# Identifying the Protests and the Protest-Makers

Holger Nehring

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter is about the origins of the anti-nuclear-weapons campaigns in both countries, the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the West German Campaign against Atomic Death and the Easter Marches. It analyses the most basic processes of identification of the movements by examining the campaigns' origins, their socio-structural composition, as well as the ways in which contemporary observers made sense of them. Its purpose is to provide a broad overview of the campaigns' histories and to lay the ground for a more detailed investigation of activism. While the social structures of the supporters of both movements appear to have been remarkably similar, the campaigns acquired very different political resonances

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It was only in the late 1950s that the British and West German publics became aware of the importance of the nuclear arms race for the cold war. This constellation provided the ground from which the various campaigns could conceive of their scattered activities as movements. And it linked the British and West German protests together in the same historical conjuncture. This chapter analyses the most basic processes of identification of the movements by examining the campaigns' origins, their socio-structural composition as well as the ways in which contemporary observers made sense of them. Its purpose is to provide a broad overview of the campaigns' histories and to lay the ground for a more detailed investigation of activism. While the social structures of the

supporters of both movements appear to have been remarkably similar, the campaigns acquired very different political resonances.

## The Development of the Anti-Nuclear-Weapons Campaigns

In 1956, the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), founded by a group of non-violent pacifists inspired by Gandhi's campaigns in 1930s' India, first galvanized public scepticism towards nuclear weapons in general and the acquisition of British hydrogen bombs in particular.[1] It concentrated on lobbying, but never became a movement. In spring 1957, an Emergency Committee for Direct Action against Nuclear War (the Direct Action Committee (DAC)) was founded to support pacifist Harold Steele's attempt to sail into the Pacific in protest against British H-bomb tests.[2] The DAC also developed plans for **(p.64)** further protests, such as a march between the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, and London.[3] Its roots lay in the divisions within the ailing Peace Pledge Union (PPU) and attempts since the late 1940s and early 1950s to give pacifism a new meaning by reviving Gandhian traditions of non-violent direct action.[4] In the Federal Republic, a group of scientists from Göttingen University pointed out the dangers of nuclear weapons by criticizing Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's use of language. He had, following NATO terminology, compared tactical nuclear weapons to an advanced and 'modern' form of artillery and had justified the possible equipment of the West German army with the need to keep the young armed forces up to date.[5]

The year 1958 saw the emergence of movements in both countries that formulated security policies that differed from that of the governments. In January 1958, a number of political, religious, and literary intellectuals came together in the flat of Canon John Collins of London's St Paul's Cathedral and discussed ways to prevent the 'universal apocalypse' that the writer J. B. Priestley had predicted in an article in the *New Statesman* in November 1957.[6] The article had generated an overwhelming response by *New Statesman* readers, to which two specific factors had contributed. First, Aneurin Bevan, the standard bearer of the Labour Left, had just abandoned the unilateralist camp of the Labour Party, which argued that the decisive gesture of Britain's nuclear disarmament could guarantee national security. Bevan now supported multilateral disarmament through the United Nations framework, which ultimately depended on Soviet consent at international conferences. After the Labour Left had lost its strongest champion, the chances that the Party—and indeed any party in Britain—would represent unilateral disarmament as its official defence policy at a general election had, therefore, become rather slim.[7]

The second factor that prompted the meeting was that the American foreign-policy expert and former ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan had advocated nuclear disarmament in Europe in his BBC Reith lectures: this had given the topic further resonance.[8] Not least, in the subsequent time period, with the obsolescence of Britain's V-bomber force in an age **(p.65)** of

intercontinental missiles, the cancellation of the *Blue Streak* and Anglo-American *Skybolt* programmes and the signing of a contract to acquire the submarine-based nuclear missile *Polaris* from the United States, it became clear that what the Macmillan government claimed was Britain's 'independent deterrent' was in fact quite dependent on American technology and expertise.[9]

On 28 January 1958, this group of intellectuals named themselves the 'Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament' or CND. There now existed a campaign that expressed the manifold fears of the British population about nuclear war. The DAC had never been able to gain much support within the British population, as its spectacular forms of attracting attention were not to most people's liking. By contrast, the response to CND was staggering. When the Campaign went public on 17 February 1958 with a meeting in Methodist Central Hall, Westminster, the room could not hold everyone who had gathered, and overflow facilities had to be organized.[10] People's experiences of the nuclear age had now, for the first time in Europe, been translated into a political movement.[11] Apart from staging many local protests, the supporters came together, from 1958, at the annual marches between the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (in Berkshire), and London. The idea for such a march had come from the DAC, and there had been considerable debate among CND's organizers whether the Campaign should participate in such a march. Ever since, however, the marches have become fixed dates in the annual calendar of political events in Britain, although they were suspended for some time from the mid-1960s into the 1970s. While differing in nuances, all these supporters fundamentally agreed that the security of the British people could be guaranteed only if their government unilaterally renounced its nuclear weapons.

On 12 October 1960, a group with links to the DAC split off from CND. Its focus was no longer on the Labour Party and pressure-group politics. Instead, the activists propagated the use of mass non-violent disobedience and direct action in order to communicate security issues. The new group called itself the Committee of 100 after 'the Guelphs and Ghibellines with their Council of 100'.[12] Its symbol and figurehead was **(p.66)** the philosopher Bertrand Russell, who resigned from his CND presidency after a public row with Canon Collins.[13] Although C100 never had a large support base, it attracted significant media attention through its unconventional campaigns, such as the occupation of military bases.[14]

Across the Channel, in the Federal Republic, experiences of the nuclear age and the desires for security also found their expression in a new political movement. A smaller-scale movement emerged in the mid-1950s, but never had any major prominence. The *Kampfbund gegen Atomschäden* (Fighting League against Atomic Damages) was founded by the head consultant of the Detmold hospital, Dr Bodo Manstein, and was a curious assembly of ex-National Socialists and left-wing national-neutralists. It maintained close links with existing veterans'

organizations, such as the *Verband der Kriegsbeschädigten, Kriegshinterbliebenen und Kriegsrentner* and the *Deutsche Volksgesundheits-Bewegung*, and launched its own journal, *Das Gewissen* (The Conscience), in mid-1956, edited by the former left-wing Social Democrat, Communist, and Dachau inmate Wolfgang Bartels.[15]

After a parliamentary debate on nuclear weapons on 23 January 1958, the opposition Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (*SPD*)) decided to organize a general campaign 'to enlighten the public' about the dangers nuclear weapons posed for the security of the whole German nation.[16] As the Christian Democrats had an absolute majority in the *Bundestag*, the West German parliament, and an effective opposition in parliament was therefore difficult, the *SPD*'s executive moved into the extra-parliamentary arena in order to mobilize what they thought was the silent majority of the German population. Unlike in Britain, the first extra-parliamentary protests in West Germany depended on the organizational capacities and legitimacy of a political party. While the movement issued its first public announcements in late February and early March 1958, the first public meeting took place in Frankfurt deliberately on 23 March 1958, the anniversary of Hitler's Enabling Act and the date for another parliamentary debate on nuclear weapons.[17] The Campaign against Atomic Death (*Kampagne Kampf dem Atomtod* (*KdA*)) was born. After this event, the local party organizations founded branches across the Federal Republic as regional and local committees were set up, by and large under the auspices of the *SPD* and the Federation of German **(p.67)** Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (*DGB*)). There were no central protest events as in Britain, but the many local and regional committees organized their own protests in close coordination with the *KdA*'s Bonn headquarters.[18] Vigils and demonstrations took place across the country in spring and early summer 1958. In May, the *SPD* launched a campaign for state-level plebiscites against the purchase of nuclear-capable equipment for the German army. Prompted by the *SPD*'s campaign, the Munich writer and essayist Hans Werner Richter set up an independent Committee against Atomic Armaments (*Komitee gegen Atomrüstung*), which attracted the support of the local educated bourgeoisie and came to function as the Bavarian branch of the Campaign against Atomic Death.[19]

