



## Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970

Holger Nehring

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199681228

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681228.001.0001

# Organizing the Extra-Parliamentary Politics of Security

Holger Nehring

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199681228.003.0005

## Abstract and Keywords

Concepts of 'fellowship' and 'community' were crucial for generating a feeling of belonging within the movements and for re-creating a synchrony between experiences and life worlds within the movements. As political actors, however, the movements also required organizations to regulate the multitude of communications about security and to turn them into political aims. Activists' political experiences and the form of social organization were, therefore, intimately related. Movement organizations aided the activists in discussing their aims and in communicating their visions of 'security' to the wider public by providing them with rules and procedures that enabled them to translate their manifold experiences into political aims. But the movements' organizational structures not only facilitated communications; they were themselves products of communicative processes.

*Keywords:* CND, Campaign against Atomic Death, Easter Marches, organizational culture, social movement organizations

Concepts of 'fellowship' and 'community' were crucial for generating a feeling of belonging within the movements and for re-creating a synchrony between experiences and life worlds within the movements. As political actors, however, the movements also required organizations in order to regulate the multitude of communications about security and to turn them into political aims. Activists' political experiences and the form of social organization were, therefore, intimately related. Movement organizations aided the activists in discussing their aims and in communicating their visions of 'security' to the wider public by

providing them with rules and procedures that enabled them to translate their manifold experiences into political aims. But the movements' organizational structures not only facilitated communications; they were themselves products of communicative processes.

Organizational structures endowed the protests with a political label. They gave activists and the general public a specific address—a name—on which they could call and thus helped establish networks of activists and aided political identification.<sup>1</sup> Thus, organizations made it possible that both activists and the general public could conceive of their protests not merely as events, but as part of a general and sustained political campaign. They helped create a seemingly stable political location that could be addressed by political actors and thus facilitated identification.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, however, the organizational structures of the campaigns created their own dissatisfactions: once the extra-parliamentary politics of **(p.128)** security had been organized, some activists came to feel that the official routines and procedures hampered the fulfilment of their personal political goals. This gave rise to novel organizational dynamics that moved the politics of security on. Especially in West Germany, the link of the Campaign against Atomic Death to the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) and the trade unions provided much cause for dissatisfaction and disillusionment.

By focusing on the main movement organizations, this chapter assesses how the movement organizers met these multiple challenges. It examines the constantly evolving organizational structures of the British and West German campaigns, the media they used to communicate with the public, and the attempts to establish transnational organizational structures. In particular, it demonstrates how the 'repertoires of collective action' available to the British and West German activists were reflected in the movement organizations.<sup>3</sup> Throughout, it is important to bear in mind that the organization of the politics of security in both countries was a highly gendered process.<sup>4</sup> Women were, because of gender, often channelled away from formal leadership positions and remained confined to informal leadership level.

The main organizational structures of the British and West German movements against nuclear weapons were quite similar. Both were coalitions of groups and individuals of, broadly speaking, left-wing political persuasion. While women occasionally played a role as organizers, the organizational structures were dominated by men. Neither campaigns introduced fundamentally new features into domestic politics. Rather, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the characteristic feature of both movements was that they rested on pre-existing social and political networks and that they creatively reappropriated older organizational and protest traditions in their campaigns for more security. It was

this ambiguity that made them so attractive to significant sections of the British and West German population.

The organizational development of both campaigns ran counter to the classic expositions of organizational theory, which assumes an increasing bureaucratization, a growing absence of accountability, and an increase in consensual strategies.<sup>5</sup> Both campaigns became increasingly differentiated functionally, but not to the detriment of grass-roots involvement. In both **(p. 129)** countries, this process was driven by conditions that were specific to the protest groups. The forms of this organizational change differed, however. In Britain, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw the split of the campaign in different organizations, CND and the Committee of 100. In West Germany, one campaign, the Campaign against Atomic Death, structured along elite lines, dissolved, and a new movement emerged with the 'Easter Marches of Nuclear Weapons Opponents', which united all groups engaged in protests against nuclear weapons. Here, the foundation itself of a campaign outside the boundaries of a political party was contentious.

