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Exporting the European Order Beyond the Border

As we have seen, Europe has treated its southern neighbourhood as a subaltern hinterland for many years. However, in the two decades since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, there has been an intensification of European efforts to integrate the states of the Mediterranean Middle East into selected parts of the European order, thereby expanding Europe's disaggregated borders further southwards. Of these, trade has certainly been the most important field of Europe–MENA relations. This is unsurprising given that the European Union has remained the largest commercial partner of all the states in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa. However, these trade relations go well beyond the exchange of goods; they involve legal and institutional matters as well. Furthermore, trade has not been the sole area of cooperation that has witnessed Europe's attempts to impose its preferences on MENA states. European policies aiming at the 'Europeanisation beyond Europe' (Schimmelfennig 2012a) have also addressed border controls, security cooperation, migration management, energy, and multiple other sectors. Repeated attempts to make third countries adopt European rules and practices and to take on the management of the borderlands are central to Europe's efforts in disseminating 'the European way of doing things', usually to the advantage of the EU and its member states.

As this chapter will illustrate, the plethora of rules and practices which the EU seeks to export to neighbouring states ranges from financial control mechanisms and food safety procedures to border control practices, to name but a few. These have taken place alongside Europe's attempts to shift the border for unwanted people southwards and to co-opt MENA governments in the control of migratory flows to Europe. While our investigation will focus on trade relations on the one hand and border controls, security, and migration on the other, the chapter will start with a brief discussion of the general picture of recent EU–MENA relations.

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The General Picture: a Differentiated Hub-and-Spoke Set of Relations

The trade accords signed by most states of the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa with the EU in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s remain the legal basis of Europe's relations with its southern periphery. Negotiated either shortly before or in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched in 1995, Tunisia and Israel signed a 'Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement' in 1995, followed by Morocco and Jordan in 1996 and 1997, respectively.[1] Equally, in 1997, the European Union concluded an interim trade agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), on behalf of the Palestinian Authority (PA), covering the Palestinian Territories that fall under the PA's limited self-rule within the broader area still occupied by Israel. 'Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements' have also been in place with Egypt since 2001 and with Algeria and Lebanon since 2002. The objective of these comprehensive and extremely detailed documents—erroneously called 'free trade agreements'[2]—is to gradually liberalize trade in industrial goods between the EU and the respective MENA state through the dismantling or reduction of external tariffs, typically over a maximum period of twelve years. Additional provisions of these agreements relate to the liberalization of trade in services, the movement of capital, competition rules, intellectual property rights, and public procurement.

The EU's Euro-Mediterranean trade agreements with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories/PLO, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon all entered into force between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, usually between one and five years after they were signed.[3] Within this period, or subsequently, the EU and MENA states also concluded a large number of additional protocols, covering, for instance, the exchange of specific goods or provisions to liberalize trade in agriculture and services (Del Sarto 2017a). Within the framework of these agreements, Europe has provided funding for a

[1] EU negotiations on free trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, and Israel had started years earlier and were already close to conclusion when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched.

[2] As mentioned above, free trade agreements are not actually about free trade, but about the typically very selective liberalization of trade, usually to the benefit of special corporate interests in advanced economies.

[3] The interim free trade agreement with the PLO entered into force in 1997. The agreement with Tunisia has been in force since 1998. The EU–Moroccan and EU–Israeli free trade agreements both came into force in 2000. Egypt's free trade agreement entered into force in 2004; the EU–Algerian agreement in 2005, and the EU's trade agreement with Lebanon in 2006 (Del Sarto 2017a). Some MENA states renegotiated the date by which they had to fully remove external tariffs on EU imports: in the case of Algeria, for example, this date was postponed to 2020.

large number of programmes and projects in MENA states, such as support for small- and medium-sized enterprises, competition policies, judicial reform, the fight against corruption, education, and many more. European monies also support the activities of civil society groups in many MENA states.

Two Arab states in Europe's southern periphery, Syria and Libya, do not have this type of contractual relationship with the EU. Syria negotiated for years on an Association Agreement, which both sides eventually signed in 2009, but the agreement never entered into force; a previous cooperation agreement, signed in 1977, continued to govern trade relations between the two sides, until Brussels suspended it in 2011. And Libya, under the rule of Muammar al-Qaddafi, was not interested in institutionalizing trade relations with Europe at all.

With regard to all other MENA states that had signed an Association Agreement, the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership policy failed in one of its original objectives, that is, the creation of a *free trade area* between Europe and the MENA region, originally envisaged to be completed by 2010. For this to have taken place successfully, the MENA states would have had to have liberalized trade among themselves. This failure can be partly attributed to the relative disinterest of MENA governments in concluding interregional trade agreements, mainly because of the similar structure of their economies (and thus a lack of complementarity in the exchange of goods) or because of persistent rivalries and conflicts among them. The rather timid attempts that a number of MENA states made in this respect, most notably within the framework of the so-called Agadir free trade agreement, signed between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia in 2004 and in force since 2007, were hailed as an important step in Brussels. Named after the Moroccan city of Agadir, where the process to facilitate economic integration among Arab states started in 2001, the overall results of this process have nonetheless fallen far short of original expectations. Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories joined this intra-MENA trade agreement only in 2016, following several years of inactivity by the original signatories.

However, the Europeans are also to blame for the failure to establish a proper liberalized trade area. In spite of repeated declarations supporting the growth of south–south trade, for many years the Europeans did not heed the demands of MENA states to allow for the diagonal cumulation of origin rules—a measure that is known to increase intraregional trade and improve the competitiveness of industrial products (Tovias 1997).[4] While some

[4] Rules of origin are the technical criteria which determine whether a specific product qualifies for duty-free or other preferential access under a given trade agreement. Cumulation of origin means that a

progress was made in 2005, a proper regional convention on the pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin was only adopted in 2011.[5] For one reason or another, therefore, the EMP de facto created a hub-and-spoke system of trade relations, with the EU at its core.

Once it was launched in 2003–2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) would reinforce this tailor-made set of relations that Europe had created, and not entirely innocently at that. Encompassing states situated at the EU's eastern and southern borders, the ENP explicitly aimed to establish a bilateral and differentiated set of relations with these states.[6] As has already been shown, this policy framework set out to deepen relations with the states in the immediate vicinity of the EU following its latest round of enlargement, up to the integration of these states into (aspects of) the EU's Internal Market. In addition to the interests of each side, the economic and institutional capacity of the participating states were important considerations here as well. Most MENA signatories of a trade agreement with the EU agreed to bilaterally negotiate and sign a so-called ENP Action, a document that defined the areas in which both sides wished to strengthen cooperation. Covering a wide array of topics beyond trade—such as political dialogue on good governance, the rule of law, and human rights, as well as migration and security—these documents are not legally binding. Rather, they represent a road map, a statement of intent setting the priorities for the development of bilateral relations as well as for the economic and political reforms that MENA states declared to undertake in the short and medium term. As noted elsewhere, the wording of these documents is usually rather vague, allowing for quite different interpretations of what both sides actually agreed on (Del Sarto 2007; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011). At the same time, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership changed its name to 'The Union for the Mediterranean: Barcelona Process' in 2008 and added a number of non-EU members.[7] To

product originating in one country can be processed or added to a product of a second country and still be considered an 'originating product' of that second country for the purpose of a particular trade agreement. A diagonal cumulation of origin rules allows for the cumulation between two or more countries. EU-MENA Association Agreements originally allowed for the bilateral cumulation of origin rules only.

[5] For the purpose of preferential treatment, the pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin system allows for diagonal cumulation between the EU, EFTA States, Turkey, the Western Balkans, the Faroe Islands, and any countries that signed the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. The Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin (PEM Convention) was adopted in 2011 (Council of the European Union 2010).

[6] Originally, the ENP encompassed nine states in the Mediterranean Middle East (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Tunisia) and six countries located to the east of the EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

[7] The Union for the Mediterranean also includes Mauretania, Turkey, and Western Balkan countries. Croatia was an additional participant until it became a full EU member in July 2013.

this day, the Barcelona Process continues to provide the regional framework for relations between the EU and its southern periphery.

While many of the ENP Action Plans concluded in the mid- or late 2000s have been updated or replaced by 'Partnership Priorities' documents in recent years, the differentiation in the EU's trade and institutional relations with its southern neighbours has been proceeding further. For instance, the EU granted Morocco an 'advanced status' (*status avancé*) in 2008, 'reflecting the ambition to strengthen EU–Morocco cooperation and to further support economic and political reforms' (European Parliament 2019). Jordan obtained 'advanced status' in 2010. Following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia was awarded a 'privileged partnership', which also reflected increased European assistance in support of Tunisia's democratic transition. Indeed, between 2011 and 2017, European aid to Tunisia amounted to €1.6 billion in grants and €800 million in macro-financial assistance; for the period 2017–2020, the EU allocated between €500 and €600 million to assist Tunisia in strengthening the rule of law, stimulating sustainable economic growth, and improving social cohesion (European Commission 2019a).

Further examples of the differentiated set of relations are the participation of Morocco, Israel, and Jordan in the EU's Open Sky arrangement that has liberalized aviation between the signatories, thus also allowing low-cost airlines to enter the market. Similarly, Israel has been fully associated with the EU's framework programme for research and development since 1996, and Tunisia became the first Arab MENA country to gain associate member status in this important programme in 2016. While these countries contribute to the EU's research funds, they can apply for research funding on equal terms as research institutes in EU member states. The net balance of research funding is usually in favour of the associated countries while, at the same time, scientific exchanges and academic cooperation with Europe become institutionalized. Furthermore, some MENA states, but not all of them, have entered negotiations concerning the liberalization of trade in agriculture and services, while a number of MENA states have participated in the EU's cross-border programmes, which aim to facilitate cooperation across border regions. Under these programmes, the EU provides funding for the economic and social development in border areas and for tackling common challenges in the realm of the environment, public health, or security. Last but not least, and as will be discussed more fully later, cooperation on undocumented migration, euphemistically termed 'Mobility Partnerships', or attempts to conclude such agreements, have characterized the EU's relationship with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon. Libya, which was integrated into the ENP after the end of Qaddafi's rule in 2011, has also been a favourite target of Europe as the bloc attempts to address the control of unwanted migration to Europe.