Yet the *SPD* soon abandoned the campaign, after the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled its plans for plebiscites incompatible with the Basic Law and after its hopes for electoral gains in the state elections of North Rhine Westphalia in July 1958 had not paid off.[20] Although the movement continued to exist on paper, it no longer planned and staged major protests.[21] But the issue of nuclear weapons had become no less pressing, and observing the British example kept the West German movement alive. A small group of pacifists from the Hamburg area who had attended the 1959 Aldermaston March decided to look for a German Aldermaston. On Easter Friday 1960, some hundred people

marched from different locations in northern Germany to the British weapons base Bergen Hohne, close to the site of the Bergen Belsen concentration camp. The 'Easter Marches of Nuclear Weapons Opponents' were born and, from 1961, took place all over the Federal Republic.[22] Like in Britain, it was mainly through media reports that the protest events turned into a seemingly coherent protest movement.

Throughout, the British and West German movements maintained their momentum by adapting to developments in foreign policy and **(p.68)** international relations: while the movements were initially concerned with rather narrow issues of national defence and foreign policy, they came to broaden their approach. With the announcement by the United States and by the Soviet Union to stop atmospheric nuclear tests in 1959, this issue fell out of view. Both movements staged protests when France began atmospheric testing in the Sahara in 1960, when the USSR resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in 1961, and when the USA followed with a resumption of its nuclear weapons tests in 1962.[23]

The Cuba crisis in autumn 1962 was a particular turning point for CND.[24] It led to a reformulation and clarification of the CND programme as 'Steps towards Peace': the crisis had shown that 'Great Britain was inevitably involved in any nuclear crisis', with its commitments to NATO and its nuclear bases. On the one hand, the new programme was presented as a move away from more radical proposals towards disarmament and towards programmes of controlling the arms race. On the other hand, CND continued to advocate Britain's immediate unilateral nuclear disarmament and now included a call for the withdrawal from 'nuclear alliances'.[25] The official West German Easter March announcements regarded the Cuba crisis as a reaffirmation of their goal of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of creating nuclear-free zones, not only in Europe, but all over the world. In the end, 'reason had won: but what kind of reason is it which was born only out of fear of mutual annihilation?'[26] Like the crises over Berlin in winter 1958–59 and in August 1961, Cuba had shown that additional efforts towards atomic armaments in areas close to the superpowers brought not more security but 'catastrophic insecurity'.[27]

The Social Structures of Support

The historian who approaches the movements will find that diversity was their main feature. And, indeed, the movements stressed that they represented 'people from all walks of life'.[28] Activists and supporters came **(p.69)** from groups that are usually not regarded as having features in common: atheist or agnostic socialists and Christians, communists and nationalists, pacifists, anarchists, and trade-union leaders and generally liberally minded citizens. And there were almost as many different reasons for people joining as there were activists. In fact, it was only when confronted with the question of nuclear weapons that the activists came to assert their experiences explicitly with

reference to what they regarded as their main social reference points. At the same time, this emergence of experiences allowed them to identify common concerns. The experiences themselves thus simultaneously shaped and were moulded by the politics of security.

Probing the actual support base of both movements is, therefore, extremely difficult. First, there are general problems of interpretation. Sociological studies are usually embedded in specific methodological assumptions that significantly influence the selection and representation of data.[29] In particular, concepts of 'class' and social stratification are so closely connected to specific cultural assumptions about politics and society that a meaningful comparison from a macro-sociological angle is not sensible. Moreover, the existing evidence is rather sketchy. Neither movement initially had an official membership. In Britain, it was not introduced until the mid-1960s to inject money into an impoverished campaign, and in West Germany it was never introduced, for fear of organizational sclerosis.[30]

Bearing these restrictions in mind, it is nevertheless possible to come to some general conclusions about movement support in both countries. The movements' social composition was quite similar. The supporters in both countries and the members of the movements were mostly middle class, better educated and younger than the average population, with the average age of supporters falling over time. Young CND activists in particular tended to be better educated than the national average and came from wealthier families, with 55 per cent receiving full-time education and 48 per cent with a grammar-school background.[31] Yet neither CND nor its West German counterparts were ever 'youth movements'.[32]

 (p.70)  According to an informal poll at the Easter March in the Ruhr area, the bulk of activists were 'employees' (*Angestellte*, essentially 'white-collar workers'), followed by 'academics' (22 per cent); 15 per cent were self-employed, 13 per cent were civil servants (*Beamte*); 11 per cent were 'workers' and only 11 per cent classified themselves as students; 76 per cent were between 25 and 50 years of age; only 19 per cent were under 25; and only 5 per cent were over 50.[33] This low involvement of 'young people' in the West German protests was in tune with the very low-level political engagement of people under 30 in extra-parliamentary politics. Similarly, a contemporary British opinion poll showed that unilateral disarmament came to the bottom of the list of problems felt by British youth.[34] Nonetheless, CND's organizer Peggy Duff recalled in her memoirs how vibrant CND was in university cities, such as Oxford and Cambridge.[35] Despite these broad similarities in age structures, there were, however, striking differences in the patterns of age distribution. In Britain, young people up to 30 and activists over 60 were over-represented in comparison to those aged between 30 and 60.[36] In West Germany, by contrast, the age cohort of those born in the late 1920s and early 1930s—that is, those

aged between 30 and 40—dominated, whereas protesters above the age of 65 made up but a tiny proportion of all activists.[37] Women made up about half of the protesters in both countries, but, with a few exceptions such as Peggy Duff in CND and Christel Beilmann in the Easter Marches in the Ruhr area, never assumed organizational roles equivalent to their social representation within the movement. Duff recalls in her memoirs that she was exposed to frequent ridicule about her brash behaviour from her male colleagues.[38] The case of female participation in the British and West German movements thus affords a unique insight into the limits to the emergence of experiences. While women did participate in the movements, they only rarely voiced their concerns *as women*. The activists' rhetoric at the time remained remarkably gender neutral (very much in opposition to the connections of 'peace' issues with particularly motherly concerns in the GDR). Specifically female experiences thus remained **(p.71)** inaudible and frequently invisible at the time, and it was only with hindsight that female activists constructed their subjectivity in explicitly female terms.[39]

Most activists had what one could describe as a broadly left-wing and progressive outlook: according to one survey, 78 per cent of the 1958 British marchers read the *Manchester Guardian*, 80 per cent the *Observer*, and 53 per cent the *New Statesman*.[40] Sociology students were particularly prominent among the British protesters.[41] We do not have comparable data for West Germany, but it is likely, given the involvement of many *SPD* members in the movement, that the picture was broadly similar. West German activists also tended to come from families with, politically speaking, liberal views who had been previously involved in politics.

