



Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970

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Epilogue: Redefining Experiences

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Abstract and Keywords

The dynamic interaction between events and the ways West German and British activists made sense of them was the condition that made it possible for activists to gain novel experiences of the cold war, and to reinterpret their agency. But British and West German developments differed in terms of the concrete links that activists made between their broader counter-cultural engagements and their political activism. This had consequences for the ways in which activists reflected upon their activism and developed their experiences from the end of the events around 1968 to the 1970s. This brought early cold war activism to a close: British and West German activists rarely took note of each other. And, while extra-parliamentary activism continued to matter in both countries, West German activists in particular developed entirely novel forms of political engagement that fed into the 'new' social movements of the 1970s.

Keywords: 'new' social movements, feminism, politics from below, non-violence

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In West Germany, the specific dynamics between international relations, concrete events, and activism lent the cognitive framework that linked an international politics of security with questions of the concrete forms of democracy, and the cultural practices that accompanied it added plausibility. In fact, it was primarily because of the unifying force of the events of 1967 and early 1968 that the diverse plurality of groupings that had emerged around the Easter March movement could be held together in one movement as an ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’: the lines between protesters and authorities appeared to be clearly drawn, and the Nazi past of some of the key players, such as Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, gave added relevance to an interpretation of the present that was fearful of the return of the Nazi past. In February 1967, the activist Helmut Schauer, in a paper distributed amongst Easter March activists, therefore, argued for a thoroughly new form of opposition that lay completely out of the left/right divisions of organizational politics, in particular because the *SPD* had stopped being a reliable partner for any politics aiming at furthering ‘democratic and progressive tendencies’.¹ Accordingly, the Easter March in 1968 already happened without the traditional public announcement in the winter. Instead, the Easter March committee developed an explicitly political platform that was discussed at a separate gathering in **(p.277)** Essen in January 1968. There, those activists who had long argued for a politics of security that combined attention to international relations and domestic issues formally won the day: it was decided to rename the ‘Easter Marches—Campaign for Disarmament’ as ‘Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament’.² There was, however, no agreement about how to take these general principles forward. The *SDS* activist K. D. Wolff argued for an explicitly anti-parliamentary politics, whereas Klaus Meschkat, a member of the Republican Club, argued in favour of a model of *Rätedemokratie*, a form of democracy from below through delegated councillors modelled upon the workers’ and soldiers’ councils of the early twentieth century.³ For some activists, the events around 1968 brought experiences of personal insecurity and fear—for example, because their personal relationships broke down, as they committed themselves fully to political campaigning: the complete merger between politics and private emotion therefore left little space for intimacy. The result was a yearning for the warmth of personal belonging and community.⁴

Britain, where the boundaries of the political were already less starkly drawn in the early 1960s, did not see the same kind of productive and public merger of culture and politics around a single movement, while the British politics of security saw essentially the same developments as the West German movement—a pluralization of groupings, together with a sustained and intensive discussion about the relationship between politics and culture. Although 1967 and 1968 were similarly eventful, and although many activists engaged constructively and adapted the cognitive frameworks of their European and especially West German counterparts, the protests remained seemingly

localized: no single frame emerged that could have tied these different strands together by making the issues under discussion more generally relevant politically. The discussions about student participation in university government, though often seen as a general trend, still remained by and large issues that mattered differently for different institutions.⁵ And, although some commentators linked the local protests to a larger pattern of protests worldwide, the seeming peacefulness of the events of 1967–68 appeared to corroborate interpretations that British developments were peculiar: protests had not led to a breakdown of public order, and there was a relative lack of violence. This **(p. 278)** encouraged a framing of protests as primarily local and worked against a sustained framing, by the mass media, of these protests as part of a larger social movement.