When the European Union revised its policy towards 'the south' in the wake of the Arab uprisings (European Commission 2011a; 2011b), it proposed a new type of trade agreement with the states in its southern periphery, the so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs). These agreements had first been negotiated and concluded with Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries in the EU's eastern periphery that have the prospect of joining the EU, at least in the long run.[8] As many observers have noted, the EU's revision of its policies towards the south in the wake of the Arab uprisings was much more rhetorical than substantial (Cassarino and Tocci 2011; Teti 2012; Teti et al. 2012; Bicchi 2014; Del Sarto 2016). As regards trade relations specifically, the DCFTAs was the logical continuation of the EU's modus operandi. These agreements thus promised even deeper integration of the respective state in the EU's Internal Market, but the conclusion of such agreements has been conditional on third states' approximation of their laws, standards, and regulations with EU law. Approximation means here that, unlike EU members, third states are not obliged to adopt the EU's rules and legislation to the letter. There is some room for interpretation and space of manoeuvre. However, these states are nevertheless compelled to modify their national legislation in a way that it is compatible with EU rules and standards.

In the complexity of their trade and institutional relationships with the EU, Israel and Turkey stand out among the original signatories of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Israel developed a relatively advanced set of economic and institutional relations with the EU, due to its fully functioning market economy and democratic structures. While Israel—a member of the OECD—is not eligible for European development aid, among all the MENA states it was in the best position to take advantage of the EU's new offer of 'a stake' in the EU's Internal Market under the ENP (Del Sarto 2007; Pardo 2008). Of the southern participants in the ENP, Israel has also dismantled more external tariffs in its trading with Europe than any other country in the MENA region. As discussed elsewhere, bilateral trade relations have constantly improved, and a large number of additional trade-related agreements have been signed over the last decades (Del Sarto 2014; 2019).

Turkey's trade and institutional relations with the EU are even more convoluted. The association between Turkey and the EC established by the

[8] The DCFTA agreement with Armenia did not enter into force, however, because under Russian pressure Armenia decided to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

1963 Ankara Agreement, which entered into force in 1964, was complemented by the creation of a customs union with a common external tariff. In force since 1995, this customs union covers all industrial goods, but does not address trade in services, public procurement, or trade in agricultural products (the exception being processed agricultural products). While the Ankara Agreement acknowledged the country's eligibility for full membership in the European bloc at some future date, Turkey officially applied for membership in 1987, with Brussels formally accepting Ankara's request only more than a decade later, in 1999. Accession negotiations formally started in October 2005. Aimed at fully integrating Turkey into the EU's Internal Market, which would require Turkey to adopt the European Union's entire body of law, the *acquis communautaire,* these negotiations covered all thirty-five chapters of the *acquis*.[9] Inter alia, these chapters include the establishment of the free movement of all goods, services, and capital; the right of establishment for companies; intellectual property rights; financial services; competition policy; and taxation. As with all candidate countries for EU membership, Turkey also received extensive European funding and training to adapt a considerable portion of its national legislation to EU law.[10] However, accession negotiations proceeded slowly and stalled repeatedly, one of the reasons being Ankara's refusal to apply an additional trade protocol to Cyprus. The Turkish government's crackdown on demonstrators in Ankara's Taksim Square and other locations throughout the country in 2013 (the Gezi Park protests) and Europe's criticism of Turkish police brutality put an additional strain on the negotiation process. The EU–Turkey refugee deal, whose conclusion in early 2016 saw the EU promise accelerated accession negotiations and visa-free travel for Turkish citizens in return for Ankara halting the flow of predominantly Syrian refugees into Europe, did not bring these negotiations back to life. Pointing to Turkey's illiberal turn in recent years and serious human rights violations (European Commission 2019b), the EU eventually suspended accession talks in June 2018. Discussions on the upgrading of the customs union, which was seen as an interim step on the way to Turkey's full EU membership, were also brought to a halt.

In this context, it is noteworthy that, in 2015, against the backdrop of the civil wars, terrorism and chaos on its doorstep, and confronted with the influx of a large number of refugees from the Middle East that peaked in 2015, the

[9] The *acquis communautaire* consists of 130,000 pages of legal documents grouped into thirty-five chapters.

[10] The total allocation for the year 2018 amounted to €387 million (European Commission 2019b: 106).

European Union decided—once again—to 'review' the ENP (European Commission 2015a). The rhetoric of wanting to transform the southern (and eastern) neighbouring countries into liberal democracies was, perhaps unsurprisingly, dropped along the way, with the revised ENP now focusing narrowly on security and stability in the periphery (Furness et al. 2019). Reflecting the pragmatic and far less ideologically tainted thinking behind the EU's strategy for foreign and security policy of 2016, termed 'principled pragmatism'[11] (European External Action Service 2016), the new *leitmotif* of the revised ENP was to focus, more explicitly than ever, on core European interests, exactly as a borderlands approach to Europe–Middle East relations would have it.

To summarize, the countries in the Mediterranean Middle East are linked in a patchwork-like set of relations to the European Union, most of them within a common framework, but along bilateral and differentiated terms nonetheless. The Barcelona Process and the ENP have remained Europe's policy frameworks vis-à-vis the periphery for the implementation of an expanding system of cooperation and integration, which 'moves at different speeds and with different dynamics in different policy areas' (Lavenex 2008: 939; see also Barbé and Herranz-Surrallés 2012). What EU policies towards the countries in this 'artificially constructed neighbourhood space' (Schumacher and Bouris 2017: 12) have in common, however, is a concerted effort by Europe to expand different types of its functional borders to the peripheries and to impose European rules and practices on neighbouring states, as will now be discussed in greater detail.

Trade Regimes and the EU Internal Market

In its trade relations with the 'southern neighbourhood', Europe has always tried to impose its preferences and to advance its interests—a feature that is obviously not a prerogative of the Europeans on the international stage. The Barcelona Process and the ENP are clear examples of this strategy. In addition

[11] According to Nathalie Tocci (2016: 6), who was responsible for the drafting of the document, '[p]rincipled pragmatism seeks to move the debate away from false dichotomies and well-known hypocrisies: be it the sterile debate on "interests versus values", or on "interventionism versus retrenchment". The point it tries to make is that we should observe the world (and ourselves) as it is, not as we would like to see it. We must be more modest at times in what we believe we can achieve and what we cannot. But modesty should not translate into closure or passivity. We must engage the world and do so responsibly, but without the illusion that we can unilaterally bring peace, security, democracy or prosperity to the world.'

to stipulating the reduction and eventual dismantling of all external tariff- and non-tariff barriers on industrial goods, to this day the EU trade agreements signed with MENA states impose import quotas and tariff barriers on agricultural products entering Europe. In return, so to speak, the EU offers some financial and technical aid in support of the far-reaching economic reforms that MENA states are supposed to undertake.

Europe's trade policy towards its borderlands is in line with the neoliberal model of development promoted by international financial institutions and the United States. These policies are deeply embedded in the Washington Consensus of the late 1980s and early 1990s, with its three pillars of macroeconomic stabilization, structural adjustment, and liberalization/privatization. The EU's trade policy deviates from the Washington Consensus model in three respects, however. First, it excludes agriculture from full trade liberalization (with the US adopting a similar policy in practice). Second, instead of full market deregulation that is typical of mainstream neoliberalism, Europe tends to support the reregulation (and not the deregulation) of markets, according to an ordoliberal tradition (Roccu 2018a).[12] A third inconsistency regards the strictly bilateral nature of EU trade policy (Hunt 1999).

Certainly, the proposed reforms were intended to modernize the often sluggish and usually highly indebted economies of most Arab states in Europe's southern periphery, and to facilitate their integration into an increasingly globalized international system. But whereas most Arab MENA governments shared this general objective, they liked the prescribed European (and Western) path towards this target far less. For one, and as noted earlier, the elimination of tariffs on imports from Europe involved high economic costs for most of these states, given that import duties accounted for an important share of the total income of their economies (Hoekman 1999: 90; Schumacher 2004: 12).[13] At the same time, it was expected that competition with European industrial goods, as well as with the EU's heavily subsidized and protected agricultural products, would put many local companies out of business, resulting in rising unemployment. Moreover, expenditure reductions in the generally bloated and unproductive public sectors in Arab MENA states and

[12] Ordoliberalism is a German variant of neoliberalism that espouses the concept of social market economy (*soziale Marktwirtschaft)*. To maximize the potential of the free market, the ordoliberal tradition emphasizes the important role of the state in regulating markets by creating a proper legal environment for the economy and ensuring fair competition, keeping inflation and unemployment low while guaranteeing safe working conditions, social welfare and functioning public services.

[13] In the mid-1990s, customs duties accounted for between 13 and 31 per cent of total revenues for Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In the case of Lebanon, customs duties accounted for almost 57 per cent of its tax revenues (Schumacher 2004: 12).

expansions in the tax base to compensate for the loss of tax revenues would have significant political consequences that continue to manifest today. After all, such measures directly infringe upon the clientelist power base on which many authoritarian Arab regimes consistently relied. This type of reform also upset the long-standing social contract that had been in place between the ruling elites and their societies. Following the reverse logic of the slogan 'no taxation without representation', the authoritarian bargain stipulated that the state should provide subsidized basic products and services, together with employment in the public sector for a large segment of society, in exchange for citizens' political acquiescence. The substantial risks and costs related to the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean trade agreement certainly explain why, in the first decade of the Barcelona Process, most MENA states (with the exception of Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon) dragged their feet when it came to dismantling tariffs on European imports (Galal and Reiffers 2010: 11–12). As was to be expected, Arab governments and societies would soon accuse the Europeans of having opened a new phase of neocolonial exploitation (Kienle 1998: 19). These accusations did not, however, prevent the EU and its members continuing with their efforts to selectively export their trade and business model southwards. Importantly, the Europeans took it as a given fact that their trade policies would also alter the socio-economic set-up in the borderlands.

Socio-Economic Engineering in the Borderlands—to Europe's Benefit

While Arab governments have often used the accusation of European (or Western) neocolonialism as a welcome excuse to postpone meaningful political reforms, it is undeniable that the trade agreements concluded with the EU sought to transform MENA economies according to remarkably unilateral European economic preferences. MENA states would not benefit equally from the opening up to high-value manufactured imports from Europe compared to the latter, at least not in the short and medium term. In particular, the exclusion of agricultural products from the liberalized trade regime strongly undermined the potential benefits for MENA states, serving the interests of European producers instead. Moreover, the delay with which the EU agreed to the pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin rules further points to Europe's attempts to export its order on a not-so-equal basis.