Both the West German and British movements attracted a significant number of Christians. CND has been described as an 'amateur alliance of Christian and humanist radicals'.[42] Similarly, the West German Campaign against Atomic Death and, even more so, the Easter Marches became a form of secular–religious pilgrimages.[43] Clergymen and lay Christians played an important role in CND, perhaps a much more important one than in the Federal Republic. Canon Collins, the Revd Michael Scott, and the Methodist Donald Soper were the three most prominent. The Welsh CND in particular drew on many clergymen when advertising its activities. Kingsley Martin, Edward P. Thompson, and others came from nonconformist backgrounds, although they had secularized their inherited nonconformity. Ministers frequently served as chairmen or secretaries of local CND branches.[44] In West Germany, senior Protestant clergy, such as the Church President of Hesse-Nassau Martin Niemöller and the Dortmund Church President Heinrich Kloppenburg, were well represented in the Campaign against Atomic Death, but played less prominent roles in the Easter Marches.[45]

Frank Parkin's sociological research suggests that 40 per cent of former CND supporters were practising Christians, which exceeded the number of regular churchgoers. The peculiarity of CND was the strong representation **(p.72)** of activists from 'nonconformist' backgrounds, such as Methodists, Baptists, Quakers, and Unitarians, which could all look back on involvement in pacifist associations since the late eighteenth century.[46] Although Nonconformity had lost influence in British society as a whole by the early 1950s, individual nonconformists still played a prominent role within CND. Nonconformists among British protesters outweighed Anglicans significantly: 52 per cent were Free Church members (Quakers, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists), 34 per cent Anglicans, and 4 per cent Roman Catholics.[47] In a later survey, Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard found that 43 per cent of their sample 'strongly agreed with the Christian belief system', and 41 per cent identified themselves as practising Christians during this period. On the other hand, resistance towards the Campaign was also particularly pronounced amongst nonconformists. Of the 58 per cent who called themselves 'non-believers' in the survey, 19 per cent ranked themselves as 'agnostic', 15 per cent as 'atheist', and 15 per cent as 'humanist'.[48]

Similar information is not available for West Germany. There, the relatively small number of Catholics among the activists was particularly remarkable, although Catholics made up more than half of the West German population and although they were as concerned about nuclear weapons as West German Protestants.[49] Given the Pope's reluctance to condemn nuclear weapons, the extent to which Catholics opposed nuclear weapons is surprising. The real fault line in opinions had, therefore, less to do with confessional allegiances than with attachment to the institutional Church. 'Nominal' Protestant and Catholics (77 per cent and 76 per cent respectively) were more likely to be against nuclear weapons than churchgoers (67 per cent and 62 per cent respectively).[50] This was not only a case of Christians joining the campaign because they were Christians. Rather, the archives of the West German campaign contain fascinating letters by grass-roots supporters that show how they came to identify with the campaign by trying to **(p.73)** suture their own feelings and experiences to the emerging movements, as they did not see them represented in the organized churches or elsewhere in politics. These letters usually started by expressing the writer's 'shock' ('Erschütterung') about the 'events of recent years and decades' and were based on a vast amount of information that the writer had gleaned from reading illustrated magazines and newspapers. Fritz Haller from Aulendorf in Württemberg, a Protestant railway worker with only basic education, writing to the *KdA* head office in May 1960, thanked the 'anonymous people and friends' who were looking for solutions. He wrote that all human beings were united as 'God's children' and cited a number of Bible verses at the beginning of his letter. This issue, he claimed, thus also tied the 'whole of humanity together'. Politics was not, as some people argued, the problem—it did not spoil people's

characters. Rather, Haller regarded politics as the solution, as a good character could influence politics in good and moral ways.[51]

The fact that we do not have similar sources for the British campaign might well be the result of different archival cultures. But these archival cultures reflect, at least partly, the differences in the politicization of security in the two post-war societies. British protesters could draw on a number of already existing outlets for the protests and, importantly, had an awareness of the continuities of history and campaigns that they constantly renegotiated, but that they took for granted. In West Germany, however, supporters of the campaigns and activists had a more acute awareness for the work that was required to create social bonds, as they sought, perhaps more forcefully than their British counterparts, to write themselves into the continuity of national history, a process that was complicated further by the division of Germany. For West German activists, therefore, joining the campaign was very often also an exercise in actively expressing their democratic credentials and civility by actively producing structures of a self-consciously civilian society.[52] A letter by a Johannes Hauck from Munich to the 'most esteemed prime minister' of Bavaria from September 1958, marked 'confidential', highlights the self-awareness that campaigners had about this issue, as it drew on explicit comparisons with Britain. Instead of a party democracy, Hauck favoured a model tried out in Austria that brought all main parties together in order to achieve a true representation of popular opinion, so that Germany could make the transition from war to peace and solve 'the world-political dangers' of the time. Majority voting, by contrast, could not yet work in the Federal Republic, because, **(p.74)** in countries like Britain, where this system worked, it depended on the 'democratic and tolerant dispositions [*Gesinnung*] of its citizens'.[53]

Germans had an 'uncanny knowledge of what total annihilation was', and they knew that they could not control the violence unleashed by wars.[54] Although Britons shared in a fundamental scepticism towards their government's civil defence efforts, they were already able to form an ironic relationship with the issue, when a satirical defence advocate in the TV revue *Beyond the Fringe* in 1961, played by Peter Cook, concluded by advising viewers: 'There is nothing like a good old paper bag for protecting you.'[55]

Research on protest movements in other countries has highlighted that figures based on national reference points should be treated with care. The composition of local chapters, branches, and associations often differed markedly from the national averages. For Britain, this is particularly true for the Scottish CND, in which workers were much more strongly represented than in Britain as a whole. In particular, this was the case for the Glasgow and Clydeside areas, which had very strong working-class strongholds.[56] Although exact figures are lacking, it is likely that this is also true for certain regions within the Welsh coalfields. It is also likely that, because of the strong nonconformist traditions in Wales,

religious affiliation was higher there than the national average suggests.[57] For West Germany, we do not possess survey data on local and regional campaign groups. A private and unpublished survey, carried out by Hans-Karl Rupp in 1965, suggests, however, that, on average, young people were not as well represented on the regional and local levels as national surveys suggest. Only 11 per cent classified themselves as 'students' and 'young people'.[58]

Although these figures suggest general similarities, the movements differed significantly in how they represented public opinion. While British opinion polls never registered more than 35 per cent popular support among the population for unilateral nuclear disarmament throughout **(p.75)** this period, West German pollsters returned figures above 80 per cent.[59] On a superficial level, this reflected the fact that the issues had a different salience in each political system. CND's demand for unilateral nuclear disarmament was in content much more radical than the demands of the West German movements, as Britain already possessed nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, the West German protesters sought to forgo nuclear-capable equipment and to strive for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in central Europe. Indeed, the West German activists' demand for international disarmament was one to which even some of CND's fiercest opponents could subscribe.[60] Moreover, it was only logical that West Germans, living at the front line of the cold war in Europe, would perceive the threat from nuclear weapons in much more dramatic and immediate terms, a fact driven home by the gloomy title 'Campaign against Atomic Death'.