Yet the forms and historical developments of these organizations differed significantly. While most West German activists joined the anti-nuclear-weapons protests as members of other organizations, the organization of the British movement itself was much stronger and more centralist. This made the West German movement far more flexible in constantly adapting to new challenges, while the more firmly structured British movement had problems containing different views about 'security' within it.

### CND: 'Society' or 'Campaign'?

In terms of organization, the British protests centred around CND. CND's typical feature was that it rested on the self-organization by individuals who came together to campaign for the general aim of nuclear disarmament. CND was, initially, no more than a think tank-cum-pressure group whose members did not dream of taking their cause to the street. CND's organizational history was thus framed by the clash between the founders' limited ideas about grass-roots involvement, on the one hand, and the growth of popular support for CND, on the other. CND's founders were quite unprepared for the mass support their campaign generated and had problems adjusting their organization accordingly.<sup>6</sup>

Almost from its foundation, there was, therefore, considerable disagreement within CND about whether it should act as a political 'campaign' or a rather traditional 'society'.<sup>7</sup> It was mainly this debate that framed CND's organizational development. While the British campaigners agreed on their main goal—unilateral British disarmament to achieve more security—there existed no consensus on how to communicate this **(p.130)** aim to the wider public. The main group in CND's executive sought to enlist the support of well-known individuals and influence Labour Party and parliamentary opinion through

lobbying. The Direct Action Committee (DAC) and, later, the Committee of 100, by contrast, favoured demonstrations that might involve nominal violations of the law. Rather than rely on 'educational methods', the DAC and the C100 sought to break through 'the barrier of silence' through civil disobedience that offered unique potential 'by virtue of its news value'.<sup>8</sup>

Ironically, CND's problems in dealing with mass support stemmed from the strength of Britain's associational culture and the genealogies of political, social, and moral reform movements, which had, for at least a century, had their centre in middle-class London boroughs as well as in semi-metropolitan cities, such as Manchester and Edinburgh.<sup>9</sup> A closer look at CND's organizational origins demonstrates this. CND's immediate predecessor was the National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), whose history had begun in the mid-1950s as a much more small-scale enterprise. It was linked to the rich traditions of middle-class metropolitan culture as well as to a section of the urban-based women's movement that stood at the centre of three overlapping spheres: cooperatives, feminism, and the labour movement. The NCANWT emerged from the Golders Green and Suburb Women's Cooperative Guild. The Guild had, under the leadership of the retired civil servant and former suffragette Miss Gertrude Fishwick, organized protests against nuclear weapons tests since July 1955 in the Hampstead area. It enjoyed strong links with the Society of Friends (Quakers), the local trade-union branches and Labour Party wards, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Cooperative Women's Guilds. Arthur Goss, proprietor of the *Hampstead and Highgate Express* and an active Quaker pacifist, became the group's new chairman, while Fishwick remained responsible for the Golders Green area. The NCANWT was set up at a meeting in Alliance Hall, Palmer Street, London, in late November 1956 with the help of the National Peace Council, an umbrella organization for various non-communist peace movements. As the personal networks, grown through personal acquaintances and joint campaign in the past, compensated for the lack of formal organizations, there was no need to think about formal decision-making and communication structures. Within the first four months after its foundation, seventy-five local **(p.131)** NCANWT groups had been established after publications of advertisements in the *News Chronicle* and *Manchester Guardian*, the paper of the liberally oriented middle class.<sup>10</sup> The rise in public support required the campaign to employ a full-time secretary, Peggy Duff, who had known some of the NCANWT organizers through her involvement as the organizing secretary of the Common Wealth Party.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout, three interrelated issues influenced the NCANWT's organizational developments, and they were to characterize CND's organizational debates as well. First, the NCANWT was an essentially liberal body. It believed in reasoned argument and persuasion and accepted the British political and party system as

a basis from which to achieve change. It focused on elite opinion rather than obtaining mass support.