The European Neighbourhood Policy provides an even stronger illustration of Europe's attempts to engineer socio-economic change in its borderlands in the interest of the European core. As a pale imitation of the logic and instruments of the EU's enlargement policy—but without any membership perspective for MENA states (Turkey excluded)—the prospects of deeper economic integration with the European trading block presuppose that these states must change their domestic legislation so as to make it compatible with EU law (European Commission 2012a: 5). 'Regulatory convergence' with the EU and 'approximation' are key words in this process, whereby Europe sets the standards, and MENA states are supposed to follow. This logic applies to all aspects of the EU's Internal Market.

The Europeans never concealed the fact that socio-economic engineering in the borderlands was a key element in their trade policies, even if only implicitly. For instance, with regard to the Common European Aviation Area, Brussels wants third states to 'move towards EU transport standards' (European Commission 2013a: 13); third states should also be 'integrated' into the European Research Area (European Commission 2013b: 15). Tellingly, in French, the primary language of the documents in the EU's relations with North African countries, the structural reform process is called *mise à niveau,* that is, 'bringing up to level'. In practice, the lion's share of European funds in support of this 'approximation' process—an amount of monies that the literature unanimously considers to be insufficient—is allocated for teaching public administration officials in third states how to implement the trade agreements signed with the EU. Government officials in third states are thus trained in the domestic implementation of European rules by 'raising their capacities adopting the best practices used in the European Union' (SAAP 2014). Revealingly, the main instruments and training activities for this purpose, in particular the 'Twinning' and TAIEX training activities,[14] were developed to prepare eastern and central European states for EU membership, in support of the adoption of legislation that is compatible with the EU's *acquis*. Both training modules were made available to the EU's southern

[14] Twinning and TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) involve long-term or short-term training to public administration officials at different institutional levels in third states. Twinning consists of sending at least one resident advisor and a number of shorter missions from the public administration of one EU member state to the beneficiary for a duration of at least twelve months. TAIEX involves short-term assistance, for instance in the form of seminars for government officials of third states. It also serves as a source of information on legislative convergence issues (European Commission 2013c). An additional programme is SIGMA (Support for the Improvement of Government and Management), which was originally developed in the early 1990s to support the transition in former Soviet Union republics and made available to states covered by the ENP in 2008. Directed at high-level government officials, SIGMA provides short-term to medium-term training in different practices of financial control and good governance. It is a principally EU-funded joint initiative with the OECD (European Commission 2013c).

(and eastern) neighbours with the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003–2004.

As the glossy and self-congratulatory (but in terms of content, rather meagre) annual reports on the Twinning and TAIEX activities of the European Commission indicate, such training activities cover a wide spectrum of issues, including the Internal Market, agriculture and food safety, justice and home affairs, transport, telecommunications, and the environment. In the section covering the Internal Market alone, for instance, these training activities cover, inter alia, the economy and trade, financial services, budget and audit activities, public administration reform, statistics, social policies, and employment. To give some figures on these training activities in MENA states, between 2004 and 2012, the EU financed 156 Twinning projects in twelve MENA states with a total budget of €160 million (HTSPE 2012: VI). Between 2004 and mid-2013, the operational budget for Twinning projects conducted in Morocco was €30 million, for Tunisia €36 million, and for Egypt €31 million (del Mar Roca Requena 2013). According to calculations based on the European Commission's annual activities report, in 2013 the EU funded and implemented a total of sixty Twinning projects in MENA states, around fifty-five in 2014, and thirty-three in 2015. Between 2004 and 2015, around 300 such projects took place, although this figure probably double-counts projects that stretched over two or more years.[15] Moreover, between 2006 and 2011, over 1200 TAIEX training activities were implemented in MENA states; in 2011 alone, these activities accounted for a total of €3 million (European Commission 2012b: 33).

What is more, Brussels pays or contributes to the salaries of dozens of government officials in MENA states who are in charge of coordinating the EU's training activities. These officials usually form a separate unit within the respective ministry of international cooperation or foreign affairs. For instance, in mid-2013 the unit in Tunisia consisted of sixteen EU-sponsored

[15] It is nearly impossible to obtain precise figures on these projects. Since 2013, the European Commission's annual reports on its TAIEX and Twinning activities have taken the form of glossy online publications that indicate the number of topics, new projects, and total participants. While these reports contain various 'success stories', they do not contain exact funding figures, nor do they include a breakdown of training activities per country. Repeated requests for information from the European Commission went unheeded. Revealingly, an EU-funded TAIEX evaluation report of 2015 (which only focused on EU candidate countries) concluded that while aggregated data existed as budgetary allocations per year for the target countries, 'there are no data available about the actual expenditures per country per year for the period under consideration according to the various types of supported TAIEX activities'. The report concluded that it is therefore 'not possible to provide findings about the cost-effectiveness based on the budget allocation/actual spending per year' (AETS 2015: 22).

staff, the Moroccan support unit included thirteen EU-financed individuals, and the one in Egypt counted eighteen officials (del Mar Roca Requena 2013). While perhaps of limited economic consequence per se, these figures are a clear indication of the EU's modus operandi in its efforts to expand its rules and functional borders. In this process, the Europeans have also nurtured the emergence and strengthening of EU-friendly economic and bureaucratic elites in the periphery. It is interesting to note here that most new projects in French-speaking countries in the 'southern neighbourhood' are usually awarded to France, entailing that French experts are regularly deployed to train mainly North African officials on how to implement EU rules.

As a concrete example of this process of 'technocratic engineering' (Kourtelis 2015: 190), the EU tried to promote a far-reaching reform package for the Egyptian banking system prior to the Arab uprisings. The prescribed reforms entailed the abolition of capital controls and the transformation of Egypt's financial system into a risk-based regulatory regime, that is, a banking system that operates according to the assessment of the amount of risk held by individual banks. Reforms also aimed at ensuring the independence of the Egyptian Central Bank. While the adoption of international banking standards in Egypt was the main objective, EU-funded training activities conspicuously promoted *European* rules and practices to achieve this aim. Incidentally, these reforms also served to facilitate the circulation of European capital (Roccu 2015; 2018a; 2018b). Similarly, EU-supported reforms to liberalize the Egyptian telecommunications sector sought to advance European regulations while facilitating investment—thereby also entrenching the strong position of European telecom operators in Egypt such as the French Orange and the UK-based Vodafone (Roccu 2015; 2018a; 2018b). EU-financed restructuring attempts, according to the neoliberal model of development and with the help of Twining and TAIEX training seminars, also targeted the Egyptian energy sector (İşleyen 2015).

Additional examples of Europe's ongoing attempts to expand the borders of its economic order southwards include EU-funded reforms in the agricultural sectors of Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Inter alia, training programmes for local administrative bodies in the agricultural sector in these countries have promoted European sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which are more demanding than WTO requirements. While higher food standards are certainly beneficial for consumers in general, the adoption and implementation of these standards are very costly for small-scale farmers (Kourtelis 2015; 2018). Yet once local agricultural companies implement these rules in MENA states, European companies benefit from improved market access (Roccu 2018a).

In Morocco, the EU's push for regulatory convergence also targeted environmental management policy (Freyburg 2011) as well as public sector reform and decentralization (Bergh 2016). Carried out in cooperation with the World Bank, these public reform and regionalization programmes have had 'some influence on the reform of the organic budget law and the budgeting guidelines and practices more generally as well as tax reform' (Bergh 2016: 14). The EU also sought—rather unsuccessfully—to promote European rules and practices for efficient water management in Jordan (Freyburg et al. 2011). It tried to advance EU telecommunications regulations in Morocco, although it was equally unsuccessful here too, with Rabat eventually adopting a Latin American model instead (Wavre and Freyburg 2020). Europe's cooperation with Algeria followed the same strategy. Here, it has been noted that EU-promoted labour market reforms entailed the standardization of skills and aimed at increasing the 'competitiveness and attractiveness of southern countries and, to a lesser extent, bolster the adaptability of southern workers to the European market' (Serres 2016: 12).

The principle of EU rule expansion also marked the agreements on civil aviation concluded with Israel, Morocco, and Jordan mentioned previously, and, interestingly, the energy sector. In this strategically significant sector for Europe, the EU has been trying to connect the southern periphery to the core according to EU rules from the early 2000s onwards. These efforts intensified in the wake of the 2006 Gazprom crisis, in which Russia reduced its gas supply to Europe via Ukraine. With the stated objective of promoting 'a real and reliable convergence of South Mediterranean partners' energy policies with EU policy' (European Commission 2011a: 10), mainly to secure Europe's energy supply, EU policies clearly envisaged rule convergence and the introduction of market principles in the energy sector (see also European Commission 2011c). Efforts to 'engage' the states in Europe's southern neighbourhood in creating an integrated (but differentiated) energy market according to EU rules has, however, been met with a lukewarm response by key actors in the MENA region, particularly Algeria, as well as by private companies (Darbouche 2011; Tholens 2014; 2017a).

Europe's attempts to selectively integrate the southern periphery into its Internal Market has thus primarily served the aim of expanding EU influence, connecting the periphery's elites to the core, and creating an EU-friendly business environment. As the EU pushes for the diffusion of European regulations in its borderlands—with some stakeholders arguing that local regulators would ideally simply 'copy-paste' EU rules (Roccu 2018b: 48)—European economic interests are key. Although a number of economic and regulatory reforms are undoubtedly beneficial to MENA states, these aim to create a business environment resembling the one in which European companies operate at home, for the benefit of the latter. The numerous EU-funded programmes on the rule of law and administrative efficiency in MENA states may be seen in this business-specific context as well, particularly since Europe's resolve in confronting repressive governments in the region in cases of human rights violations has been limited, to put it mildly.

What is more, Europe's modus operandi in the realm of trade has not changed considerably following a major development that occurred in Europe's borderlands, that is, the Arab uprisings that began in 2011.

EU Policies After the Arab Uprisings: DCFTAs and More of the Same

What was Europe's response to the millions of Arab citizens who took to the streets in 2011, demanding *khubz*, *huriyya*, *karama insaniyya* ('bread, freedom, dignity') and calling for the downfall of the regimes? Suggesting that MENA states accelerate their socio-economic restructuring processes ever more rapidly (European Commission 2011a: 2), Brussels proposed Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) as the way ahead. Without changing the basic modalities of EU engagement with its borderlands (Del Sarto 2016; Roccu 2018b), this latest generation of EU trade agreements on offer go much further in the EU's attempts to integrate neighbouring countries into its Internal Market. Besides the full elimination of tariffs in the trade of industrial goods, this new type of trade agreement aims to reduce or wholly remove all non-tariff barriers to trade, liberalize investment regimes, and harmonize or mutually recognize various trade- and investment-related rules, standards, and certificates. In this vein, the envisaged 'regulatory convergence' is meant to cover competition policy, public procurement, investment protection, and sanitary and phytosanitary certificates. As these agreements also cover trade in agriculture and services, the European Commission (2006b) posited that the economic benefits for third states would be much larger than had previously been the case. European policies would also create incentives for reform in neighbouring states, according to the Commission (European Commission (2006b). After 2011, Brussels proposed to open negotiations on DCFTAs with the original four signatories of the Agadir agreement—Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.