Differences in the ways in which different sections of society were represented highlight the complexities and ambiguities in the resonances of both campaigns. The sociological structure of the British movement reflected trends in British opinion polls much more directly than the sociological structure of the West German movement did West German ones. Polls compiled by different institutions show that Adenauer's policy of atomic armament was least rejected among those groups in the West German population as a whole most active in the movement: the younger and more educated sections of society (some 60 per cent opposed). Opposition to nuclear armaments was particularly pronounced among those who were under-represented in the movement: workers (between 80 and 90 per cent).[61]

These different figures reflect a fundamental difference between processes of identification of the British and West German campaigns. It mattered greatly that the West German discussion was not about the stationing of Germany's own weapons and that it revolved instead around purchasing nuclear-capable equipment for the West German army that would allow it to deploy NATO weapons in collaboration with British and US **(p.76)** forces stationed in West Germany as part of the occupation regime. The feeling of helplessness in West Germany towards foreign policy was, therefore, even more pronounced than in Britain. For example, an activist called Arne H. wrote to the campaign almost

immediately after its foundation in March 1958, sketching out his plans for a short play called *The Chaos*. He offered the play to the the campaign as a contribution to highlighting the 'madness of the atomic arms race', using metaphors of flooding and water to highlight the loss of control. H. evokes danger through graphic descriptions of body functions, thus replicating the language of the phantasies of annihilation similar to those developed by the *Freikorps* in the early Weimar Republic and the soldiers of the Eastern front during the National Socialist war.[62] The play unfolds in three short acts, which H. calls 'images', and it sketches the conversations between a fanatic, a rebel, a scientist, an engineer, and a dictator. The first scene (at the factory gates) shows a conversation in front of a factory guide where the rebel and the fanatic discuss the futility of protection and mention that the trade unions were unable to help as they were busy spending members' contributions. The second scene ('In a conference room'), a discussion between the scientist, the engineer, and the dictator, validates these assessments. The third scene, called 'In a barren landscape', contains graphic descriptions of death and destruction that is reminiscent of images of the empty battlefield on the Western front during the First World War: nuclear war would mean total chaos, against which the aerial bombing of the last war paled by comparison. The play warns the audience vividly that 'your swollen bodies will explode like soap bubbles', the waves will play with 'your stinking intestines'. Indeed, 'what you can see is not a stone, but the dead swollen body of a pregnant woman', and you can also see 'the severed breasts of a woman, and a children's body without arms and legs'. The play closes with a scene of complete emptiness. One can hear the constant ticking of a Geiger counter, with a grey-brown/red curtain visible at the back of the stage. A scientist babbles to the rhythm of the Geiger counter.

In its drastic depiction of nuclear 'chaos', H.'s account is not representative. But its liminality highlights especially well the core features of the identifications connected with the West German campaign.[63] Michael Geyer has identified this as the main aspect of 'Cold War *Angst*'. This angst was the expression of the fundamental fact that those Germans who **(p.77)** disapproved of nuclear armaments saw themselves as the first future victims of a nuclear war, a fate that they thought they would be unable to control. But it also highlighted a sense of profound scepticism towards the military functions of the state: although very few of the people consulted in the opinion polls were pacifists, they cut their bonds with the state 'at a crucial sinew'.[64] The language of campaigners such as Hövel demonstrates that their rejection of the German past of militarism went hand in hand with the reproduction of its arguments and language.

### Self-observations

While these sociological data reveal, in broad terms, who was most concerned about the implications of nuclear weapons for security during this time period, the structures of the polls themselves reflect the specific assumptions of those who designed them, and the parameters through which each society observed

itself. The attempts by activists and observers alike to endow the movements with a clear social structure were one of the first acts of labelling and identifying the movements. They played an essential part in constituting them; so did the activists who described themselves with specific political and social attributes.

But there were important differences in how the pollsters slotted into the general political process the experiences that revealed themselves in the polls. While British pollsters regarded the experiences primarily as limited to specific sections of society, their West German counterparts treated them explicitly as tools of political power, which could be manipulated to achieve political ends. In Britain, those who compiled the polls were mainly sociologists trying to understand the society around them. In the Federal Republic, by contrast, the government, the political parties, and even the movements took a much keener interest in polling than their British counterparts. While the Adenauer government, the *SPD*, and the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (*CDU*)) commissioned extensive and differentiated polls (frequently classified as 'top secret') and had departments that analyzed the material, the British government and the political parties were much slower in making use of the polls, so that polling became standard practice among British political actors only from the mid-1960s onwards.[65] This reflected not **(p.78)** only different political structures and cultures, but also fundamentally different concepts of 'society' in both countries. West Germans had a far more homogeneous view of 'society' than their British counterparts. This was, in part, a legacy of National Socialism, but it also compensated for the loss of a united Germany.[66] Intellectuals close to the West German movement, such as Jürgen Habermas, emphasized the critical potential of 'society' understood as a 'public sphere'. Thus, 'public opinion' itself had become a contested issue in the West German politics of security, and had, by the early 1960s, became one of the most popular topics in West German intellectual discussions.[67]

Despite these different resonances, the *structures* of analysis that the polls offered were quite similar. In both societies, we can find three types of social characterization for the movements, each of which had a different importance within national political discussions: the first made assumptions about social hierarchy and was often connected to generational arguments; the second assumed a social stratification (in upper, middle, and working class) and sought to locate the movements within it; the third assumed a binary opposition between 'the people' and 'the elite' or 'the establishment'. Indeed, the term 'establishment' itself had close CND connections: it was first made famous by CND supporter A. J. P. Taylor and later popularized in an edited collection by the New Left supporter Hugh Thomas.[68] Each of these interpretations was linked to specific views about the political process and about the role of security within it. Unlike in debates about peace movements after the First World War, gender, although mentioned in the debates, did not play the role of a master frame to

conceptualize the debates about nuclear weapons.[69] In West Germany, by pointing out the great scepticism of women towards Adenauer's policy of strength, only the Allensbach Institute for Demographic Research singled out 'gender' as an important determinant for attitudes towards security and nuclear weapons in its confidential polls for the government.[70]

Movement activists in both countries preferred the binary opposition between 'the people' and 'the elite'. And the West German campaigns **(p.79)** were specifically targeted at challenging the Christian Democrats' claim that it was a *Volkspartei* (a people's party) by highlighting its nature as a *Volksbewegung* (people's movement).[71] Rudolf S., the owner of a motorcycle shop in Braunschweig, echoed this sentiment in a letter he wrote to Walter Menzel, the chairman of the Campaign against Atomic Death, in March 1958. In it, he mentioned his and the Social Democratic Party's own democratic activism in the time before 1914, and he found little to praise in the contemporary Federal Republic: 'democratic opposition in the Bonn parliament was inappropriate', he wrote, as it could be abused by the governing party, revealing the ambiguities of extra-parliamentary political involvement in the Federal Republic: scepticism towards tolerating opponents' views went hand in hand with a commitment to direct representation. 'One polemicizes humanely', Schmidt pointed out, 'one sits in committees and even contributes to a field that one used to fight against as a socialist'. This was a situation that was reminiscent of the 'madness of 39–45'. What was required instead was 'hard, but honest words and deeds', like the ones 'by Bebel, Crispien, Südekum, etc.', when 'we marched through the streets to demonstrate'.[72]