This implied, second, that the NCANWT rejected DAC's direct action campaigns. The DAC had been founded in spring 1957 to support pacifist Harold Steele's attempt to sail into the Pacific in protest against British H-bomb tests. While the DAC and some local branches promoted direct action, picketing at weapons factories and missile bases, and organized protests against French tests in the Sahara,<sup>12</sup> the NCANWT's National Council focused on applying political pressure on parties, especially the Labour Party, and on organizing legal demonstrations of protests to mobilize public opinion.<sup>13</sup> Third, the NCANWT's general policy meant that it refused to adopt a thoroughly pacifist stance; it was intent on keeping its focus on the single issue of unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons tests and, from November 1957, on unilateral nuclear disarmament, and did not seek to widen its campaigns to weapons and armaments in general, as advocated by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Society of Friends (Quakers), and the Peace Pledge Union (PPU).<sup>14</sup> The question of anti-communism did not greatly influence the organizational debates and developments of the NCANWT. Although most of the NCANWT's leading members were firmly anti-communist, the issue did not arise initially, as the Communist Party followed a firmly multilateralist line until 1959.<sup>15</sup>

**(p.132)** These organizational, social, and ideological characteristics formed the basis for CND's organization and underlay its problems in creating an efficient politics of communication. Its foundation was closely linked to the social networks around the NCANWT and, like CND, was initially founded as a small pressure group of (mostly male) metropolitan intellectuals around the *New Statesman* journalist Kingsley Martin.<sup>16</sup> Peggy Duff became CND's full-time organizer and secretary. When CND was founded, the NCANWT handed over its assets and contacts as well as its premises in 146 Fleet Street, London, to the new campaign. Eric Baker, the general secretary of the National Peace Council, gave the premises rent-free to CND.<sup>17</sup>

CND's executive committee continued to show a remarkable cultural homogeneity from the late 1950s into the early 1960s. Throughout 1958, nineteen people were, at one time or another, members of the executive committee. Thirteen of them were listed in the current *Who's Who*, four were journalists, at least twelve were authors, and almost all of them had, at one time, written for the national press. Most were associated with the Labour Party or at least firmly sympathetic towards it. Canon Collins and Peggy Duff became key figures in policy-making and strategy, while the importance of J. B. Priestley and Kingsley Martin declined. Michael Foot and A. J. P. Taylor played particularly forceful roles. Similar founding processes played themselves out on the local level in England, Scotland, and Wales.<sup>18</sup>

The result was that, from hindsight, CND's executive at its foundation was closer to the associational world of Edwardian Britain than to the forms of organizations that dominated the student protests of the later 1960s. Unlike in these Edwardian associations, however, no formal campaign membership existed. CND organizers sought to remain an essentially elite organization that lobbied parliament and parties, rather than built up a mass membership. Moreover, had CND constituted itself as a membership organization, it would, in all likelihood, have been proscribed by the Labour Party. This formed an important precondition for future growth to a social movement.<sup>19</sup>

After CND's first public meeting in mid-February 1958, local CND chapters sprang up across the country. By the end of 1958, there were 200 groups across Britain. This made some organizational adjustments necessary, **(p.133)** as there was increasing conflict between the executive's structure and the manifold interests at the local level. Yet even once CND had gone public, the intellectuals in the executive committee did not systematically address the question of how to harness the broad popular support for the movement for its aims, without destroying its diversity. Although Peggy Duff organized the campaigns efficiently, the great support had taken the executive by surprise, and the intellectuals assembled in it did not see the need for a more thorough engagement with the question of movement communication.<sup>20</sup>

