songs should be replaced by a (one can assume: more rational) model of campaigning around clearly structured jazz music.¹⁰¹

The pluralization of the politics of security also had repercussions for actual practices of citizenship on demonstrations and protests. Previous protests had made a point to conform to mainstream expectations by creating a specific image of citizenship as sober, rational, and self-disciplined and that took no explicit note of differences between men and women.¹⁰² Situationists and some SDS activists in the Easter March movement were highly critical of the ritualized yearly demonstrations as devices for the stabilization in society.¹⁰³ They explicitly sought to link medialization, performance, and action directly as the expression of activists' values.¹⁰⁴ *Kommune I* activists, for example, distributed a leaflet at one of the Easter Marches addressed to the 'Easter marchers and Easter martyrs', thus poking fun at the sombre mood at most of those demonstrations and highlighting that their protests essentially followed the **(p. 256)** mainstream cultural conventions: 'What do you do when the conductor comes? Pay! What are you doing in a self-service shop? Pay!'¹⁰⁵

Over the course of 1966, 1967, and 1968 such practices of citizenship became more widespread in the movement as a whole. From this angle citizenship lay precisely in the performance of transgression. Referring to a sit-in at the Free University of Berlin, the writer Peter Schneider outlined such a strategy of performative rule-breaking:

We have informed [West Germans] about the war in Vietnam with all matter-of-factness, although we experienced that we could cite the most unthinkable details of American policy in Vietnam without getting our neighbours' imaginations going. But then we found that we only had to step on the lawn where it said "Keep off" to cause sincere, general and lasting horror.¹⁰⁶

Mass-medialized images were fundamental to this form of transgression: they not only represented the protests, but they constituted them—the logic of the mass media, and television in particular, co-produced this performativity.¹⁰⁷

Whenever this form of the politics of security was pushed further, as in the commune movement and in some Situationist groups, the boundaries between reality, joking, and phantasy disappeared even more thoroughly, and the nuclear arms race became purely imaginary:

The playful life forces in Europe are suppressed by the culture industry. The value of atomic bombs becomes obvious when used in the struggle against the culture industry ... After every shop in a culture supermarket, an atomic bomb is discretely put in together with the product ... As soon as the world has become a sea of rubble, the search for experimental life forms can enter a creative stadium.¹⁰⁸

Britain saw structurally very similar debates, but it did not witness the emergence of one movement around which the different strands converged—there was no single plausible frame under which different sections of the movement could unite. CND as a protest campaign declined and could not write itself into the anti-Vietnam War campaigns and campaigns for university reforms that emerged in Britain over the course of the 1960s. Instead, its activists went elsewhere when they sought to grapple with what they regarded as the fundamental issues of their time. The Old Left remained remarkably strong in **(p.257)** Britain over the course of the 1960s, fundamentally because the Labour Party had never created the fundamental sense of betrayal that the West German activists had sensed with the *SPD*. The New Left, many of whom were active in CND, shared some of the Old Left's ideas, but, unlike the Old Left, supported direct action. CND, therefore, moved away from a general humanitarian towards a more socialist anti-militarist platform. Such a trend was already visible in CND's 1962–63 policy statement that argued that hunger and poverty were the 'real enemies', and that they could not be tackled while the 'reckless waste of arms race' continued.¹⁰⁹ CND and other groups continued to develop this theme further by applying it to the Vietnam War and racial discrimination in the United States.¹¹⁰ As in West Germany, the US black power movement was attractive to some British protesters, and the origins of a British Campaign against Racial Discrimination (CARD) related directly to the ways in which activists around CND and the C100 engaged with the civil rights

movement in the United States. Claudia Jones, the editor of the *West Indian Gazette* who had already taken a role in the 1962 Aldermaston March, organized a march to the American Embassy in London in March 1963 to coincide with Martin Luther King's march on Washington.¹¹¹ A number of CND activists, especially Marion Glean, a black West Indian Quaker, Michael Randle (from C100), and Theodore Roszak, the US editor of *Peace News*, played instrumental roles in setting up a meeting with King in London that led to the foundation of CARD.¹¹²