Fundamentally, this was also a struggle over who was responsible for political representation, and where that representation should take place. This was the main purpose behind the campaign to organize *Volksbefragungen* in those West German states with *SPD* governments, plebiscites that were supposed to highlight the lack of support for Adenauer policies among the West German public. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled these plebiscites unconstitutional on the technicality that foreign and defence policies were federal matters that did not fall within the remit of the German states. But an internal memorandum that a civil servant at the Federal Ministry of the Interior wrote about the planned plebiscite in the state of Hesse revealed how this dispute was fundamentally a contest over the very form of the political and the locations at which the politics of security should be carried out. The federal civil servant wrote that plebiscites were not required to gauge public opinion, since, 'in order to detect the opinion of the people, we can today draw on the methods of so-called demoscopic research … that private institutes have developed following the model of the north American Gallup institute. The will of the people, by contrast, is not detected and researched, but produced and voiced.' And for that purpose a democratic polity already had 'elections and other votes' that allowed individuals to take part in the 'formation of a general will'. And **(p.80)** he

concluded: 'One must not simply reinterpret opinion polls as elections and elections as opinion polls.'[73]

In accordance with their emphasis on representing 'the people', campaign organizers in both countries were adamant that they represented no specific political or social group and called themselves 'classless'. Instead, they stressed that they represented humankind in their campaigns against nuclear weapons, regardless of gender, class, race, or nation. CND supporters solemnly pledged themselves to 'the common cause of mankind'.[74] Parkin's survey confirms that CND's middle-class supporters had particular problems in placing themselves within a class system.[75] We can find similar evidence for the West German movement.[76] British New Left supporters remained, however, highly critical of interpretations that neglected the class character of British society.[77]

Rather than as indications for the end of social inequalities in the 'age of affluence', 'the end of ideology', or the arrival of 'postmodern' values altruistically concerned with the fate of the less well off, these statements should be interpreted as self-descriptions that served specific political purposes in the politics of security.[78] Like discussions about 'class', such arguments about the absence of social stratification have been part of the attempts of societies and social groups to invest their own social standing and the general social structure with cultural meanings. The movements' vision of being in tune with world public opinion enabled them to create a community and human fellowship that appeared to give supporters the security they so desired.[79] At the same time, this vision was a powerful political argument that created an image of a public sphere identical to that of movement; this public sphere had merely to be activated by educating the public. Yet, like the bourgeois public sphere of the eighteenth century, it was not a reality, as Jürgen Habermas has suggested, but a 'phantasy'.[80] **(p.81)** The activists' desire to reach out to the public, then, provided a significant degree of the momentum for the movements.

Yet, there were not only striking differences in the ways activists sought to represent the movements to the public, but also in the interpretation by those outside the movements. In Britain, observers used middle-class stereotypes to describe the protesters, characterizations that the protesters often used themselves to enhance their political and social reputation. In West Germany, by contrast, 'class' was entirely absent from social descriptions, and, if observers and movement supporters referred to social criteria at all, they highlighted the importance of 'professions'.[81] Despite Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's announcement after the 1959 general election that 'the class war [was] over' and that the Conservatives had won it, 'class' as signifier of social structure had a much greater resonance in Britain than in the Federal Republic.[82] British concepts of 'security' thus entailed specific visions of social structure. Activists and opponents alike linked the issue of 'security' to the role the 'middle classes' should play in society. They debated the question whether, in the light of the

rising affluence of the 'working class', it could still serve as the enlightened and rational pillar of society that it claimed it had been since the nineteenth century.[83]

Thus, Alan Brien described the British supporters in the *Daily Mail* as 'the sort of people who would normally spend Easter listening to a Beethoven concert on the Home Service, pouring dry sherry from a decanter for the neighbours, painting Picasso designs on hardboiled eggs … '.[84] While such assessments reflect a certain dislike of the middle classes especially among Conservatives, movement supporters, by contrast, regarded the CND's middle-class character as part of its success. A report on a gathering of CND supporters in the CND *Newsletter* in January 1959, mirroring similar reports in the national press, read:

> This was not coterie stuff, this was not any gathering of eccentrics on the lunatic fringe of world affairs. This affair has long outgrown its beard-and-dufflecoat phase. The solid bourgeois multitude here could have been a share-holders meeting—and, indeed, that was what it seriously considered  **(p.82)**  itself to be … —which does its business, or tries to, in what the brokers would call Futures.[85]

At the same time, the involvement of such 'responsible' people in extra-parliamentary politics against nuclear weapons puzzled some sociologists. The sociologist Frank Parkin coined the term 'middle-class radicals' as a catchphrase for CND supporters and as a mirror image of the 'affluent worker'.[86]

In West Germany, by contrast, interpretations about the class-bound character of the protests had a very low salience, although social structure was becoming a fashionable topic among West German sociologists at the time.[87] Despite the persistence of social inequalities, interpretations dominated West German public discourse, which assumed the end of 'class society' and the arrival of a 'levelled-out middle-class society' (*nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft*), as the sociologist Helmut Schelsky called it in a highly influential contemporary definition stemming from his study on the German family.[88] 'Generation' replaced 'class' as the master frame for the interpretation of the extra-parliamentary politics of security. 'Generation' and 'youth' played the part in West Germany that 'middle-class radicalism' played in Britain.[89]

This fact was directly linked to the 'security' that generational concepts could offer in the specific situation of post-war West Germany by relating to the politics of 'normalization' and 'stabilization' after the war. Within the West German context, the term 'generation' was ideally suited to create a world of kin and community within the movement, while connecting it to a rhetoric of social and political transformation more generally. As the discussions within and outside the West German movements focused primarily on the 'young generation', the generational framework established a link between the young

generation and its function in West German economic reconstruction as central to political stability. Moreover, as the concept of 'young generation' focused on the future, rather than on the past, it allowed protesters and the general **(p.83)** public alike to distance themselves rhetorically from the troubles of Germany's most recent past.[90] By talking about 'generation' and 'youth', West German protesters, even those belonging to age cohorts born in the late 1920s and 1930s, stylized themselves as representatives of a new and democratic Germany that had remained unscathed by the problems of the past.[91] In reality, however, students and younger people were originally not the main social basis of the West German marches.[92]

For West German supporters, referring to the 'young generation' thus became a central means of moral and political criticism and an argument for a better future against alleged authoritarian thinking. Easter March founder Hans-Konrad Tempel (born 1932) took up this theme by highlighting the younger generation's role in preventing future disasters on the scale of National Socialism. While many might have rightfully claimed that they knew nothing about the crimes of the National Socialist regime, this argument did not hold true with regard to nuclear weapons.[93] The Protestant Church President of Dortmund, Heinrich Kloppenburg (born 1903), expanded on this theme by linking the involvement of a 'young generation' to West Germany's 'liberalization': 'There is, within the young generation, a turn towards thinking on one's own, which, for many, includes an active political commitment.'[94] But, rather than relying on the independence of young people, he favoured 'guidance'.[95] Although the question of youthful lifestyles was hotly debated within the movements, many sympathetic outside observers applauded the endorsement of the emerging popular culture as a democratizing element: 'No one has yet died of jazz music, a few million, however, have died by following marching tunes', a trade-union paper wrote.[96]