This led to a growing disjuncture in the ways in which executive and grass-roots supporters sought to address the problem of 'security'. The executive responded by replicating the organizational structure of the early Labour Party. In order to solve the problems of coordination with the rank and file, the executive set up a coordinating committee in autumn 1958. The purpose of this committee was to establish links with the constituent bodies of the movement. It was to serve primarily as a body for discussion, through which information could travel in both directions. The introduction of annual conferences was another means of improving intra-movement communications. Over the course of 1958 and 1959, the executive encouraged the establishment of regional councils to coordinate the work of the local groups. Yet decision-making continued to lie with the (unelected) executive, whose social composition was maintained by co-optation rather than election.<sup>21</sup> More specifically, the problems reflected the efforts of a group of 'public moralists' both to maintain their intellectual status in the debates about security and to enlighten and guide the British population towards what they regarded as sensible political aims.<sup>22</sup>

Hence, tensions within CND's organization increased as the executive struggled to cope with the *Eigen-Sinn* of its supporters. This situation resulted in frequent complaints from the rank and file who, in the words of one 1958 conference delegate, 'were not prepared to be general hewers of wood and drawers of water without some representation on the executive committee'.<sup>23</sup> The main theme of these discussions was how CND should campaign: through education and gentle

pressure alone, or also through public demonstrations? This theme had been visible as early as March 1958. Only after intensive discussions and perceived pressure from **(p.134)** the grass roots did the CND executive agree to join the DAC on a march from London to the governmental nuclear weapons research establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, there emerged two campaigns in one: the grass-roots popular movement, which remained virtually unrepresented in the executive; and the executive itself, which showed disdain for 'the masses'. Looking back, A. J. P. Taylor bemoaned that CND 'had become too democratic'.<sup>25</sup> And Diana Collins showed outright disgust at social-movement politics when she wrote to Jacquetta Hawkes in February 1958 that 'the thought of spending a social evening organised by our long-haired bearded friends instead of an evening with you and Jack [Hawkes's partner, J. B. Priestley] fills me with such despondency and gloom that I can hardly bear to contemplate it'.<sup>26</sup>

The executive and activists responded to these challenges of intra-movement communications by founding bodies that represented special interests and advanced their very own ideas of the politics of security. Thus, an organization emerged over time that split CND into different social and professional groups that lobbied for their specific aims. There was, for example, a CND scientists' organization, a Youth CND, a Universities' CND, and a Women's CND. There also existed a Labour advisory committee, which was made up of Labour politicians sympathetic towards CND.<sup>27</sup> From 1961, Christian presence within the Campaign was institutionalized in an own subgroup: Christian CND (CCND), run by Pamela Frankau, Francis Jude, and Diana Collins,<sup>28</sup> with its own journal *Rushlight*. CCND never grew very large: only fourteen people were actively involved in 1962, and the mailing list of its journal *Rushlight* contained only 750 names.<sup>29</sup> This pattern reflected the specific features of British political life. British society was divided into a multitude of distinct, but often overlapping, groups and associations that all dealt with specific problems. In terms of social organization, there were many societies, but no concept of 'society' as a whole.<sup>30</sup>

**(p.135)** The functional differentiation of CND's organization was ultimately not able to prevent internal tensions from coming to a head. Open discussions started in spring 1959 when Bertrand Russell proposed at the annual conference that the executive be elected and a membership scheme be introduced. The proposal was rejected. Instead, the conference voted to increase the members of the executive committee, so that local groups could be represented through delegates from the regional councils.<sup>31</sup>

Labour's defeat at the 1959 general elections appeared to expose the weaknesses of CND's Labour-centric strategy even further. By contrast, the success of the 1960 Aldermaston March, whose final rally attracted between 60,000 and 100,000 people, lent more credence for those who argued for a

strategy based on direct action. For many grass-roots activists, developments in the international arena further accentuated the need for new forms of action. The crisis of a U2 spy plane in Soviet airspace, the shooting-down over the USSR of an American RB47 reconnaissance plane, and the collapse of the Paris disarmament summit in June 1960 appeared to require some more dramatic forms of action that were 'in keeping with the needs of the situation'.<sup>32</sup>