The explicit condition of DCFTAs, namely that third states approximate their trade-related legislation with the *acquis,* is significant for our purposes. Such approximation is quite a demanding process for most of the low-income and administratively weak Arab states in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa. What is more, approximation also entails the consideration of EU case law. This would require MENA states to automatically apply any future changes in EU standards, for instance as regards food safety, without any further negotiation (Rudloff and Werenfels 2019). A particularly problematic aspect here is that the required EU certifications and standards are set by European industry, and not by independent regulatory bodies (Kourtelis 2015: 201). These standards are constantly evolving, often reflecting predictable protectionist reflexes of European producers vis-à-vis third states.

Moreover, the question remains whether MENA state regulatory convergence with EU standards is a necessary condition for expanded trade relations with the Europeans and for (sustainable) economic growth more generally. In fact, many states, such as the Asian economies, trade intensively with the EU without having adopted EU rules (Hoekman 2018: 376). More generally, adopting EU rules and standards may actually represent an impediment to states that have a diversified set of trading partners. The adoption of *international* standards and practices may be more beneficial here. An additional consideration is that some sectors and industries in third states are poised to lose from the adoption of EU standards and regulations as the costs of domestic production increase. More generally, empirical research in development economics has demonstrated that key conditions for trade liberalization leading to higher economic growth include improved economic governance and efficient transport, financial, and communications services and infrastructure (Hoekman 2018: 376). These structures and services, however, remain extremely weak in most Arab states, with most MENA states having very serious economic problems to face in the first place (Springborg 2020).

It is equally important to underscore that Brussels insists on negotiating these trade deals on an exclusively bilateral basis. Hence, even if DCFTAs may in theory be instrumental to deeper economic integration between Europe and MENA states, Europe's attitude not only deprives MENA states (for example the members of the Agadir Process) of their bargaining power as a group, it is also contrary to Europe's professed goal of promoting interregional trade (Liargovas 2013: 20). At any event, while some scholars see the DCFTA as the cementation of colonial-style patterns of production via iniquitous trade and aid arrangements (Langan and Price 2020), it is to be expected that the outcome of the negotiations will 'be biased in favor of European big business' (Liargovas 2013: 21).

It is thus not particularly surprising that the reaction of most MENA governments to the proposed DCFTA negotiations was far from enthusiastic. Egypt showed no interest from the outset. Jordan was initially willing to negotiate but politely backtracked soon after. Negotiations with Morocco on a DCFTA started in 2013, but the Moroccan government suspended them soon afterwards because it first wanted to assess the potential impacts on its economy. Rabat subsequently put all relations with the EU on hold, following the December 2015 ruling by the European Court of Justice that declared an agricultural trade agreement between the two sides invalid because it included the Western Sahara in its territorial scope.[16] Relations resumed in early 2019. However, the DCFTA option continued to be of little appeal to Rabat because of limited expected benefits. Particularly in the context of growing commercial ties with the African continent and Morocco's relatively diversified trade relations, the Moroccan government would prefer to negotiate a new trade deal with the Europeans based on the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+).[17]

Tunisia, on the other hand, has been negotiating a new trade deal with the EU since 2016, and the preliminary text of the agreement, as proposed by the EU, was published at the end of 2019. Tunisia, however, is also the only 'Arab Spring' country to have succeeded in initiating a democratic transition after its 2011 Yasmine Revolution. An extremely active civil society played an important role in this process, and it continues to influence Tunisian politics to this day. Domestic opposition to the DCFTA has been strong.

It is important to note here that sector-specific mutual recognition of tests and certificates for industrial goods represent an alternative to third states' acceptance of the EU's body of legislation (Rudloff and Werenfels 2019). So-called Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial products (ACAAs) allow industrial goods from third states to enter the EU's Internal Market without any further testing, thus removing most non-tariff

[16] The EU has adopted an incoherent position on the Western Sahara issue: it has not recognized the POLISARIO Front (the Saharawi independence movement) nor the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, but neither does it recognize Morocco's claims to the disputed territory.

[17] The GSP+ is meant for vulnerable low and lower-middle income countries that implement twenty-seven international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment, and good governance. Under this system, the EU slashes import duties to zero per cent from products coming into the EU market. It is intended to be a special incentive for sustainable development and good governance. As of January 2020, Armenia, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka are GSP+ beneficiaries.

barriers to trade. Israel, for instance, signed an ACAA on pharmaceutical products with the EU in 2010.[18] While easier to implement for most MENA states and economically more beneficial for them (Hoekman 2018), these ACAAs, however, still rely on third states aligning their standards with those of the EU, albeit on a limited basis within specific sectors.

Exporting EU Rules and Practices to MENA Outliers: Turkey and Israel

While all these considerations apply to most MENA states, Turkey and Israel are clear outliers here, as noted earlier. Both states are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), their tariff liberalization is far more advanced by comparison to most Arab countries in the southern Mediterranean (Ghoneim et al. 2012: 32), and their trade relations with the EU are far more comprehensive and developed. With an annual trade in goods volume of around €153.4 billion in 2018, Turkey used to be the EU's fifth-largest trading partner (after Brexit the UK is the EU's fifth-largest trading partner). For Turkey, the EU remains its largest commercial partner, and over 70 per cent of foreign direct investment in this country originates in the EU (European Commission 2019b: 105). Israel, whose main trading partner is also the EU, is perhaps less important for the Europeans in quantitative terms—with an annual trade volume of around €35 billion in goods, Israel ranked twenty-eighth among the EU's trading partners in 2018 (European Commission, DG Trade 2019a). However, Israel represents a valuable commercial partner for the Europeans considering the cooperation on cutting-edge research and development, as well as on security.

This does not mean, however, that Europe has not tried to impose its trade preferences and regulations on these countries as well—quite the opposite. Turkey is the prime example here: The customs union that binds Turkey and the EU is, unsurprisingly, modelled according to EU rules, with Turkey applying the EU's common external tariff for the products covered. Recent discussions on the modernization of the customs unions anticipated additional regulatory convergence by Turkey towards the EU's *acquis* in several essential areas, notably with regard to industrial standards. More importantly, the (currently suspended) accession negotiations for full membership aimed at Ankara's eventual implementation of the entire *acquis communautaire,* as is the case for all new EU members. And indeed, since accession negotiations

[18] The agreement entered into force in January 2013.

started in 2005, and until recently, Turkey had begun a broad reform process with the objective of adopting EU legislation. During this time, the Europeans had been providing extensive financial and technical assistance to the country's reform process. Although Brussels had cut European funding by almost €800 million in 2018, it still provided Turkey with almost €400 million in financial assistance.[19] These funds supported multiannual Twinning and other cooperation programmes on, inter alia, education, environment, employment and social policies, competitiveness, innovation, transport, and rural development (European Commission 2019b: 106). In fact, while it participates in a large number of programmes that are accessible only by EU members, Turkey is already part of the European order in certain areas. These include programmes on academic mobility, such as Erasmus and Erasmus+, the EU's research and development programme, and EU activities on the competitiveness of small- and medium-sized enterprises, employment, and innovation. Turkey also participates in the European Environmental Agency, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, and the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism. Through these forms of cooperation and technical assistance programmes, the Europeans have also been trying to transform the practices of key actors in that country, including, for instance, the Turkish police (Bahçecik 2014). Of course, were it to be a full member of the European bloc, Turkey would enjoy the same rights and have an equal voice in the decision-making process in Brussels, as with all EU members. The question remains, however, as to whether the EU member states were ever fully convinced of accepting Turkey into their ranks; that the Europeans have dragged their feet for the last thirty years would appear to indicate otherwise. What is clear is that ever since Ankara applied for membership in 1987 and was deemed as 'eligible' a decade later, Europe's modus operandi vis-à-vis Turkey has aimed to include it within the expanded borders of its economic order.

Finally, due to the advanced nature of its economy, Israel enjoys 'special status' in its relations with the EU, as Brussels affirmed in its 1994 Essen Declaration (Council of the European Union 1994: 28). Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy, economic relations between the two sides have continued to improve—despite rather troubled political ties (Pardo and Peters 2010; 2012). As discussed elsewhere (Del Sarto 2007; 2014; 2015), Israel cooperates with the Europeans on an extremely wide range of issues, ranging

[19] The EU budget allocated for these measures for the 2018–2020 period was cut by around €760 million, due to Turkey's backsliding on reforms and low absorption capacity of EU funds.

from taxation to money laundering, statistics, and the environment, and both sides have signed a number of significant agreements in the last fifteen years. These cover trade liberalization in agriculture, fishery, and services, and the 'Open Sky' liberalization of civil aviation mentioned earlier. Israel has also been cooperating with Galileo, the European navigation programme, since 2004; it joined the EU's Competitiveness and Innovation Programme relating to small- and medium-sized enterprises in 2007; and became a member of the EU academic programmes that enable student and staff mobility and the establishment of joint graduate programmes. Israel's participation in European research and development programmes, which it joined in 1996, has been ongoing. Furthermore, the country became part of the EU's Copernicus project, which develops satellites for monitoring the environment and borders, and there were discussions regarding the country joining the Single European Sky Research initiative, responsible for developing an air transportation management system. Perhaps even more important is the earlier-mentioned EU–Israeli ACAA governing pharmaceutical products, which entered into force in 2013. According to this agreement, both sides now mutually recognize one another's pharmaceutical standards and testing, which, nevertheless, is premised on Israel aligning its standards with those of the EU.