 **(p.84)** For the West German protesters, 'generation' was not merely oriented towards the future. It also contained specific visions of the past and thus helped the protesters to redefine and reinterpret earlier political traditions, which, they argued, had been lost in West Germany's reconstruction. Easter Marchers in particular did not regard '1945' as a 'zero hour'. Rather, they commonly characterized the period between 1945 and 1948 as 'our twenties'.[97] Their central reference point was the failed hopes of Weimar. For them, the central aim was to begin afresh by remembering a period of time that was still free of the horrors of the Third Reich. In their view, the political 'restoration' of those in government who advocated nuclear armaments referred not to direct continuities with the past, but to the political elite's refusal to take the policy options of the 1920s seriously. Self-enlightenment about Germany's most recent past in which the activists themselves had participated as young children became one of the central benchmarks of their private and public activities.[98] The West German government's opinion pollsters, by contrast, identified the lack

of concerns and the lack of general education and political interests with the mood of opposition against nuclear weapons. The Allensbach Institute singled out workers and women as particularly susceptible to the emerging protests and thus argued for a broad campaign of *Volkserziehung* ('people's education') to stem the tide.[99]

The West German voices more critical of the protests drew on the same assumptions and experiences of the crucial function of the 'young generation' for the stabilization and democratization of the young West German polity. But they differed substantially about what this contribution should look like. They regarded youthful lifestyles as representative of 'youth protests' and, therefore, as dangerous. For them, 'youth' and 'young generation' became metaphors of social threats, social risk, and social disintegration, in short: markers of insecurity.[100] In their view, the ideal young person was pragmatic, involved in private affairs and, in Helmut **(p.85)** Schelsky's words, 'sceptical' towards the political process, but not directly involved in it.[101]

Young protesters with their alleged emotionality challenged the precarious order of the young West German state and threatened to bring back 'Weimar conditions'. Movement references to kinship and community in particular raised conservatives' eyebrows: they feared that the movement would replace 'rational' description of the German present with utopian visions of the future, like the National Socialists in the past and the GDR in the present. Instead, they preferred models of 'private' life after the alleged politicizations of the masses during the National Socialist regime.[102]

In Britain, by contrast, generational arguments failed to gain the salience they obtained in the Federal Republic and remained confined to communist and radical–socialist circles within CND.[103] Although there existed a 'Youth CND' and a student section, and although there was a rising interest among activists, government officials, parties, and sociological circles to analyze and understand problems of 'youth',[104] the descriptions of the campaign as a youth movement came from outside and had mostly negative connotations. One reason for this difference lay in the differences in student numbers and their importance within society as a whole. By the early 1960s, there were about 118,000 students in full-time higher education (compared to 82,000 in 1954/55), and their numbers only rose after the expansion of the university system in the wake of the 1963 Robbins Report.[105] West Germany, by contrast, had around 247,000 full-time students in 1960.[106] But the relative absence of 'generational' patterns of self-observation also reflected the fact that recent British history lacked the sharp ruptures that Germany had experienced. Hence, when British observers discussed CND in generational terms, **(p.86)** they denied any political connotations, but focused on the threat to morality instead or saw 'generation' as subordinate to the issue of 'class' and the effects of affluence.[107] The age

cohort that defined Schelsky's 'sceptical generation' was a vague 'Generation X' in Britain.[108]

The interpretations of how the movement activists presented themselves and how they were represented endowed the movements with seemingly fixed and stable addresses within society. 'Society' as a totality, however, is, as Ernesto Laclau has pointed out, itself an 'impossible object', and imagining, creating, and producing it required significant work and political effort.[109] But these processes of identification also made this political effort possible in the first place. Identifying the protesters and the protest movement opened up the space for imagining a new world on the basis of hegemonic concepts of security. Such interpretative work was itself part of the discussions about movement politics: on the part of the sociologists, they were exercises in classifying society; for the governments and the protesters, they involved more directly a struggle for power over how the activists' experiences and expectations were and should be represented in the political process. A letter by Wilhelm Keller from a conscientious objectors' association to the chair of the West German campaign illustrates how this worked in practice in July 1959, at a time when the main campaigning effort was already over. Pleading for leaving classic social divisions aside and mentioning his own pacifist credentials, he argued that 'it [was] high time to move from an ideological and irreal pacifism towards a humanitarian, clear concept that is, given the threat of atomic war, the only alternative to self-annihilation'.[110] For Keller, as for most others who joined the movements in both countries, one utopia was beginning to give way to another.

Notes:

(1) TNA CAB 128/72, C(54): 'Memorandum on Fall-Out from the Minister of Defence', 9 December 1954; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 31.

(2) *Manchester Guardian*, 12 April 1957, 3.

(3) Hugh Brock, 'The Evolution of the Aldermaston Resistance', *Peace News*, 9 January 1959, 6.

(4) Cf. the articles by Esme Wynne Tyson and Gene Sharp in *Peace News*, 6 January 1956, 6–7; *Peace News*, 3 January 1958, 4; Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 117–18, 120.

(5) Cf. the letters from the population to the Federal Ministry for Atomic Energy: BAK, B138/100 (2); *Der Spiegel*, 17 April 1957, 8.

(6) J. B. Priestley, 'Britain and the Nuclear Bombs', *New Statesman*, 54, 2 November 1957, 554–6.

(7) *Proceedings of the 57th Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (Brighton, 1957), 10.

([8]) George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (London, 1958).

([9]) Cf. Nigel Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke and New York, 2002).

([10]) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 27 February 1958.

([11]) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 2 January 1959.

([12]) Ronald William Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell* (London, 1975), 576; Internationaal Instituut voor sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam (IISG), C100 papers, unsorted folder: C100 minutes, 22 October 1960. On the general history, cf. Frank E. Myers, 'British Peace Politics: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Committee of 100, 1957–1962' (Columbia Univ. PhD thesis, 1965) and Myers, 'Civil Disobedience and Organizational Change: The British Committee of 100', *Political Science Quarterly*, 86 (1971), 92–112.

([13]) Cf. the material in BLPES CND 1–15.

([14]) Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 22.

([15]) Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, 70–1.

([16]) AdsD: Parteivorstand, minutes, 20 November 1957.

([17]) AdsD 2/PVAM00005: 'Kampf dem Atomtod', brochure, 23 March 1958.

([18]) AdsD, Menzel papers: circular by the *SPD*'s *Kommunalpolitische Zentralstelle*, 17 March 1958; Parteivorstand, minutes, 25 April 1958; Minutes of the meeting of the *DGB*'s executive committee, 4 March 1958, in Klaus Schönhoven and Hermann Weber (eds), *Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert*, xii. *Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1956–1963* (Bonn, 2005), 263–5.

([19]) Archiv Stiftung Akademie der Künste, Berlin, Hans Werner Richter papers (HWR), 72.86.512: Hans Werner Richter to Siegfried Bußjäger, 26 February 1960.

([20]) AdsD 3/BEAB000557: minutes, SPD Berlin, 13 October 1958; *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, 1 August 1958; *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 14 June 1958, 1065–6, 1068.

([21]) AdsD: Präsidium, minutes, 23 January 1961, 3; AdsD, DGB Archives, Abt. Organisation, 24/9006: 'Pressemitteilung der SPD, betr.: Ostermarsch-Bewegung', 7 November 1963.