The foundation of the Committee of 100 (C100) was a direct result of these organizational problems.<sup>33</sup> But it did not really reflect grass-roots concerns either. Through its advocacy of illegal ways of campaigning, such as the invasion of army barracks and air force bases, the C100 soon came under constant police and secret service surveillance. From 1962 onwards, more of its activists were in jail than demonstrating on the streets.<sup>34</sup> Following the anarchist tradition of 'propaganda by the deed' became increasingly difficult.

While the C100 continued to campaign for human fellowship, its communicative practices came to resemble the initiation rites of male secret societies in order to protect itself from intrusion by secret service agents. This increased the C100's coherence as a movement, but it weakened its overall appeal. Together with an influx from a younger and more active group of members, the pressures of constant police and secret service surveillance led to the break-up of the C100 from a relatively compact structure with a leading group of people into an amorphous collection of almost autonomous units with no authoritative leadership.<sup>35</sup> Instead of **(p.136)** one C100, there existed thirteen regional Committees of 100 from 1962 onwards, which lacked a powerful executive body.<sup>36</sup>

In the wake of the C100's foundation CND sought to address the issue of intra-movement communication by reforming the constitutional set-up and making it more systematic.<sup>37</sup> The executive's plan for a new constitution carried the day at CND's annual conference in 1961. It entailed the establishment of a pyramidal organization, with local groups at the base and the executive at the apex. CND policy was to be decided by annual conference. Members of the annual conference were delegates from each local group and each specialist section. The national coordinating committee was abolished and replaced by a national council, which, in the period between conferences, determined overall policy and strategy.<sup>38</sup> The elections resulted in a national council and an executive that was not strikingly different from its predecessors: Canon Collins remained chairman and Ritchie Calder vice-chairman.<sup>39</sup> In late April 1961, putting the personal issues between Russell and Collins aside, the CND executive also established a liaison committee with the DAC and the C100.<sup>40</sup>

Yet conflicts continued over the question of whether to campaign with CND candidates at by-elections. This strategy was favoured by a group around Nigel Young and CND treasurer Laurie Kershaw from the London CND, who founded



an Independent Nuclear Disarmament Election Committee in 1962 after unilateralist motions had been rejected at the Labour Party conference.<sup>41</sup>

Faced with these persistent problems of intra-movement communications, the CND's executive committee agreed to a major overhaul of its structure and practice at the beginning of 1963. A new management subcommittee was established in order to supervise CND's day-to-day business, consisting of the officers, three members of the executive, and the national council.<sup>42</sup> The reorganization strengthened CND's centralized structure and pushed the public figures who had initiated CND further to the sidelines. Canon Collins resigned in 1964 and Peggy Duff in 1966–7. In 1966, CND became a membership organization, thus leaving its past as a political *movement* behind.<sup>43</sup>

### **(p.137)** The West German Movements: From Organizing Societies to Mobilizing Society

As in CND, the organizational communications within the West German movements were characterized by differences between the activists' *Eigen-Sinn* (sense of one's own agency) and the policies of the executive. Yet the coding of these communications differed. It mainly revolved around the distinction of communism/anti-communism rather than legitimacy. The cold war conflict had a more immediate impact on the West German movement in structuring the organizational cultures themselves and in transforming existing forms of organizations into a political movement. It was mainly this framing of the discussion that allowed the West German movement to make a transition from the *SPD* campaign that sought to mobilize its members in order to reach 'the public' into a movement that sought to mobilize West German 'society' as a whole.