Unlike in West Germany, most British protests in the 1960s unfolded not within a national political frame of reference, but within the remit of university-specific issues. It was therefore possible for each strand to ‘keep reinventing itself at the grass roots without ever becoming effectively integrated into wider political alliances’.⁶ The first protests broke out at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1966 when the school announced that Walter Adams, who had been director of University College, Rhodesia, and had backed the apartheid regime at his home institution, would become the new director of the school. This happened without proper consultation of the student body, so that issues of intra-university democracy were linked to issues of the lingering imperialism of British politics and culture.⁷

Students at the LSE drew parallels with the Berkeley sit-ins in 1964, and the presence of Marshall Bloom at the LSE, an American student who had been involved in the US civil rights movement, helped to cement these networks more tangibly.⁸ Over the course of 1968, student protests also took place at Sussex, where fifty students burned a US flag. Moreover, there was a sit-in at Leeds ‘against the visit of the right-wing conservative MP Patrick Wall’ to the campus, and students at Oxford occupied the Clarendon Building.⁹ Similarly, around 500 students occupied the administration building at Hull, and a number of students came out to heckle Secretary of Defence Denis Healey when he visited Cambridge University. Leicester and Hornsey Arts School also saw protests.¹⁰ The VSC organized a number of increasingly violent demonstrations in London over the course of 1967 and 1968 to respond to the escalation and intensification of the US war effort. Some 5,000 people attended the rally on 2 July 1967, and there were thirty-one arrests after small-scale **(p.279)** fights with the police.¹¹ Another demonstration took place on 22 October that attracted between 4,000 and 8,000 protesters with forty-seven arrests made.¹² The largest and most violent protest took place in front of the American Embassy in London on 17 March 1968 and was inspired directly by a similar protest in West Berlin a few weeks before.¹³ Of the 10,000–20,000 activists, 300 were arrested, and thirty-six were injured by baton charges and mounted

police.¹⁴ Protesters themselves noted the variety of aims behind the façade of the anti-Vietnam War protests in London in spring and autumn 1968, and some were worried to be seen as making common cause with violent factions within the movement.¹⁵ Media representations of the protests worked further to diminish such an interpretation: unlike in West Germany or in the United States, the mass media did not interpret the British protests as part of a global revolution. Rather, they diagnosed a spot of 'me-too-ism' among British students, who were merely 'looking for a grievance' to protest against.¹⁶

The anti-imperialist theme never developed into a master frame for all protests, as debates at the arts schools at Hornsey and Guildford focused on student representation and specific conditions at those institutions, whereas discussions at Hull and Essex tried to connect a generally anti-imperialist agenda with specific local issues.¹⁷ In May 1968, for example, a group of Essex students disrupted lectures by T. A. Inch, a specialist in germ warfare, in order to highlight the 'militarization' of British universities and demonstrate how British research might be related to the conduct of the Vietnam War.¹⁸

Given that they could not develop a common framing of their activities, the protests remained more or less isolated incidents that could not generate a general thrust or momentum. Another factor was that activists continued to be, on balance, less sceptical towards party politics, with most of them still supporters of the Labour Party.¹⁹ Not least, there was no fundamental sense, as there existed in West Germany, among extra-parliamentary protesters that Harold Wilson's policies of technocratic (**p.280**) planning would lead to the establishment of an authoritarian regime that would violate the viability of democracy and the moral integrity of the individual: Britain's lack of a recent authoritarian (albeit not necessarily unblemished) past and the lack of a simultaneous sustained discussion of the militarization of British society in the context of emergency legislation worked against the emergence of such a framework of interpretation.²⁰ The dynamics of events in Britain worked further against a more large-scale mobilization. The protests in May 1968 appeared to indicate to British activists that demonstrations could be a powerful means for overthrowing the political system. But this motivation occurred at a time when the French movement was already in decline, so that it could provide no further inspiration.²¹

Some British activists interpreted this seeming lack of a movement as an expression of political apathy: 'virtually all intelligent and worthwhile debate . . . still takes place among relatively small groups in an atmosphere of comparative privacy.'²² Others, like E. P. Thompson, reacted by using the standard tropes of cultural critique and by classifying the transformation of the politics of security away from more expressly political aims as 'psychic self-mutilation . . . self-absorbed, self-inflating and self-dramatising. *Very* like Methodist revivalism.'²³ Some reacted by wishing to awaken students' revolutionary consciousness. By

the mid-1960s, there were still thousands of activists in the revolutionary left who looked for socio-economic roots of the arms race.²⁴ Factions such as the International Marxist Group (IMG) replaced the metaphysics of labour with an emphasis on students as 'the new revolutionary vanguard'.²⁵ Accordingly, IMG activists joined some *New Left Review* activists in establishing the Revolutionary Socialist Students' Federation (RSSF) in June 1968 in order to instil the spontaneity of student activism with some revolutionary consciousness.²⁶