([22]) Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (HIS), TEM 400,01: Central committee, minutes, 6/7 May 1961.

(23) *Peace News*, 17 January 1958, 1; 5 December 1958, 4; 5 June 1959, 4.

(24) Hilary Bourne, 'In Fleet Street', *Sanity* (October 1962), 3.

(25) BLPES, CND/1/4: 'Press statement', 27 November 1962.

(26) Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (IfZ), ED 702–7: 'Entwurf eines Rundschreibens an die Jugendorganisation des Ortsausschusses München', n.d. [*c*. summer 1963].

(27) If Z, ED 702, 2: Arno Klönne, 'Ostermarsch—Zentraler Ausschuß, Einige Argumente für's Bonner Lobby', n.d. [*c*.1963].

(28) AdsD 2/PVAM00005: 'Volksbewegung Kampf dem Atomtod', leaflet (April 1958); Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (HIS), TEM 200,06: 'Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner', pamphlet, 1961; BLPES, CND/1/3: Flyers for the 1958 and 1959 Aldermaston Marches.

(29) Cf. Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, 'Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena? The Example of Public Opinion Research', *British Journal of Sociology*, 50 (1999), 367–96.

(30) HWR 72.86.512: Hans Werner Richter to Siegfried Bußjäger, 26 February 1960.

(31) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 166–7. 'Young' meant between 12 and 25 years old.

(32) Philip Abrams and Alan Little, 'The Young Activist in British Politics', *British Journal of Sociology*, 16 (1965), 315–33, here 324; Robin Jenkins, 'Who are these Marchers?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 4 (1967), 46–60, here 49.

(33) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 90.

(34) Philip Abrams and Alan Little, 'The Young Voter in British Politics', *British Journal of Sociology*, 16 (1965), 95–110, 104; Dieter Rucht and Roland Roth, 'Weder Rebellion noch Anpassung: Jugendproteste in der Bundesrepublik 1950–1994', in Rucht and Roth (eds), *Jugendkulturen, Politik und Protest: Vom Widerstand zum Kommerz?* (Opladen, 2000), 283–304, here 288.

(35) Peggy Duff, *Left, Left, Left: A Personal Account of Six Protest Campaigns* (London, 1971), 160–1.

(36) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 140–74.

(37) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 90.

(38) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 17, 167,171–2; Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 146.

(³⁹) Sheila Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties* (Harmondsworth, 2000).

(⁴⁰) Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard, *Protest Makers: The British Nuclear Disarmament Movement of 1958–1965, Twenty Years On* (London, 1980), 26; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 60.

(⁴¹) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 172.

(⁴²) Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity 1920–1990* (London, 1991), 510.

(⁴³) Gerhard Schmidtchen, *Protestanten und Katholiken: Soziologische Analyse konfessioneller Kultur* (Berne, 1973), 324.

(⁴⁴) Hastings, *History of English Christianity*, 428–9.

(⁴⁵) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 94.

(⁴⁶) Michael Hughes, *Conscience and Conflict. Methodism: Peace and War in the Twentieth Century* (Peterborough, 2008), 140–79.

(⁴⁷) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 27, 74–5. This contradicts the claims of a declining influence of nonconformity, especially on the peace movement in Alan P. F. Sell and Anthony R. Cross (eds), *Protestant Nonconformity in the Twentieth Century* (Carlisle, 2003).

(⁴⁸) Taylor and Pritchard, *Protest Makers*, 28 and 23; 34 and 38.

(⁴⁹) BAK, B 145/4230: DIVO, 'Zum Thema "Volksbefragung und Atombewaffnung" ' (Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativerhebung im Mai 1958); Daniel Gerster, 'Von Pilgerfahrten zu Protestmärschen? Zum Wandel des katholischen Friedensengagements in den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1990', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 51 (2011), 311–42, here 319–25.

(⁵⁰) BAK, B 145/4230: DIVO, 'Zum Thema "Volksbefragung und Atombewaffnung" ' (Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativerhebung im Mai 1958).

(⁵¹) AdsD 2/PVAM000015: Fritz Haller to KdA, 17 May 1960, fos 1, 3.

(⁵²) Till van Rahden, 'Clumsy Democrats: Moral Passions in the Federal Republic of Germany', *German History*, 29 (2011), 485–504.

(⁵³) AdsD: 2/PVAM000015: Johannes Hauck (Munich) (copy) to the 'esteemed Prime Minister', 22 September 1958.

(⁵⁴) On this knowledge, see BAK, B145/4230: IfD, 'Die KZ Prozesse', Stimmung im Bundesgebiet, no. 357, 27 October 1958; quotation from Geyer, 'Cold War Angst', 398.

(⁵⁵) *The Complete Beyond the Fringe*, ed. Roger Wilmut (London, 1982), 82. Cf. Matthew Grant, *After the Bomb: Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945–68* (Basingstoke, 2010), 130–6.

(⁵⁶) Cf. Jane Buchan and Norman Buchan, 'The Campaign in Scotland', in John Minion and Philip Bolsover (eds), *The CND Story: The First 25 years of CND in the Words of the People Involved* (London, 1983), 52–3.

(⁵⁷) BLPES, CND/1/8/8: Welsh CND pamphlet, 1960.

(⁵⁸) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 90.

(⁵⁹) Gallup, *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain, 1937–1975*, i. 449, 461, 584, 668; D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959*, new edn (London, 1999), 71; D. E. Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1964*, new edn (London, 1999), 37, 129–31; BAK, B145/4230: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 'Standorte der öffentlichen Meinung', 5 September 1958, 10; DIVO, 'Zum Thema "Volksbefragung und Atomrüstung" (Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativerhebung im Mai 1958)'.

(⁶⁰) Cf., e.g., Hugh Gaitskell in the House of Commons: *Hansard*, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. DCXVII, 776–7, 11 February 1960; and Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959–61* (London, 1972), 98.

(⁶¹) BAK, B145/4229, no. 291: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, *Die Atomrüstung*; BAK, B145/4266: EMNID-Institut für Meinungsforschung, *Die Resonanz der Bundestagsdebatte zur Außenpolitik und Atombewaffnung* (March 1958).

(⁶²) AdsD: 2/PVAM00025: Arne H. to KdA, 27 March 1958; cf. Klaus Theweleit, *Male Phantasies*, i. *Women, Floods, Bodies, History* (Minneapolis, 1987).

(⁶³) Cf. for a different voice Peter Fritzsche, *The Turbulent World of Franz Göll: An Ordinary Berliner Writes the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 202–8.

(⁶⁴) Geyer, 'Cold War Angst', 386, and Biess, ' "Everybody Has a Chance" '.

(⁶⁵) Butler and King, *The British General Election of 1964*, 204–11; Anja Kruke, *Demoksopie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Meinungsforschung, Parteien und Medien 1949–1990* (Düsseldorf, 2007), 61–86, 209–20, 392–405.

([66]) Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft: Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung* (Munich, 2000), 197–207.

([67]) Cf. Christina von Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise. Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit 1945–1973* (Göttingen, 2006).

([68]) Adam Sisman, *A. J. P. Taylor: A Biography* (London, 1994), 214.

([69]) Susan Kingsley Kent, *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (Princeton, 1993).

([70]) BAK, B145/4225: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 'Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet', no. 168 (March 1958), 2.