Hence, without offering Israel any EU member state privileges or perspective to join the club, Europe has been increasingly exporting its economic rules and practices to Israel. This process, for which Brussels provides financial support, involves the approximation of Israeli norms and standards to those of the EU in a growing number of fields. In the words of the European Commission (2019d: 141): '[i]n a wide range of areas (including transport, environment, energy, statistics, agriculture and telecomm) EU regulatory practice (norms, standards and procedures) has been shared with the Israeli authorities, thus helping specific policy formulation and implementation'. While undoubtedly burdensome, Israel has benefited economically from this process, since European or third-country companies have been increasingly able to take advantage of the EU's Internal Market by locating themselves in Israel. This is particularly significant in areas where Israel has a comparative advantage, such as high tech, biotech, phytosanitary products, or food processing (Tovias and Magen 2005: 421; Tovias 2007). Reflecting on Israel's exceptional status in its relations with the Union, former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana stressed that 'there is no country outside the European continent that has this type of relationship that Israel has with the European Union' (quoted in Ahren 2009). In the case of Israel, then, and in strictly business-related terms, the EU's export of its economic order beyond the border has been rather successful.

Migration, Security, and Border Controls

An additional policy field in which Europe has constantly been trying to shape the southern periphery according to its rules and preferences is migration and border controls. These issues have undoubtedly gained in importance in Europe's relations with its southern periphery in recent years, not least since the Syrian refugee crisis that peaked in 2015–2016, with hundreds of thousands of refugees trying to enter EU territory. At the time of writing (March 2020), and in the shadow of the Coronavirus outbreak, migration was once again on Europe's agenda. The reason was a decision by Turkey to open its land borders to Greece, allowing Syrian refugees to cross into EU territory after a Turkish and Russian offensive in the Syrian province of Idlib. Shocking images of Greek border police firing tear gas and rubber bullets at refugees fleeing the embattled Syrian province and migrants from other countries have become a sad reality at Europe's borders (Stevis-Gridneff 2020).

Equally, the strengthening of jihadi groups in the Middle East against the background of the disintegration of Libya and Syria, the temporary rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or Daesh), and a dramatically rising number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Europe only added urgency to the European concern with security and borders. In 2015 alone, the long list of terrorist violence included attacks in Tunisia's Bardo Museum, Sousse, and Tunis; in the Turkish cities of Diyarbakır, Suruç, and Ankara; in the Egyptian cities of Al-Arish and on a Russian passenger plane leaving from the Sinai; in Beirut; as well as in Nice, Paris, and Copenhagen.

Before elaborating on the specific ways in which Europe has expanded its external borders while seeking to export a European migration and security 'order' to its southern periphery, we will now briefly consider the development of Europe's migration and security policy.

Securitizing Migration and the 'Europeanization' of Border Control Policies

Migration, security, and border controls have been at the top of the European policymaking agenda for several decades, since at least the end of the Cold

War in 1989. Shortly thereafter, the Algerian civil war, prompted by the cancellation of the second round of the country's parliamentary elections in 1991, raised the spectre of growing migratory pressures and Islamist terrorism spilling over into Europe. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 1995 Barcelona Declaration establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership included the European objective of cooperating with its 'Mediterranean partners' on the management of the EU's external borders, regarding migration, drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism (Barcelona Declaration 1995). Within the EU, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty introduced the objective of coordinating policies on migration among member states, reaffirmed and developed in greater detail at subsequent meetings of the European Council (such as in Tampere and The Hague, both in 1999). The European Commission initiated a number of programmes to address border controls, the fight against irregular migration, and human trafficking involving third states in this period. Specific cooperation on these topics with MENA states was embedded in the Barcelona Process.

The events of 9/11 and major terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, in 2004 and 2005 respectively, further reinforced the resolve of European policymakers to cooperate with the governments in North Africa and the Middle East on security, border controls, and counterterrorism (for example European Commission 2003a). On the issue of migration, which is actually not correlated to terrorism, the European Commission had started to negotiate so-called readmission agreements pertaining to irregular migrants with Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey in the early 2000s. While European countries had already been attempting to prevent the migration of unskilled and undocumented persons for some time—unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, they no longer needed cheap labour for their economic reconstruction and growth—the issue of migration became securitized as a result. In the EU's order of priorities, concern with democratization and human rights—if they had ever been truly relevant—were quietly deprioritized; stability and security patently trumped any lofty ideal of supporting political reforms in the borderlands (Joffé 2007).

With the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003–2004, migration and border controls became a centrepiece of the EU's policy towards its periphery. In the context of the European bloc's eastern enlargement in 2004, Brussels deemed it necessary that new and old neighbouring states took on a greater responsibility in improving the control of their borders, prevent unwanted migration to the EU, and assist in the removal of irregular migrants who had entered EU territory. Collaboration on counterterrorism and security more broadly was considered as equally important. As a result, all ENP Action

Plans concluded with the states in the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa have contained provisions on migration, transnational crime, and border management, along with sections on police cooperation and collaboration in justice and home affairs. Europe undoubtedly adopted the principle of conditionality in these matters, making the granting of 'a stake' in the EU's Internal Market dependent on the willingness of 'partner countries' to cooperate. In this vein, Brussels openly stated that 'co-operative countries' would be rewarded with a 'more generous visa policy [. . .] or increased quotas for migrant workers, closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, additional development assistance, better market access or WTO compatible tariff preferences' (European Commission 2003b: 14).

The Europeans' 'global' approach to migration and mobility, developed at the end of 2005, focused its attention on the issue of legal migration as well as the interlinkage of migration and economic development in third states (Council of the European Union 2005a). In the same month, however, Europe also formulated a counterterrorism strategy (Council of the European Union 2005b), which defined cooperation with third countries, including those in the Middle East, as essential. Certainly, the development of Europe's migration policies is embedded in a wider shift at the global level to address migratory questions in a comprehensive manner. The International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM) of 2000 reflects this international—but still Western-dominated—consensus on migration governance, which gradually turned into the normative framework of many international and regional initiatives on migration. Mechanisms for strengthening the centrality of countries of origin and transit in controlling the mobility of their nationals and foreigners have been a central element here (Cassarino and Del Sarto 2018). The emerging international consensus also gave way to the collaboration between international organizations and institutions working with the Europeans in advancing migration-related projects and in establishing regular consultation processes with third states. Altogether, in the general post-9/11 climate and with growing migratory pressures, a restrictive approach to migration came to prevail in European policies towards its periphery. The Arab upheavals starting in 2011 and the ensuing flows of refugees and undocumented migrants from the Middle East to Europe reinforced this approach even further. Despite a normative rhetoric stressing the importance of human rights and international law, European policies clearly gravitated around the issues of security, migration, and border management (Carrera et al. 2012; Teti et al. 2012; Dandashly 2015; Del Sarto 2016; Fakhoury 2016; Geddes and Hadj-Abdou 2017).

As mentioned earlier, the EU's pragmatist Global Strategy for foreign and security policies of 2016 bears witness to Europe's set of priorities. EU budget allocations reflect the ever-growing importance the Europeans have been assigning to migration, borders, security, and related matters: in 2015, these issues received around half of the available funding within the European Neighbourhood Policy—in Europe's south and east (European Commission 2016: 9). Morocco, one of Europe's favourite countries in the cooperation on border security and migration control in the MENA region, reportedly received close to €215 million from the EU to finance different border security projects between 2001 and 2019 (Statewatch 2019).

As will be discussed in the following sections, Europe's policy on migration, security, and border controls vis-à-vis its southern periphery has been marked by a process of externalizing and outsourcing EU border controls, the conclusion of rather problematic agreements, the transfer of specific borders and bordering practices to the borderlands, and, more generally, burden-shifting. These are the different aspects of European attempts to shift its borders southwards and to keep Europe 'safe', as will be elucidated next.

Moving and Multiplying Europe's External Borders

Much has been written in recent years on the externalization and outsourcing of Europe's border controls (for example Lavenex and Uçarer 2003; Boswell 2003; Bigo and Guild 2005; Geddes 2005; Lutterbeck 2006; Rijpma and Cremona 2007; Bialasiewicz 2012). This development describes Europe's strategy of transferring the physical control of people outside EU territory and thus closer to and even into the territory of its 'neighbours'. This process has also entailed the deployment of police officers from EU member states or private security contractors outside national territory and the partial delegation of border controls duties to government officials of peripheral states.

In Europe's southern periphery, a good example of this process is the regular joint patrols of European coastguards with the border police of MENA states off the coasts of the Mediterranean (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015; Rijpma 2016). Perhaps the presence of Italian personnel from the *Guardia di Finanza* (Italy's military finance police corps)[20] on the patrol boats of the Libyan coastguard receives some public attention in the event of

[20] Mainly responsible for detecting smuggling and financial fraud, the *Guardia di Finanza* is a military police under the control of the Italian finance ministry.

major incidents. This was the case, for instance, when a Libyan coastguard vessel—one of the six vessels it had received as a donation from Italy—opened fire on an Italian fishing boat in international waters in 2010 (Corriere della Sera 2010). However, these joint Italian–Libyan patrols have become the norm. Police officers from European member states such as France have also reportedly been involved in border controls at North African sea and airport terminals. Specialized French immigration liaison officers, for example, have been deployed in Morocco, where they are responsible for coordinating the activities, procedures, and police departments of both countries with regard to migration control and readmissions (El Qadim 2014). Not only have EU-funded projects led by France and Spain supported the creation of border infrastructure in Morocco since 2001, these projects have also facilitated joint Moroccan patrols with the coastguards of EU member states. Yet another example here is Rabat's participation from 2006 to 2008 in the Seahorse Project, an EU-funded initiative implemented by the Spanish military police, the *Guardia Civil*.[21] Seahorse has created a network for exchanging information on irregular migrants that now serves as one of the foundations of the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). Established in 2013, this system provides surveillance of the EU's external borders and the so-called pre-frontier area. It has also established an information-exchange network that enables the near real-time sharing of border-related data (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015; Statewatch 2019).

There are many other examples of this externalization process, all of which have resulted in the relocation and multiplication of the EU's external borders. As Europe's internal and external security have become increasingly interlinked (Bigo 2006), this development demonstrates most visibly the disassociation of physical boundaries from functional regimes in Europe's fluid borderlands that is so typical of imperial practices. It also points to the reconfiguration of the relationship between territory and sovereignty (Casas-Cortes et al. 2013).