Organizations played a more significant role for channelling people into the movements in West Germany than in Britain throughout the period, although they lost in importance as the movements became established. This is why intra-movement communications and the adaptations to new demands happened more smoothly in West Germany than in Britain. While problems of intra-movement organization led to the split of the British movement into CND and the more radical C100, the West German movement was characterized by a chronological split that divided it into two distinct political phases. While the first phase was directly linked to the politics of the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions, the second phase led to the foundation of a grass-roots movement independent of party-political influences. These differences reflected different political and social contexts. After the destruction of working- and middle-class associations during the Nazi regime,<sup>44</sup> associational culture in the young Federal Republic was not yet fully developed, so that the organizations of the Labour movement played a large role for mobilizing activists.

More importantly, the impact of cold war political culture on the movement was more significant in the Federal Republic. Particularly during the second phase of the West German Marches, the protests faced a generally antagonistic climate and a massive government campaign against them. There were widespread accusations of fellow-travelling, and the organizers had to overcome serious practical obstacles when applying **(p.138)** for permissions to march on the Easter weekend. The Easter Marches, therefore, developed more into the direction of the British C100, yet without becoming a secret society with initiation rites. Instead, the rhetoric of fellowship and community remained as open as it had been intended by the organizers. Both these factors enabled the organizers to devise a much more sophisticated and efficient intra-movement communication that made constant self-observations and, thus, adjustments of strategy possible.

From the beginning of the campaign in 1958, the SPD brought its campaign strategies to bear on the Campaign against Atomic Death and focused on organizing communications, rather than organizing people. The Campaign was a part of the *SPD's* party machinery. Like the British Campaign, it was set up 'to enlighten the public', but it did so much more emphatically.<sup>45</sup>

Unlike in the movements against conventional rearmament in the early and mid-1950s, the *SPD* now became directly involved in the protests and used methods tested out in election campaigns for internal and external campaign communications.<sup>46</sup> The Campaign was clearly set up in order to sway 'public opinion' beyond the traditional working-class voter base in the upcoming elections in the important state of North Rhine Westphalia, after the general elections in autumn 1957 had resulted in an absolute majority for the *CDU*.<sup>47</sup> It constantly used polls to gauge public opinion and determine whether the campaign was successful.<sup>48</sup> There was a systematic collection of press cuttings, which were fed into the decision-making process. The Campaign organizers used the *SPD's* papers to propagate the message of the 'Fight against Atomic Death', and prominent journalists were contacted to write in favour of the Campaign in the other main papers.<sup>49</sup>

Although the organizers used means (such as posters, newspaper adverts, and even films) similar to ones the party had already used in election campaigns in the Weimar Republic, they no longer relied on direct **(p.139)** communication with its members alone. The focus extended beyond the immediate *SPD* and trade-union membership to (West) German society as a whole. Unlike the *CND* executive, the Campaign headquarters never addressed the government and specific sections of society or interests groups only. It addressed (West) German 'society', rather than its societies. The name of the campaign in some regions was *Volksbewegung gegen den Atomtod* (People's Movement against Atomic Death).<sup>50</sup>

This reflected the desire not just to campaign for a specific cause, but also to mobilize 'the people' and the 'public sphere' as a whole. The title also echoed calls for a progressively defined 'Volksgemeinschaft', which had become prominent in the *SPD* during the First World War, but was also attractive for all those who had identified with the National Socialist 'Volksgemeinschaft'.<sup>51</sup> In addition, the cold war helped to create coherence of 'society' in the eyes of the *SPD* organizers. The key binary opposition communism/anti-communism facilitated communications about movement aims and organizations both within the Campaign and between the Campaign and 'the public'. Within, it created an initial basic consensus about campaign strategy and practice.<sup>52</sup> Outside, the main goal was to shield the Campaign against accusations that it was a communist fellow-travelling organization and that it represented the 'real interests of the German people'.<sup>53</sup>