(p.281) Hence, when activists in Britain reflected on their experiences in extra-parliamentary politics after 1968, they did not see a future determined by a series of social movements in key areas. Instead, they argued, like the authors of the May Day Manifesto (with contributions from Michael Barratt Brown, Raymond Williams, and others) that was written by a number of New Left activists in 1968: 'The key to our future, I firmly believe, is the extension of politics beyond the routines of the parliamentary process, as CND, more than any other movement has already shown to be possible.'²⁷ Thus, the key idea to come out of the British politics of security was to try to implement the kinds of politics that the New Left had started in the early 1960s.²⁸

But by spring 1969, the 'euphoria of May '68 had metamorphosed into "the past"', and the memory of the experiences of the late 1960s became a driving force for the campaigns of the 1970s.²⁹ Activists sought to do this by working in local campaigns to fight poverty or to work for affordable housing in the big cities, campaigns that were coordinated by the national convention of the left that was set up in April 1969. The most significant of these new departures was, however, a regrouping of the feminist movement, and the emergence of gay and lesbian activism: as women participated in the politics of culture over the course of the 1960s and gradually discovered their selfhood, they also became aware of the gendered structure of extra-parliamentary politics where they were responsible for specifically female tasks, such as typing, cooking, and some of the organizational work, but were more or less ignored by their male counterparts when they wished to participate in discussions about ideology and strategy.

These moves, especially among feminists and gay activists, sought to redefine the politics of security in terms of a politics of individual liberation as the root for societal transformation. In Britain, whereas many previous campaigns had posited a model of society that was characterized by a dialectic between the socio-economic base and the political and ideological superstructure, these movements now argued, following the psychological insights of R. D. Laing and others and reflecting on the new culture of subjectivity in counter-culture that had emerged over the course **(p.282)** of the 1960s, that individual and society were superimposed upon, and read through, one other. Therapeutic activism was now the appropriate form of politics, prompting individuals to analyze how enmeshed they were both structurally and ideologically within the structures of

power and violence in their society.³⁰ The movements that emerged in Britain from the 1960s were, therefore, no longer campaigns or pressure groups, but worked primarily in the cultural field.

In West Germany, the period after 1968 saw the break-up of the extra-parliamentary opposition. The events alone could no longer conceal the growing rifts between the different sections of the movement.³¹ In October 1969, the former socialist Willy Brandt, who had to flee Nazi Germany and take exile in Norway, became the first social democrat to lead the federal government in West Germany. Although most activists had not reconciled themselves with the *SPD*, Brandt's election and his commitment, expressed in his inaugural address, to 'dare more democracy' made interpretations of a gradual re-Nazification of West German politics implausible.³²

As the organizational coherence had already suffered before 1967, there now emerged a plethora of small groups that sought to continue the work of the sections of the extra-parliamentary opposition.³³ The most tangible effect was the growth of a women's movement when, at the Federation's 23rd delegate conference in September 1968, Helke Sander put forward a fundamental critique of the male structure of authority within the *SDS*. Hans-Jürgen Krahl, who chaired the discussion, simply ignored her. When Sander hurled six tomatoes at him, calling him a counter-revolutionary, a separate women's caucus was formed. This was the origins of the West German women's movement.³⁴

What united all these groupings was that they rested on a novel conception of the political: the creation of spaces that enabled critical thinking and action. Politics itself now appeared to be both a productive process (**p.283**) and a process of production, where the representation of experiences rather than political opinions was paramount.³⁵ Spaces here were not merely geographical locations, but also relational networks between people.³⁶ The Young Socialists' 1969 slogan 'Don't leave politics to the politicians' summed up this sentiment.³⁷ In their very different ways, these groupings carried the ethico-political objectives that had driven the Easter Marchers into the 1970s. While some organizations, such as the Red Army Faction and some hard-core communist groups, sought to develop revolutionary and even violent forms of bonding, most of these groups advocated ideals of authenticity and autonomous life forms as key.³⁸ They focused on practices of living together in the present, rather than on creating the conditions where this might happen after a revolutionary transformation of society.³⁹ For example, a movement sprang up to organize children's nurseries away from the churches and the state sector in order to practise such novel ways of engagement from early childhood. First tried out spontaneously at the West Berlin International Vietnam Congress in 1968, the movement is an especially good example of this transformation towards framings and conceptualizations of democracy as a form of 'intimacy'. Till van Rahden has identified this transformation as a key shift in the culture of politics