Furthermore, as Europe's external and shifting borders with MENA states are fortified for specific people and goods, the relationship between Europe, its periphery, and 'the periphery of the periphery' is rearticulated. Repeated rounds of EC/EU enlargement have demonstrated, for instance, that the economic integration of new members has produced patterns of exclusion

[21] Besides Morocco, other participants in the Seahorse project include Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and the Republic of Guinea.

vis-à-vis the new peripheries, which often witnessed economic decline as a result. Very similar patterns also mark the movement of people across Europe's neighbours and 'the neighbours of the neighbours'. At Europe's urging, many MENA states have hardened the external borders they share with their respective hinterland. Brussels has been particularly adamant in trying to convince North African states—major 'sending countries'—to strengthen their border controls in order to limit migration from sub-Saharan Africa (Cassarino 2006). From the mid-2000s onwards, however, the EU opened its hitherto internal cross-border cooperation programmes to its near abroad, MENA states included, with the aim of fostering greater cooperation and integration *within the border regions* in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This process most clearly conveys Europe's construction of a buffer zone around itself, as observed previously (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005; Del Sarto 2010). As Europe 'fades out' at its external borders, Europe's buffer zone is, however, increasingly separated from the area that lies beyond it, with important material and diplomatic costs for these 'buffering states' (see also Zardo and Cavatorta 2016: 4).

Finally, there is Frontex, the EU border agency, which plays a significant role in Europe's 'policing at a distance' (Bigo 2006: 399). Not only does Frontex act as a hub for the European Border Surveillance System Eurosur, it assists EU member states at the EU's external borders through its operations and rapid border interventions. As noted in the first chapter of this book, Frontex has turned into the European bloc's moving but impermeable border for unwanted people and illicit goods (Rumford 2012: 891). Comprised of contingents and assets from different EU member states, the various Frontex operations off Morocco's Atlantic coast and in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas usually occur in response to requests for assistance by individual EU states. The longest-lasting Frontex naval mission is Operation Hera, requested by the Spanish government to assist with the blocking of unwanted migration along the maritime route from West Africa to the Spanish Canary Islands. Starting in 2006, the mission has repeatedly been adjusted and prolonged to this day. Other examples include Operation Poseidon, which started in 2006 at the request of Greece to assist in the surveillance of the country's sea and land borders with Turkey; Operation Hermes in the Mediterranean Sea, requested by Italy in 2011; and Operation Triton, which operated between 2014 and 2015. The latter replaced an Italian search-and-rescue operation in the Mediterranean, *Mare Nostrum,* launched after more than 350 people had drowned off the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013 when their boat capsized. Unlike the Italian mission, which was larger but also very costly, Operation Triton did not have the specific goal to engage in search and rescue.[22]

It is important to note that Frontex operations often involve third states as well, including MENA countries. The bases of their cooperation with Frontex, however, are usually the bilateral agreements they have signed with single European states, such as Spain and France in the case of Morocco. While these accords are rarely available to the public, Frontex officials usually claim that they are not in possession of these bilateral agreements either.

Against the backdrop of the growing number of migrants and refugees drowning on their journey to Europe in recent years, humanitarian emergencies and rescues at sea have helped to boost the image, legitimacy, and self-perception of the Frontex border agency (Perkowski 2018). According to the assessments of the border agency, the sea, especially along the Mediterranean routes, 'will remain the most active path for illegal crossing of the EU external borders, but also one of the most dangerous for migrant smuggling requiring humanitarian assistance efforts' (Frontex 2018: 8–9). However, problems of transparency, accountability, and democratic oversight remain. Indeed, the professed duty of saving migrants' lives tends to hide from public scrutiny the precise modalities in which Frontex controls Europe's mobile border, including the interception and return of migrants and potential asylum seekers, in violation of international law (Omonira-Oyekanmi 2012; Wriedt and Reinhardt 2017). Yet while the entanglement of the logics of securitization and humanitarianism provides a script for the production of knowledge about and governance of 'irregular' populations (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017), the humanitarian narrative has also helped Frontex to steadily expand its role, powers, and resources (Rijpma and Cremona 2007; Baldaccini 2010; Campesi 2014; Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015; Tazzioli 2016; Rijpma 2017).

It is worth noting that the European arms industry, which had been pushing for the expansion of Frontex for years, has been a major beneficiary of this development. Major European security companies succeeded in obtaining large contracts on border security with the EU and single European states, for instance by providing helicopters, radars, border patrol vessels, and biometric identification equipment (Akkerman 2020) to guard

[22] Italy's *Mare Nostrum* naval operation lasted for a year and is thought to have saved thousands of lives. However, in view of the high costs, estimated at almost €10 million a month, Italy ended the operation, asking the EU for assistance (see for example Campesi 2014). In June 2015, Triton was replaced by an EU naval force mission, EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia, headquartered in Rome, and with the contribution of twenty-six EU member states.

Europe's borders.[23] Yet, Frontex's cooperation with third states implies the partial delegation of legal and human rights responsibilities to these states, with little if any attention paid to either monitoring or enforcement. Considering the dubious, if not appalling, human rights record of many states with which Frontex cooperates, this aspect is particularly problematic (see also Del Sarto and Steindler 2015).

Shady Agreements and Arrangements

The contractual, or better pseudo-contractual, dimension of the EU's border externalization process has witnessed the multiplication of formal and informal cooperation agreements on migration and border controls, signed between single EU member states and MENA countries on a bilateral basis (Cassarino 2007; 2020).[24] In the framework of these agreements, the country in question commits itself to blocking undocumented migration from their territory to Europe, including through the patrolling of maritime borders, and to 'readmitting' undocumented migrants that are expelled from Europe. The accords often include different arrangements on police and other forms of security cooperation (see also Bialasiewicz 2012; Casas-Cortes et al. 2013). Usually embedded in broader arrangements or memoranda of understanding and often hidden from the public eye, readmission agreements also cover nationals from other countries who have entered EU territory through the point of exit of the relevant state that has agreed to cooperate with Europe. In the case of North African countries, this particularly concerns nationals from sub-Saharan Africa. With France, Greece, Italy, and Spain being the main drivers of these informal arrangements, cooperation on migration is usually rewarded with financial aid, the transfer of equipment and technology, and political concessions of various kinds (Cassarino 2007; 2010).

Under Qaddafi's rule, Libya served as a prime example of these shadowy European deals on migration and border control. As is widely known, Tripoli received extensive European financial and technical support, mainly from Italy, as a reward for preventing migrants and refugees from reaching Europe (Paoletti and Pastore 2010; Paoletti 2011). In December 2000, Rome and Tripoli signed a cooperation agreement on combating terrorism,

[23] These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (a pan-European company), the Italian Leonardo, and the French Thales.

[24] For an inventory of bilateral agreements on migration and readmission see Cassarino's database at http://www.jeanpierrecassarino.com/datasets/ra

organized crime, drugs, and illegal migration, an agreement that the Italian government was rather reluctant to publicize. It precipitated cooperation on the deportation of irregular migrants and refugees who had entered Italian territory, most notably the island of Lampedusa, back to Libya by airlift (UNHCR 2005). The fact that Libya under Qaddafi never signed the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees is particularly troubling in this context. However, this did not prevent the European Union from sending a technical mission to the country to explore cooperation on undocumented migration and border controls in 2004, an initiative the Libyan authorities were very interested in (European Commission 2004d). The 'Friendship Treaty' concluded in 2008 by Silvio Berlusconi's government with the erstwhile Libyan strongman included a comprehensive reparations package for Italy's colonial past, but it also allowed for the intensification of joint patrols along the Libyan coast.[25] It also facilitated Italy's return to Libya of hundreds of migrants and refugees rescued at sea or on its shores. Given that it prevented refugees from lodging asylum applications and violated the principle of *non-refoulement*, this unlawful practice was (and still is) regularly condemned by human rights organizations (UNHCR 2010; also Baldaccini 2010: 253; Maccanico 2020).[26] Notwithstanding these concerns, high-ranking EU officials agreed on future cooperation on asylum and migration with their Libyan counterparts in October 2010 (Paoletti and Pastore 2010: 23). During Qaddafi's rule, media reports on the ill-treatment of mainly sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees in detention centres in the Libyan middle of nowhere, financed by the EU and the Italian government, circulated frequently in the media (see for example Brothers 2007; also Paoletti 2011). The unlawful detention of refugees and migrants in squalid and overcrowded detention centres, many without access to food and basic healthcare and often subject to mistreatment, rape, and torture, has continued in Libya since the fall of Qaddafi. According to the European Commission, which has defined the situation in Libya as requiring particular attention, between four and five thousand refugees and migrants were held in Libyan detention centres in 2016, 'with the fragility of the state creating obvious doubts about their basic protection and respect of their rights' (European Commission 2016: 15).

[25] The 'Friendship Treaty' of August 2008 committed Italy to pay US $5 billion over the next twenty years to compensate Libya for Italy's colonial damages. Part of this money was supposed to be used to finance major infrastructure projects in Libya with the involvement of Italian firms.

[26] In 2019, an Italian court found the Italian authorities guilty of the *refoulement* of fourteen Eritreans, who were among around eighty people rescued by an Italian warship and taken back to Libya in July 2019, thus denying them access to procedures to obtain international protection (Maccanico 2020).

In addition to Rome's dealings with Libya, the Italian authorities have also maintained formal and informal agreements on security and migration with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey (Cassarino 2020). They signed an agreement on police cooperation with Egypt in 2000, followed by a 'proper' readmission agreement in 2008. Since then, both sides have been cooperating on the forced return of migrants and refugees intercepted on Egyptian territory (thanks also to charter flights from Egypt paid for by the Italian Ministry of the Interior). Part of this cooperation also involves the swift deportation of undocumented Egyptians entering Italian territory. In return, Cairo has benefited from donated coast patrol vessels, fingerprinting technology, off-road vehicles, and other equipment, together with various training activities for Egyptian government officials (Cuttitta 2017: 8). Despite a short moment of hesitation following the 2011 revolution and the subsequent election of Mohamed Morsi, and notwithstanding the murder of the Italian doctoral researcher Giulio Regeni in Cairo in January 2016, Italy's cooperation with the Egyptian authorities on borders, security, and migration control has been continuing, including under the repressive regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Other European member states, eager to follow Italy's example in Egypt, have cooperated with other MENA states on security, migration, and border control (Cuttitta 2017: 8). In particular, the issue of counterterrorism has remained the domain of single EU member states, with the amount of bilateral deals multiplying since the early 2000s (Wolff 2009). It is no secret that France, for example, has maintained cosy relations with the intelligence services and police forces of most of its former colonies in North Africa. Indeed, an impressive range of formal and informal agreements on police cooperation, security cooperation, and the readmission of unwanted migrants is in place between Paris and Rabat, Tunis, Algiers, and also Tripoli, with some of these dating back to the 1980s (Cassarino 2020). Following the 1991 intervention by the Algerian military, which aborted the democratic process in that country apparently won by the Islamists, France successfully lobbied the EU to increase its aid to the Algerian regime (Durac and Cavatorta 2009: 11). In a similar vein, Greece has maintained police cooperation and readmission agreements with Tunisia, Egypt, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, Turkey. Equally, Spain and Morocco have a long history of cooperating on counterterrorism and border controls. These joint efforts were further reinforced following the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks, with both sides stating their clear approval of the cooperation (Ortega Dolz 2016). Involving the Spanish national police and the *Guardia Civil*, these have included joint maritime patrols, joint police teams based in cities such as Tangier, mixed investigation teams, and the regular exchange of information. Madrid's close cooperation with Morocco has also included sending a liaison magistrate to Rabat involved in the prosecution of terrorism cases, together with joint counterterrorism operations carried out by Moroccan and Spanish police. Between 2013 and 2014 alone, six major joint operations took place that led to forty arrests across both countries (Reinares and García-Calvo 2015).