([71]) Thomas Mergel, *Propaganda nach Hitler. Eine Kulturgeschichte des Wahlskampfs in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1990* (Göttingen, 2010), 270–81.

([72]) AdsD: 2/PVAM000009: Rudolf S. to Walter Menzel, 10 March 1958.

([73]) BAK 116–2442: 'Stellungnahme des BMI zu Schriftsatz der Hessischen Landesregierung vom 7.6.58', 28 June 1958. AdsD: Parteivorstand minutes, Sitzung des PV am 3.9.58 in Bonn.

([74]) Hull Archives Centre, John Saville papers (JS), JS-7: 'CND Charter', n.d. [*c.* 1959]; Robert Bolt, 'Do you Speak Nuclear?', *New Statesman*, 24 December 1960.

([75]) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 46.

([76]) Appeal from 23 April 1957, quoted in: *Blaubuch über den Widerstand gegen die atomare Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik*, ed. Friedenskomitee der Bundesrepublik Deutschlanded (Düsseldorf, 1957), 95–6; AdsD, DGB Archives, Abt. Organisation, 24/2182: Georg Reuter to Willi Richter, 17 March 1958.

([77]) Raphael Samuel, 'Dr Abrams and the End of Politics', *New Left Review*, 5 (1960), 3.

([78]) Daniel Bell, *On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (New York, 1962).

([79]) IISG C100, uncatalogued section: 'The H-Bomb's Thunder', Easter March song book (*c.*1960).

([80]) Cf. on this general point Harold Mah, 'Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking Habermas for Historians', *Journal of Modern History*, 72 (2000), 153–82.

(⁸¹) HIS, TEM 400,01: 'Aufruf zum Ostermarsch' (March 1961); Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 90.

(⁸²) Quoted from Anthony Sampson, *Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity* (London, 1967), 165; Mike Savage, *Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940: The Politics of Method* (Oxford, 2010).

(⁸³) A. J. P. Taylor, quoted by David Cannadine, *Class in Britain* (Harmondsworth, 2000), 129.

(⁸⁴) *Daily Mail*, 8 April 1958; *Daily Express*, 31 March 1959.

(⁸⁵) *CND Newsletter*, January 1959, 1.

(⁸⁶) Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, 46.

(⁸⁷) Cf., for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Die neue Gesellschaft. Soziale Strukturwandlungen der Nachkriegszeit', in Hans Werner Richter (ed.), *Bestandsaufnahme. Eine deutsche Bilanz 1962* (Munich, 1962), 203–20.

(⁸⁸) Hans Braun, 'Die gesellschaftliche Ausgangslage der Bundesrepublik als Gegenstand der zeitgenössischen soziologischen Forschung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der neueren deutschen Soziologie', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 31 (1979), 766–95.

(⁸⁹) Cf. Detlef Siegfried, ' "Don't trust anyone older than 30?" Voices of Conflict and Consensus between Generations in 1960s West Germany', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40 (2005), 727–44.

(⁹⁰) Holger Nehring, ' "Generation" as political argument in West European Protest Movements in the 1960s', in Stephen Lovell (ed.)*, Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 2007), 57–78.

(⁹¹) For the general approach adopted here cf. Bernd Weisbrod, 'Generation and Generationalität in der Neueren Geschichte', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B8/2005 (21 February 2005), 3–9; A. Dirk Moses, 'The Forty Fivers. A Generation between Fascism and Democracy', *German Politics and Society*, 17 (1999), 94–125.

(⁹²) Jürgen Habermas et al., *Student und Politik: Eine soziologische Untersuchung zum politischen Bewusstsein Frankfurter Studenten* (Frankfurt/Main, 1961); Boris Spix, *Abschied vom Elfenbeinturm? Politisches Verhalten Studierender 1957–1967. Berlin und Nordrhein-Westfalen im Vergleich* (Essen, 2008).

(⁹³) HStAD: 308–84/48, 53: Report on the 1962 Easter March to the Interior Ministry of North-Rhine Westphalia.

(⁹⁴) SAPMO-BArch: DY30/IV A2/10.02/301: 'Bericht über den Ostermarsch', 11 April 1963.

(⁹⁵) AdsD: Präsidium, minutes, 20 February 1961.

(⁹⁶) *Welt der Arbeit*, 30 May 1958; HIS, TEM 300,03 Regional Committee West, minutes, 21 February 1962; Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 92.

(⁹⁷) Joachim Kaiser, 'Phasenverschiebungen und Einschnitte in der kulturellen Entwicklung', in Martin Broszat (ed.), *Zäsuren nach 1945: Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte* (Munich, 1990), 69–74, here 71.

(⁹⁸) Cf. Arno Klönne and Karl Heinz Westphal, 'Generation der Anpassung?', *Solidarität*, 6 (1958), 1–2; Friedhelm Boll, 'Hitler-Jugend und "skeptische Generation": Sozialdemokratie und Jugend nach 1945', in Dieter Dowe (ed.), *Partei und soziale Bewegung: Kritische Beiträge zur Geschichte der SPD seit 1945* (Bonn, 1993), 33–57, here 39.

(⁹⁹) Cf. BAK, B145/4224: 'Die Stimmung im Bundesgebiet: Die Atomrüstung', no. 191 (April 1957); BAK, B145/4230: 'Stimmung im Bundesgebiet: Volksbefragung populär', no. 354 (May 1958).

(¹⁰⁰) BAK, ZSg. 1/262.1, 4: 'Presseanalysen zum Ostermarsch', 1961 and 1962.

(¹⁰¹) Cf. Robert Jenke, *Ostermarsch-Betrachtungen* (Cologne, 1964), 45–58, and Jenke, *Ostermarsch-Nachbetrachtungen* (Cologne, 1964), 34–41. On the concept, cf. Helmut Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation: Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend* (Cologne and Düsseldorf, 1957), especially 488–9.

(¹⁰²) Kai Herrmann, 'Erfolg und viele Kilometer', *Die Zeit*, 3 April 1964.

(¹⁰³) *CND Bulletin* (January 1959), 2; Paul Rose, 'Manchester Left Club on Youth', *New Left Review*, 1 (1960), 70–1. An exception is [E. P. Thompson], *New Reasoner* (summer 1959), 1.

(¹⁰⁴) BLPES, CND/8/2: Polls at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (1961); for the background, cf. Lawrence Black, *The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951–64: Old Labour, New Britain?* (Basingstoke, 2003), 67–76; Steven Fielding, *Labour and Cultural Change* (Manchester and New York, 2003), 168–82.

(¹⁰⁵) David Butler and Gareth Butler (eds), *Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900–2000* (London, 2000), 366.

(106) Helmut Köhler, *Der relative Schul- und Hochschulbesuch in der Bundesrepublik 1952–1975: Ein Indikator für die Entwicklung des Bildungswesens* (Berlin, 1978), 168.

(107) Uwe Kitzinger, writing in the *Listener*, 16 May 1963, 2; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 59, 131; Ferdynand Zweig, *The Student in the Age of Anxiety* (London, 1963), 199.

(108) Charles Hamblett and Jane Deverson, *Generation X* (London, 1964).

(109) Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time* (London, 1990), 92.

(110) AdsD, 2/PVAM0000021: Wilhelm Keller to Walter Menzel, n.d. [rec. Am 15 July 1959].

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