in post-war West Germany.⁴⁰ The *Sozialistisches Büro* (*SB*, Socialist Office) is one of the clearest examples for this redefinition of the political within the politics of security. The *SB* had come out of attempts by a group of Easter March organizers and activists with socialist youth movement backgrounds, such as Klaus Vack, Herbert Stubenrauch, Heiner Halberstadt, Arno Klönne, and Christel Beilmann. The group sought to redefine the ground on which extra-parliamentary politics would take place after the Easter March movement had been abandoned following the last marches over Easter 1969. In July 1970, these activists therefore agreed to dissolve the central Easter March committee and create a **(p.284)** new forum for a range of different forms of political engagement.⁴¹ As protest activity had moved elsewhere, the Aldermaston Marches in Britain took place in a different format in 1964 and 1965 and were then discontinued. They were revived again in 1972 in the context of campaigns for a final US withdrawal from Vietnam.

Such an 'organization' was no longer oriented towards creating an efficient mass base for revolutionary transformation, but instead provided a loose *forum* for exchanges and encounters that would allow the free discussion of different social and political interests from below and outside bureaucratic routines and restrictions. Its focus was not on creating a collective *identity* of interests. Instead, it was to provide a space from which a 'political morality of action' could be realized—and where Max Weber's distinction between an 'ethics of responsibility', as practised by politicians in the context of governmental bureaucracies, and an 'ethics of intention', as practised by those who wanted to do good outside these restrictions, were no longer opposed to each other. Instead, activists began to conceptualize these two ideal types as two sides of the same coin, as they reflected on the ways in which they quite literally produced their politics and as the form of organization would reflect the moral intentions—the self-organized politics from below was, therefore, both the form of this new politics, but also its main moral and political purpose. Instead of trying to channel experiences through an organization, groups such as the *SB*, wanted to accept experiences as given and deal creatively with their plurality.⁴² Such groups became part of one densely networked milieu, with 11,500 alternative projects existing across West Germany by the early 1980s.⁴³ Within these groups, the cipher '1968' became a code through which the former activists could discuss the meaning of their activism as well as their experiences of hopes and disappointments in achieving security.⁴⁴

In Britain and West Germany, the politics of security had now come full circle. It now encompassed both international relations and issues of **(p.285)** social security, as well as security against terrorists and personal security. The former activists had begun their 'long march through the institutions' in which they tried to make 'subversive use of the contradictions and possibilities in and outside the state-social apparatus as a whole, in order to destroy it within a long process'.⁴⁵ Yet, state institutions reacted by developing broader notions of

security that resembled those of the activists by resting on perceptions of selfhood and on self-control.⁴⁶ In the guise of 'human security', such ideas are used in the early twenty-first century to justify military interventions outside Europe in the name of 'humanitarian' values and goals.⁴⁷ The mass violence and the bombing warfare of the Second World War were no longer the key reference points for comprehending the cold war arms race. Attention had now shifted towards one key feature of the cold war: the United States. It appeared to be the root cause for the origins and continuation of the cold war, and the use of its military highlighted the real violence of the cold war. From this perspective, the United States *was* the cold war. The multiple endings of the politics of security that had begun in 1945 in the shadow of the violence of the Second World War were also new beginnings.

Notes:

(¹) HIS, TEM 400, 05: Helmut Schauer, 'Arbeitsthesen über die Probleme der Opposition', Easter March Central Committee, minutes, 18-19 February 1967.

(²) HIS, TEM 400,05: Easter March Central Committee, minutes, 16-17 September 1967; *Extradienst*, 17 January 1968, 3-4.

(³) Cited in *apo/IZA*, 54 (1968), 11, 12.

(⁴) Citing from his diary: Schneider, *Rebellion und Wahn*, 13, 285. Cf. also Lethen, *Handorakel*, 75.

(⁵) Nick Thomas, 'Challenging Myths of the 1960s: The Case of Student Protest in Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 13 (2002), 277-97.