These formal and informal deals on borders, security, and migration have not been the sole prerogative of southern European countries, however. Germany, for instance, has concluded police cooperation and readmission agreements with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and even with Syria; the United Kingdom has maintained similar relations with Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon (Cassarino 2020).

The advent of the European Neighbourhood Policy witnessed the EU's attempts to standardize the migration, security, and border control policies of the single member states while simultaneously adding an EU dimension to the process. The ENP Action Plans signed with the majority of the states in the Mediterranean Middle East, for instance, entailed almost identical provisions on collaborations on migration control, police cooperation, and capacity building. Libya, which was not part of the ENP, also became the target of European efforts to foster migration and border control cooperation. In 2005, the EU started an ad hoc dialogue on migration issues with Tripoli (Paoletti and Pastore 2010). However, despite the EU's pronounced interest in forging closer counterterrorism cooperation with the MENA states, this has remained confined to bilateral agreements between single EU members and MENA governments.

Brussels has been more successful in its attempts to 'Europeanize' the policy of single member states on migration control. Beginning in 2005 as a follow-up to the EU's newly adopted 'global' approach to migration (European Commission 2005), the EU has proposed so-called Mobility Partnerships to MENA states, which, in addition to readmission, have covered visa facilitations and the opening of channels for temporary and circular legal migration. After the Arab uprisings and the ensuing refugee crisis, and as Europe became particularly concerned with migration and border controls (European Commission 2011d; 2011e), Brussels coaxed MENA governments into signing such Mobility Partnership agreements. In an uncertain period of transition, the EU started exerting considerable political and financial pressures on vulnerable states, as was the case with Morocco and Tunisia (Limam and Del Sarto 2015).

While the Mobility Partnership documents are not legally binding and cooperation on deportations is no longer a strict requirement (an affirmed willingness to cooperate suffices), there are several problems with these documents. For one, the EU's promise of 'visa facilitation' does not necessarily mean that it will be easier for MENA nationals to obtain a visa to enter EU territory. Rather, it means that cumbersome *visa application procedures* will be facilitated. Similarly problematic is the fact that the Mobility Partnerships commit third states to cooperate with the EU *and all of its member states* on unwanted migration and border controls, whereas legal migration and the granting of long-term visas remain the exclusive sphere of EU member states. This implies that single EU members have to agree on these issues with third states in separate agreements—and they are usually not in a hurry to conclude such accords. What is more, visa applications to the EU's Schengen area have become not less, but more complicated and costly for MENA nationals in recent years (Limam and Del Sarto 2020). For instance, most EU Schengen countries have delegated visa application procedures from their consular authorities to private contractors in MENA states, thereby creating serious accountability issues. Since the Mobility Partnerships (which are about neither mobility nor partnership) clearly reflect the priorities of the EU and its members, MENA states have showed little enthusiasm to sign up to these agreements. Under enormous pressure from Europe, Morocco and Tunisia did eventually conclude a Mobility Partnership in 2013 and 2014 respectively, but both countries have been dragging their feet in reaching a formal agreement on the readmission of expelled migrants from Europe, measures that are highly unpopular in both countries. Jordan, for its part, also signed up to a Mobility Partnership in 2014.

Perhaps the most sensational and widely criticized deal on migrants and refugees was the 2016 EU agreement with Turkey, led by Germany. Although the signing of this agreement occurred after the time span under consideration in this book (1995–2015), it is worth mentioning since it epitomizes the predicament of EU policies on migration and border controls vis-à-vis its southern borderlands. As the number of Syrian refugees reaching Greece increased exponentially from the summer of 2015 onwards—with more than 300,000 people arriving in Greece from Turkey in less than three months during this period—and as the Europeans reacted with bewilderment and complete confusion to the unfolding events, Brussels discovered Turkey's role as Europe's potential gatekeeper. The number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey under temporary protection had already risen to 1.5 million people at the end of 2014 (Okyay and Zaragoza Cristiani 2016: 53), and Ankara had signalled to the Europeans that it was no longer able or willing to host additional refugees without any help. In the EU–Turkey deal of March

2016, Brussels and Ankara agreed on the resettlement to EU member states of 72,000 Syrian refugees present on Turkish territory, in return for Turkey's readmission—that is, acceptance of Europe's expulsion—of irregular migrants crossing to the Greek islands from Turkish territory. Furthermore, Ankara received a total of €6 billion to host Syrian refugees from the EU, in addition to reopening the stalled EU accession negotiations and the promise to liberalize the visa regime for Turkish nationals travelling to the EU. As noted earlier, the accession negotiations resumed but were subsequently suspended, and the visa liberalization issue has not proceeded as Turkey had hoped for. As discussed later in greater detail, this deal clearly gave Turkey, which by 2019 was hosting 3.7 million Syrian refugees, the ability to blackmail Europe. Indeed, this is exactly what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proceeded to do in March 2020 with his decision to open the Turkey–EU border to Syrian refugees fleeing Idlib province.

As the number of refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war continued to grow, the EU has also provided funds and incentives to other MENA countries to host and integrate refugees—and to ensure that they stay put. Jordan, for instance, which has been hosting over 600,000 Syrian refugees, has received EU funding through the so-called Madad Fund, an EU regional trust fund in support of Syrian refugees and local communities created in 2014.[27] Economic incentives have accompanied the increased flow of money: to take just one example, Brussels has agreed to simplify the rules of origin for Jordanian exports in the hope that this measure would create jobs for both Jordanian citizens and Syrian refugees. The EU has also proposed a special export regime for manufactured goods produced in special industrial areas, provided the respective companies employ a minimum percentage of Syrian refugees (Trauner and Cassarino 2018).

Similar arrangements are in place in Lebanon, which in 2019 hosted approximately one million Syrian refugees within a total Lebanese population of around 5–6 million people. While the country is also a recipient of Madad funding, Brussels and Lebanon signed a 'refugee compact' in 2016 with the aim of easing the burden incurred by Lebanon in hosting the refugees and to generate employment for refugee and Lebanese communities alike (Fakhoury 2019).

Finally, Brussels gave a mandate to open negotiations between Frontex and a number of MENA states, reflecting the persistent interest in concluding

[27] By March 2020, this trust fund has mobilized €2.2 billion, including voluntary contributions from twenty-one EU member states, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (European Commission 2020a).

framework agreements between the European border agency and third states. Thus far, the only state in the Mediterranean Middle East to sign a 'memorandum of understanding' with Frontex has been Turkey, which did so in 2012. However, Frontex has been planning to sign working arrangements with a number of other MENA states, including Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. According to the EU's regulations, these working agreements are geared towards operational cooperation, that is, joint patrolling operations and the return of undocumented migrants, border technologies transfer and training, and cooperation on research and development. While no formal cooperation agreements with Frontex have been signed thus far, Tunisian and Egyptian officials have been participating as observers in a rather obscure forum, the Africa–Frontex Intelligence Community, since early 2015. Set up in 2010, this regional network aims to provide a framework for intelligence sharing on border security and the improvement of operational capabilities between Frontex and African countries (Jones 2017; Frontex 2019b).[28]

Given the ambiguity and legal uncertainty surrounding Frontex operations in general, this type of arrangement, together with all the formal and informal agreements on borders and migration control at the EU and bilateral level, encapsulates Europe's attempts to externalize its border control practices and export them to the neighbourhood. While many agreements may contain the commitment to respect human rights and refugee law, Europe's collaboration with states violating these rights by default raises very serious concerns.

Training on Security and Border Management Practices

The European training of border and police officials in MENA states represents a further crucial aspect in the process of turning the Mediterranean Middle East into an advanced EU checkpoint for the control of undocumented migration and refugee flows. This is equally true of the realm of counterterrorism and the fight against the smuggling of illicit goods. In other words, the EU's remote policing, which dovetails with the shifting of European borders beyond the borderline (Balibar 2009), is intrinsically linked to Europe's attempts to teach local authorities in its periphery how to follow its rules

[28] In 2015, this forum included Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as full members, and officials from Tunisia, Chad, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya as observers (Jones 2017). Algeria and Libya joined more recently (Frontex 2019b).

and practices—in a highly selective manner, of course. To complicate matters, EU-funded training on border management and security may fall under different expenditure areas and funding lines, such as police cooperation, security sector reform, cross-border programmes, and cooperation on migration, making it rather difficult to track these activities in detail.[29]

Moreover, the bilateral dimension of this cooperation is of crucial importance here. Many of the border and security agreements mentioned earlier that have been signed in recent decades between single EU member states and MENA governments contain a training component. Capacity building and the transfer of know-how usually entail the use of technical equipment that Europe has been providing to MENA states, ranging from fingerprinting technology and surveillance devices to coastguard patrol vessels. For example, Italy has been training Libyan coastguards and other police personnel; Rome's generous donations of patrol boats to the Libyan coastguard have continued to this day (Nigro 2018). Spain has been providing training to Moroccan officials in these areas for a long time; French authorities train Tunisian and Moroccan border and other police forces, and so on (Cuttitta 2017; Ortega Dolz 2016; Statewatch 2019; European Commission 2012c).