By the end of the 1960s, then, activists had broadened the scope of the politics of security by embedding the issue of nuclear weapons in more general deliberations about the nature of politics and society around the world: they had developed notions of the world as 'global' that incorporated, but also transcended, previous visions of humanitarian bonds. Activists also accentuated their political commitment by moving from a position of acknowledging the existence of an abstract humanity that had to be preserved against the dangers of nuclear weapons towards a position that emphasized specific and concrete solidarity. Not least, protesters deepened their sense of a politics of security that was rooted not primarily in political processes and procedures, but in themselves as active subjects. They began to reflect on themselves as activists, rather than in terms of **(p.258)** other social bonds. Experiences had become essential for them to conceptualize their activism. Throughout the 1960s, changes in the cognitive framing of the contents of a politics of security were linked to the forms in which activists sought to express it. These transformations in the politics of security in both Britain and West Germany meant that 'peace' was no longer defined purely in terms of the absence of war and the arms race or in terms of static ideals of security. Instead, the peace activists now also included social and economic justice as well as personal well-being in the politics of security, although there was no agreement on the exact relationship between the level of politicization of the component elements.

Notes:

(¹) Joseph Masco, ' "Survival is your Business": Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America', *Cultural Anthropology*, 23 (2008), 361–98, here 378.

(²) Heinrich Böll, *Werke: Essayistische Schriften und Reden 2*, ed. Bernd Balzer (Cologne, 1979), 44–5. My translation.

(³) Hannah Arendt, *Macht und Gewalt* (1970; Munich, 2006), 17, 21, 20 (my translation; the last phrase appears in English in the German edition).

(⁴) Jeff Nuttall, *Bomb Culture* (London, 1968), 105.

(⁵) See conceptually Jakob Tanner, ' "The Times they are A-Changin": Zur subkulturellen Dynamik der 68er Bewegungen', in Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), *1968: Vom Ereignis zum Mythos* (Frankfurt/Main, 2008), 275–95.

⁽⁶⁾ Alexander Sedlmaier and Stephan Malinowski, ‘“1968”—A Catalyst of Consumer Society’, *Cultural and Social History*, 8 (2011), 255–74, here 259.

⁽⁷⁾ HIS, TEM 300,06: Flyer, ‘Zum Tod John F. Kennedys’, n.d.; *Sanity* (August 1963), 1.

⁽⁸⁾ Cited in Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 221–2.

⁽⁹⁾ Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 13, 71.

⁽¹⁰⁾ John Nagle, ‘From “Ban-the-Bomb” to “Ban-the-Increase”: 1960s Street Politics in Civil Rights Belfast’, *Irish Political Studies*, 23 (2008), 41–58, here 46–53.

⁽¹¹⁾ Niall Ó Dochartaigh, *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles* (Basingstoke, 2005), 55.

⁽¹²⁾ Note by Klaus Vack, printed in *Tradition heißt nicht, Asche aufheben, sondern die Flamme am Brennen erhalten!*, ed. Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (Sensbachtal, 1985), 181.

⁽¹³⁾ Willi Hoss, *Komm ins offene, Freund: Autobiographie*, ed. Peter Kammerer (Münster, 2004), 45; Vack, *Das andere Deutschland nach 1945*, 68–72.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 136–40.

⁽¹⁵⁾ *Vorwärts*, 8 January 1964; *Vorwärts*, 11 March 1964.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Jürgen Seifert in Bernt Engelman et al. (eds.), *Anspruch auf Wahrheit: Wie werden wir durch Presse, Funk und Fernsehen informiert* (Göttingen, 1987), 65.

⁽¹⁷⁾ HIS, TEM 400,01; Central Committee minutes, 11–12 April 1964, as well as the material in TEM 200,05.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Willy Albrecht, *Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS): Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum Repäsentanten der Neuen Linken* (Bonn, 1994), 318–39.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Geoff Eley, ‘Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere’, *positions*, 10 (2002), 219–36, here 228.

⁽²⁰⁾ Jacques Schuster, *Heinrich Albertz—Der Mann, der mehrere Leben lebte: Eine Biographie* (Berlin, 1997).

⁽²¹⁾ Danny Cohn-Bendit, cited in Ronald Fraser (ed.), *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt* (New York, 1988), 361.

(²²) Thomas von der Vring, 'Probleme einer neuen sozialistischen Strategie', *neue kritik*, 5 (1964), 5-15, 12-14; Ursula Schmiederer, 'Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus', *neue kritik*, 6 (1965), 28-31.