(⁶) Alistair J. Reid, 'The Dialectics of Liberation: The Old Left, the New Left and the Counter-Culture', in David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (eds), *Structures and Transformations in Modern British History* (Cambridge, 2011), 261-80, here 280.

(⁷) See the overview in Ralf Dahrendorf, *LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895-1995* (Oxford, 1995), 443-71; Tessa Blackstone et al., *Students in Conflict: L.S.E. in 1967* (London, 1970).

(⁸) Ben Brewster and Alexander Cockburn, 'Revolt at the LSE', *New Left Review*, 43 (May-June 1967), 11-25.

(⁹) *The Times*, 4 May 1968, 1; Nick Thomas, 'Challenging Myths of the 1960s: The Case of Student Protest in Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 13 (2002), 277-97, here 284.

(¹⁰) David Triesman, 'Essex', *New Left Review*, 50 (July-August 1968), 70-2; Tom Fawthrop, 'Hull', *New Left Review*, 50 (July-August 1968), 59-64; *The Times*, 8 and 9 March 1968.

(¹¹) *VSC Bulletin*, 6 (July–August 1967), 1.

(¹²) Thomas, 'Myths', 289.

(¹³) Ali, *Street fighting Years*, 239–46.

(¹⁴) *The Guardian*, 18 March 1968, 1, 3.

(¹⁵) MRC, MSS 21/3369/29: October 27 Ad Hoc Committee, 'Briefing to all Demonstrators: "Street Power" ' [printed leaflet].

(¹⁶) *The Guardian*, 10 June 1968, 8.

(¹⁷) Lisa Tickner, *Hornsey 1968: The Art School Revolution* (London, 2008).

(¹⁸) Triesman, 'Essex', 70–1.

(¹⁹) *Student Demonstrations: A Gallup Poll Inquiry with Students at two Universities, Cambridge and Sussex, Undertaken for the Daily Telegraph Magazine* (May 1968), questions 8 and 9.

(²⁰) Sylvia Ellis, '“A Demonstration of British Good Sense?” British Student Protest during the Vietnam War', in Gerard J. de Groot (ed.), *Student Protest: The Sixties and after* (London, 1998), 54–69. Cf., by contrast, 'Notstand—Ende aller Sicherheit', *Der Spiegel*, 11 April 1966, 37–61.

(²¹) Sheila Rowbotham, *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (Harmondsworth, 1973), 24.

(²²) *Ripple*, 12 January 1967, 3, cited from Thomas, 'Myths', 282.

(²³) In a letter to Sheila Rowbotham in March 1968, cited in Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 169.

(²⁴) John Callaghan, *The Far Left in British Politics* (Oxford, 1987); Avishai Zvi Ehrlich, 'The Leninist Organisations in Britain and the Student Movement 1966–1972' (PhD, University of London, 1981), especially 52.

(²⁵) *Black Dwarf*, 5 July 1968, 1; *Black Dwarf*, 15 October 1968, 1; Gareth Stedman Jones, 'The Meaning of the Student Revolt', in Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn (eds), *Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action* (Harmondsworth, 1969), 25–56.

(²⁶) Cf. Marcus Collins and Willie Thompson, 'The Revolutionary Left and the Permissive Society', in Marcus Collins (ed.), *The Permissive Society and its Enemies: Sixties British Culture* (London, 2007), 155–68.

(²⁷) Cited in Alan O'Connor, *Raymond Williams: Writing, Culture, Politics* (London, 1989), 20.

(²⁸) Fred Inglis, *Raymond Williams* (London, 1995), 196–209; John Davis and Anette Waring, 'Living Utopia. Communal Living in Denmark and Britain', *Cultural and Social History*, 8 (2012), 513–30, especially 520–4.

(²⁹) Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*, 224; on the variety of movements in Britain, see Adam Lent, *British Social Movements since 1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power* (Basingstoke, 2002).

(³⁰) R. D. Laing, 'The Obvious', in David Cooper (ed.), *Dialects of Liberation* (Harmondsworth, 1968), 13–33; Lucy Robinson, 'Three Revolutionary Years: The Impact of the Counter Culture on the Development of the Gay Liberation Movement in Britain', *Cultural and Social History*, 3 (2006), 445–71, here 455.

(³¹) *Extradienst*, 17 January 1968, 3–4.