In the context of growing European concern with counterterrorism and unwanted migration, the European Neighbourhood Policy added an EU layer to the efforts of individual member states to shape the police and security forces operating at the border according to their individual preferences. EU-funded projects on these topics, such as the EUROMED Police project and the 'flagship' EUROMED Migration programme, have their origins in this period. In this vein, the explicit objective of the EUROMED Migration project, which started in 2004 and is currently in its fourth phase, is to provide 'capacity-building, applying a new outcome-oriented approach which includes sub-regional activities, tailor-made national training programmes and a targeted technical assistance package for small-scale concrete actions' (European Commission 2018a). In practice, it is rather difficult to ascertain what these 'small-scale concrete actions' actually consist of. An equally

[29] For background, the section within the EU's multiannual financial framework covering expenditures for external relations between 2014 and 2020 (which amount to approximately 6 per cent of the EU's total budget) included sixteen different 'instruments'. These range from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)—the European Neighbourhood Policy financial tool—to pre-accession assistance for EU candidate countries (such as Turkey), expenditures for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the European Fund for Sustainable Development, to name but a few (see for example European Commission 2018b: 3–4). The type and name of financial tools and the programmes funded by these tools have also changed over time.

important objective of the EUROMED Migration project is the establishment and strengthening of a 'North-South and South-South regional dialogue on migration, including on the root causes of migration' (European Commission 2018a). One is left wondering why the root causes of migration need year-long discussions. In any event, the EU-funded project, which is primarily implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), has witnessed the participation of most MENA states since it was launched, from Morocco to Israel and Syria, and has been funded with approximately €15 million in the period between 2004 and 2015 (see also GIZ et al. n.d.). The ICMPD has been carrying out a large number of additional EU-funded borders- and migration-related programmes. For instance, between 2011 and 2013 it implemented a project, cofunded by the Swiss government, to improve the capacity of the Algerian authorities to 'manage mixed migratory flows' and enhance the protection of migrants. The organization is also in charge of a project with the revealing acronym MIEUX ('MIgration EU eXpertise'), a project that since 2009 has aimed to strengthen the 'migration governance capacities' of governments in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Within the framework of this project, EU and member state specialists transfer their expertise and 'best practices' to third states. Of the MENA states, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon have participated in these capacity-building and training activities (ICMPD 2016). For Libya, on the other hand, the EU allocated €3 million to strengthen Libyan capacities in the field of border controls in 2006 (Paoletti and Pastore 2010).

Europe's (selective) export of its rules and practices on borders and security more broadly is also carried out through other agencies, such as Frontex and EUROPOL, the EU's law enforcement agency. In fact, when the EU agencies, implementing organizations, and single EU member states are all taken into account, the sheer number of training activities conducted in this area becomes overwhelming. However, alongside the traditional secrecy surrounding any sort of security cooperation, the diffuse and ubiquitous nature of these activities makes it extremely difficult to obtain a clear picture. Evidently, however, Brussels is satisfied with the training activities that have been conducted on border management in third states. In this vein, the European Commission and the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy recommended in 2015 that this mode of collaboration should be intensified. More specifically, they advocated that work on 'information exchange, administrative capacity and operational and technical cooperation' with the states on Europe's periphery should be increased, with a focus on 'training, research, capacity-building projects and pilot projects [. . .], notably working through relevant EU Agencies, including FRONTEX and EUROPOL' (European Commission 2015a: 17).

With regard to selected states in the Mediterranean Middle East, Europe's attempts to mould border controls according to European rules and practices are more structured. For instance, the EU has sought to export its 'Integrated Border Management' system, which also deals with the movement of goods and customs checks, to Turkey and Lebanon (and more recently to Tunisia). The EU developed this system of border management, which entails the standardization of rules and practices governing border controls, in the context of the abolition of internal border checks within the Schengen area, the growing concern with transnational terrorism and irregular migration in the early 2000s, and the eastern enlargement of 2004. The objective of this border management system is to block the cross-border movement of unauthorized people and illicit goods while simultaneously facilitating the flow of goods and authorized people, thus boosting trade and the 'legal' movement of people. Borders should be 'open, but controlled and secure' (European Commission 2010: 14).

In the EU's attempts to export this model to third states, first tried in the Western Balkan region, there is a host of seemingly technical prescriptions governing how national borders should be managed, and by which agencies. For instance, border controls should occur through flexible managerial procedures; they should be based on data collection and regular risk analyses and operate in conjunction with the effective coordination of, and cooperation between, relevant ministries and border management agencies. Moreover, border management should be conducted by a specialized and professional body, preferably by civilian (as opposed to military) authorities (European Commission 2010: 41; also Okyay 2020).

With regard to Turkey, the EU had tried to export the underlying rules and practice of this border management model in the context of the pre-accession process, as was the case for all other EU membership candidate countries.[30] Extensive training on European practices and procedures was, of course, an important aspect of these attempts. This was particularly relevant when it came to the issue of controlling irregular migration through Turkey, an important transit country for migration to Europe. While controlling the

[30] In addition to the Western Balkans, the EU has been promoting its border management system to Central Asia and to the countries in its east, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia (the latter kindly turned down the EU's offer to train its border agency personnel, though).

flow of undocumented migrants had not been Ankara's main priority, the European model of border management diverged from Turkey's concept and practice of border controls in several respects. Given its specific regional and geopolitical context, Turkey had retained a rather classical understanding of security threats, with the military taking the lead in controlling its borders (Okyay 2020). The aftermath of the Arab uprisings and the start of the civil war in Syria would considerably impact the EU's attempts to export its 'Integrated Border Management' system to Turkey, as discussed more fully in the next chapter .

In Lebanon, the EU's promotion of its Integrated Border Management model went hand in hand with the establishment of a new border data management system and training centre. Within this framework, the EU has also been training 'all Lebanese national security agencies' (European Commission 2017: 21) and organizing study visits to Europe, in addition to providing technical assistance and equipment to these agencies (European Commission 2017: 21). Certainly, the EU's training on border management in Lebanon is only one of the various security assistance programmes supported by a myriad of other external actors, including the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Qatar, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The intensity of this external involvement in Lebanon's security structure reflects a much broader geopolitical competition that has increased since the Arab uprisings, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and the emergence and temporary expansion of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In any event, the EU's training programmes on lean procedures and practices for better interagency coordination, intra-agency cooperation, improved communication, and clear chains of commands, implemented by the ICMPD and beginning in 2013, conflicted somewhat with the fragmented, military-dominated, sectarian, and often chaotic reality of border management practices in Lebanon (Tholens 2017b). Even if it is possible to question the effectiveness of the EU's training programmes in both Turkey and Lebanon, it is important to note that the EU's efforts to export seemingly technocratic rules and procedures on border management to its southern periphery have far-ranging political implications. These rules and practices directly touch upon questions of governance and the domestic power configuration, which both derive from the involvement of specific agencies and groups in border control functions (Okyay 2020; Tholens 2017b).

Finally, in the case of the Palestinian Territories, the EU's training of security personnel has taken place in the context of the professed European objective to support security sector reform, state-building, and the two-state solution to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Here, the Europeans have trained the civilian police of the Palestinian Authority, which exercises limited power across eighteen per cent of the West Bank, primarily in the major Palestinian cities. Established in January 2006, the police mission, named EUPOL COPPS,[31] provides training to senior officials of the Palestinian Ministry of Interior and Palestinian civilian police officers 'in accordance with the best European and international standards' (European Union External Action—EUPOL COPPS, n.d.). While the United States has been in charge of training the various Palestinian security sector agencies, including the Presidential Guard, a 'rule of law section' was added in 2008 to the original European police training mission. EUPOL COPPS, which continues to this day and currently employs seventy-two staff from the EU member states, sets out to strengthen the civilian police within the Palestinian security architecture, advance procedures in respect of human rights and sensitive to questions of gender, and promote 'effective and efficient frontline policing' (European Union External Action—EUPOL COPPS, n.d.). The mission's stated ultimate objective is to contribute to the safety and security of the Palestinian people, a goal that stands, however, in clear contrast to the actual state of affairs in the West Bank. While the Palestinian Authority has been cooperating with Israel on security and in jointly fighting Hamas for the benefit of the security of Israeli citizens (Klein 2010: 21 ff.), the EU's training activities for Palestinian civil police have taken place within the rules and boundaries set by Israel's protracted control over the West Bank (Khalil and Del Sarto 2015). Furthermore, EU training in the framework of EUPOL COPPS has sought to contribute to state-building where no Palestinian state exists—and where none is in sight (Bouris 2014; Del Sarto 2019).

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Our focus on trade relations and cooperation in the fields of migration, security, and border controls has shown that Europe's engagement with its southern periphery is inseparable from concerted attempts by the bloc to shift southwards a variety of borders that are functional and, at times, territorial. Efforts to impose its order and preferences on neighbouring states are a central element of Europe's modus operandi, which applies to all MENA states irrespective of the type of contractual relations that happen to be in place: it encompasses participants of the Barcelona Process and the ENP, non-participants, and pre-EU accession countries alike. In the realm of trade

[31] The acronym stands for EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support.

relations, European policies have created a differentiated system of partial integration into the EU's Internal Market, and according to EU rules. The Europeans have provided extensive financial and technical assistance in support of the reform process they have prescribed. However, while primarily serving European economic interests, the EU's expansion of its economic order beyond the border has also aimed to restructure the borderlands and create a business-friendly environment for European companies there. In this process, Europe has relied on economic, political, and bureaucratic elites in the periphery, which it has nurtured through its policies. Another way to look at this process is to consider it as the rearticulation of the frontiers of capital accumulation through different forms of inclusion and exclusion from the EU's Internal Market. A combination of single states, large European companies, EU institutions, and MENA elites seem to drive this process (Smith 2015; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013).

A similar picture emerges in the realm of migration and border controls. In the process of turning the Mediterranean Middle East and North Africa into Europe's southern buffer zone, Europe has tried to co-opt the governments, security, and law enforcement agencies of MENA states. It has done so with the help of different incentives and rewards or by exerting political pressure. Alongside dubious agreements and arrangements, numerous training activities involving the EU and its agencies as well as single EU member states have created an opaque web of relations across Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East in these policy fields. Importantly, Europe's policies of externalizing its border controls with the objective of reducing unwanted migration and providing 'security' to its citizens have also entailed the delegation of the duty of international protection of refugees and migrants to a number of peripheral states with scandalous human rights records.

Europe's policies vis-à-vis the southern periphery, which translate into continuous and wide-ranging efforts to transfer the European model of governance, is clearly limited to the rules and practices that align with its agenda. The question of how these European 'channelled policy transfers' (Cassarino 2014) have affected the political and economic order in the states of the Mediterranean Middle East themselves is the focus of the next chapter.