After its launch, the Campaign spread across the Federal Republic as regional and local committees were set up. This often followed local and independent initiatives, but the local campaigns were soon integrated into the top-down organization and run, by and large, under the auspices of the *SPD* and the Federation of German Trade Unions (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)*). Thus, the links between party, trade unions, and the Campaign's organization were replicated on the local level. The regional and local committees acted merely as executive organs of the central committee, and their role was to assist in the regional and local distribution of the campaign material that had been compiled centrally, rather than to **(p.140)** participate in policymaking. It is, therefore, not surprising that the campaign was strongest where the *SPD* did particularly well in local, regional, and state elections, such as in the *SPD* district of South Hesse.<sup>54</sup>

Unlike in Britain, the main question that framed the discussions about intra-movement communications in West Germany did not explicitly address campaign strategy. Although there was considerable discussion about plans put forward by some Social Democrats and trade unionists to launch a general strike in protest against the government plans, the main debate focused on the question of how to maintain an anti-communist stance, while launching protests outside the conventional political channels of parliament, party, and interest group.<sup>55</sup> Because of the common heritage of radicalism, all Labour movement campaigns came to be exposed to accusations of communist bodies sponsored by the GDR after the banning of the German Communist Party in 1956. These bodies operated in the Federal Republic under similar names, such as the 'Action Committees for Atomic Disarmaments'.<sup>56</sup>

Anti-communism permeated the West German intra-movement communications so much that there was a constant interchange with civil servants in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence who felt sympathetic towards the *SPD* and leaked classified information to the Campaign. This often involved the *SPD*'s

office in East Berlin, which entertained close connections to the West German government and probably also had informers among West Berlin students.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the Campaign offices appeared to be under observation from the Federal Constitutional Protection Agency (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*), at least until spring 1958.<sup>58</sup> The Campaign's executive wrote to its members increasingly frequently advising them against associating themselves with **(p. 141)** these groups—decisions that the supporters, lacking the intelligence information, often found exaggerated, or did not understand.<sup>59</sup> The Campaign's supporters thus found themselves in an almost impossible position. On the one hand, they had to defend themselves against accusations even by Social Democrats to be Moscow's 'fifth column'. On the other hand, if they reacted by weakening their message towards general humanitarian appeals, their critics might accuse them of being the willing tools of the *SPD*'s public-relations machine.<sup>60</sup>

Subsequent developments of intra-organizational communications were, therefore, driven by the top-down nature in which the executive dealt with the clash between the activists' *Eigen-Sinn* and the *SPD*'s attempts to strengthen its central organization at its Stuttgart conference in May 1958, which was part of a longer-term effort to 'modernize' the party.<sup>61</sup> The *SPD* and the trade unions supported the Campaign against Atomic Death's communication aims as long as their observation of social reality appeared to pay off. Initially, opinion polls suggested that the Campaign had indeed increased the opposition party's standing in the population. Yet, when opinion polls and, finally, the devastating election results in North Rhine Westphalia in summer 1958 suggested otherwise, discussions began in the *SPD* to stop the campaign.<sup>62</sup> The Federal Constitutional Court's ruling on 30 July 1958 against plebiscites on a *Land* level against nuclear weapons, and the Campaign's main protests in the summer, provided the Campaign's opponents with the necessary arguments.<sup>63</sup>

Likewise, the *DGB* tried to strengthen its central organization. It had also come under increased strain, as its Christian trade-union affiliates had become increasingly dissatisfied with the executive's open support for a campaign against the Adenauer government and as overtures by the East German Trade Union Federation (*Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB)*) increased the risk that campaigns might be 'hijacked' by the *SED* regime.<sup>64</sup> Although the Campaign continued to exist on paper, its **(p.142)** main activities were now limited to calls for nuclear disarmament on Labour Day (1 May), which continued until 1963.<sup>65</sup> The Hessian and North Rhine Westphalian regional committees had already ceased their activities in autumn 1958.<sup>66</sup>