(³²) On the Brandt government's democratic agenda, see Bernd Faulenbach, *Das sozialdemokratische Jahrzehnt: Von der Reformeuphorie zur Neuen Unübersichtlichkeit: Die SPD 1969–1982* (Bonn, 2011), 39–79.

(³³) Rainer Paris, 'Der kurze Atem der Provokation', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 41 (1989), 33–52.

(³⁴) Kristina Schulz, *Der lange Atem der Provokation: Die Frauenbewegung in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich 1968–1976* (Frankfurt/Main, 2002), 81; Sarah Haffner, 'Die Kunst als Weg zu sich selbst', in Ute Kätzel (ed.), *Die 68erinnen: Porträt einer rebellischen Frauengeneration* (Berlin, 2002), 141–60, here 151.

(³⁵) 'Kurzprotokoll über die Sitzung des Zentralen Ausschusses der KfDA', 29–30 June 1968, 2, cited in Otto (ed.), APO, 357.

(³⁶) Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, *1968: Eine Zeitreise* (Frankfurt/Main, 2008), 100–2; Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig: Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht* (Göttingen, 2001), 158.

(³⁷) Johano Strasser, *Als wir noch Götter waren im Mai: Erinnerungen* (Munich, 2007), 129–30.

(³⁸) Andreas Buro, *Gewaltlos gegen den Krieg: Lebenserinnerungen eines Pazifisten* (Frankfurt/Main, 2011), 127–8.

(³⁹) Sven Reichhardt and Detlef Siegfried, 'Das Alternative Milieu. Konturen einer Lebensform', in Reichhardt and Siegfried (eds), *Das Alternative Milieu: Antibürgerlicher Lebensstil und linke Politik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Europa 1968–1983* (Göttingen, 2010), 9–24.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ Berliner Kinderläden, *Antiautoritäre Erziehung und sozialistischer Kampf*, 2nd edn (Cologne, 1970) 15–17; for the general context, see Rahden, ‘Clumsy Democrats’.

⁽⁴¹⁾ Letter cited in Vack, ‘Versuch, Geschichte und Erfahrung darzustellen: Mehr als biographische Daten, weniger als eine Lebensgeschichte’, in Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (ed.), *Tradition heißt nicht, Asche aufheben, sondern die Flamme am Brennen erhalten!* (Sensbachtal, 1985), 151–225, here 194. On the historical genealogies of these debates, see the pathbreaking study by Karrin Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* (Cambridge, 2012), ch. 4.

⁽⁴²⁾ Oskar Negt, *Keine Demokratie ohne Sozialismus: Über den Zusammenhang von Politik, Geschichte und Moral* (Frankfurt/Main, 1976), 11, 300–12.

⁽⁴³⁾ Sven Reichhardt and Detlef Siegfried, ‘Das Alternative Milieu. Konturen einer Lebensform’, in Reichhardt and Siegfried (eds), *Das Alternative Milieu*, 11.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Detlev Claussen, ‘Chiffre 68’, in Dietrich Harth and Jan Assmann (eds), *Revolution und Mythos* (Frankfurt/Main, 1992), 219–28; Wolfgang Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur* (Hamburg, 2000).

⁽⁴⁵⁾ Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch*, 22–3; Belinda Davis, ‘Jenseits von Terror und Rückzug: Die Suche nach politischem Spielraum und Strategien im Westdeutschland der siebziger Jahre’, in Klaus Weinhauer, Jörg Requate, and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), *Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik: Medien, Staat und Subkulturen in den siebziger Jahren* (Frankfurt/Main, 2006), 154–86.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Holger Nehring, ‘The Era of Non-Violence: “Terrorism” in West German, Italian and French Political Culture, 1968–1982’, *European Review of History*, 14 (2007), 343–71; Christoph Gusy and Gerhard Nitz, ‘Vom Legitimationswandel staatlicher Sicherheitsfunktionen’, in Hans-Jürgen Lange (ed.), *Kontinuitäten und Brüche: Staat, Demokratie und Innere Sicherheit in Deutschland* (Leverkusen, 1999), 335–54.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Christopher Daase, ‘Sicherheitskultur: Ein Konzept zur interdisziplinären Erforschung politischen und sozialen Wandels’, *Sicherheit und Frieden*, 29 (2011), 59–65.

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