(²³) Hans-Jürgen Krahl, 'Römerbergrede', 27 May 1968, in Krahl, *Konstitution und Klassenkampf* (Frankfurt/Main, 1971), 149.

(²⁴) See Michael Schmidtke, *Der Aufbruch der jungen Intelligenz: Die 68er Jahre in der Bundesrepublik und den USA* (Frankfurt/Main, 2003), 46-56.

(²⁵) Jürgen Seifert, 'Die Neue Linke. Abgrenzung und Selbstanalyse', *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1 (1963), 30-40, here 31.

(²⁶) Michael Vester, 'Die Strategie der direkten Aktion', *neue kritik*, 30 (1965), 12-20, here 12-14. On the importance of his US experiences, see Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton, 2010), 40-74.

(²⁷) On this nexus, see Mia Ching Lee, 'Art and Revolution in West Germany: The Cultural Revolution of 1968' (University of Michigan, Ph.D., 2007), especially 193-5.

(²⁸) Quoted in Fraser (ed.), 1968, 83. On Kunzelmann, see Aribert Reimann, *Dieter Kunzelmann: Avantgardist, Protestler, Radikaler* (Göttingen, 2009).

(²⁹) Ilaria Favretto, '“Wilsonism” Reconsidered: Labour Party Revisionism 1952-1964', *Contemporary British History*, 14 (2000), 54-80.

(³⁰) Wilfried Mausbach, 'The Present's Past: Recent Perspectives on Peace and Protest in Germany, 1945-1973', *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen*, 32 (2004), 67-98.

(³¹) Dennis Dworkin, *Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of Cultural Marxism* (Durham, NC, 1997) and the important PhD project by Tom Dowling (Sheffield) on the cultural politics of 'New Leftism'.

(³²) Elisabeth Lenk, 'Die sozialistische Theorie in der Arbeit des SDS', *neue kritik*, 13 (November 1962), 7-11, here 8-9.

(³³) Siegfried, *Time Is on my Side*, 60.

(³⁴) Helmut Kentler, '“Subkulturen” von Jugendlichen', *Deutsche Jugend*, 12 (1964), 403-12, here 409-10.

(³⁵) Patrick Bernhard, 'An der “Friedensfront”: Die APO, der Zivildienst und der gesellschaftliche Aufbruch der sechziger Jahre', in Hodenberg and Siegfried (eds), *Wo 1968 liegt*, 164-200.

⁽³⁶⁾ For an early reflection on this, see Fritz Vilmar, *neue kritik*, 11 (June 1962), 15. For the general background, see Frank Biess, 'Feelings in the Aftermath: Toward a History of Postwar Emotions', in Frank Biess and Robert Moeller (eds), *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York, 2010), 30–48, especially 30–3, and Holger Nehring, '“Generation”, Modernity and the Making of Contemporary History: Responses in West European Protest Movements around “1968”', in Anna von der Goltz (ed.), *'Talkin' 'bout my Generation': Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe's '1968'* (Göttingen, 2011), 71–94.

⁽³⁷⁾ APOA, SDS-Gruppen, Frankfurt, 60er Jahre: Sozialistischer Club, n.d. For the general context, see Moritz Ege, *Schwarz warden: 'Afroamerikanophilie' in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren* (Bielefeld, 2007); Klimke, *The Other Alliance*, 108–42.

⁽³⁸⁾ Geyer, 'Cold War Angst' 385–6.

⁽³⁹⁾ *konkret*, 8 (August 1968), 22 ff.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ R. S. [Rudi Dutschke], 'Zum Verhältnis von Organisation und Emanzipationsbewegung: Zum Besuch Herbert Marcuses', *oberbaumblatt*, 5, 12 June 1967, printed in Kraushaar (ed.), *Frankfurter Schule*, ii. 255–60; Detlef Siegfried, 'Dritte Wege: Konzepte der Emanzipation in den 1960er Jahren', *Jahrbuch des Archivs der deutschen Jugendbewegung*, nf 4 (2007), 17–30.

⁽⁴¹⁾ LAB, B Rep. 002, no. 4346/I: Protokoll der konstituierenden Versammlung des RC, 30 April 1967.

⁽⁴²⁾ Lönnendonker, *Rabehl and Stadt, Antiautoritäre Revolte*, 347–54.

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