From spring 1958, the organizational strengthening of the Campaign began to clash with several grass-roots initiatives on the local level. This was particularly the case in Berlin, where, because of the permeable border with the GDR, independent extra-parliamentary campaigns could easily be portrayed as

communist-inspired. In April 1958, the foundation of the Campaign's Berlin regional committee had been marred by earlier accusations of communist subversion, since it had supported a protest demonstration by the Falcons, a social-democratic youth organization, in Neukölln.<sup>67</sup>

Similar discussions surrounded the student congress against nuclear weapons, which was held in Berlin in January 1959. The initiative had come from the Berlin Student Committee around the moderates Manfred Rexin and Ansgar Skriver. Yet, from the beginning, the Campaign's national executive had been sceptical of such a congress for fear of communist subversion, a fear that was heightened by Krushchev's Berlin ultimatum on 27 November 1958. While there is some evidence for communist activities at the congress, what was noteworthy was that even non-communist and moderate students used their opposition to the *SPD*'s anti-communism as an organizational and communicative resource.<sup>68</sup> Although cloaked in the language of anti-communism, this was essentially a debate about the role of grass-roots involvement within *SPD* politics.<sup>69</sup>

Activists were, in the end, left without a campaign organization. While they maintained their original policy goals, their activities became dispersed across several existing pacifist, youth, and labour movement associations as well as independent local activities. Yet, their general concern **(p.143)** for the issue of nuclear weapons and their previous involvement in extra-parliamentary politics provided them with the political and social resources to found and join a new campaign. While the Campaign against Atomic Death had depended entirely on pre-existing organizational structures, the 'Easter Marches of Nuclear Weapons Opponents' gradually emerged from the bottom up. While there was still some organizational cohesion and a central office, 'grass-roots' involvement and 'movement' became the concepts that began to frame intra-organizational communications.

The Easter Marches' organization developed out of discussions about how to organize an opposition outside parliament within what some supporters called 'democratic totalitarianism'. Even activists outside the remit of the socialist left in the Federal Republic, such as Hans-Konrad Tempel, subscribed to such interpretations as they feared that existing social organizations such as parties and trade unions had been brought into line with the Adenauer government and offered little scope for alternative politics. Protests therefore had to focus on 'social self-organization from below' and on 'direct action' in order to realize their aims.<sup>70</sup> The communist/anti-communist coding continued to influence discussions about how to organize 'security'. But it was primarily important for describing the movement from the outside and created cohesion in an environment in which actions left of the parameters of the *SPD* came with almost automatic supervision by the secret services and, possibly, practical consequences.<sup>71</sup>

The organizers continued to maintain the *SPD* Campaign's emphasis on communicating with 'the people'. But they developed methods of organizational self-observation further, as they realized that it was primarily through appearances in the mass media—rather than merely the Campaign's name—that the different protest events appeared as a sustained political movement. While the *SPD* campaign had mainly focused on rationalizing internal communications, internal and external movement communications had become inextricably connected in the Easter Marches. By aiming to reach individual members of 'the public', rather than sections of it, the organization remained in constant movement.<sup>72</sup> This approach had been conditioned by the dominance of the communist/ **(p.144)** anti-communist coding: 'Because of the danger of the appearance of "Eastern friends of peace" ... under an associational banner, we would like to stress in our letters and flyers as well as on posters that only individuals and not organizations are allowed to take part.'<sup>73</sup>

Most importantly, through its very organization and the communication about it, the movement became linked to West Germany's political system. In view of the Easter Marchers, it not only organized West German security, but also West German democracy.<sup>74</sup> But reaching the public remained a 'phantasy'.<sup>75</sup> The movement was part of West German society, but remained outside it. Widespread accusations in the West German press about the non-, if not anti-democratic, nature of the campaign and its allegedly communist clientele maintained the border.<sup>76</sup>

Despite the lack of an elaborate organizational structure and communication regime, the Easter March organizers were keen to translate their own views about campaigning into movement politics. In leaflets entitled 'Suggestions for Participants', the organizers asked the marchers to follow the organizers' orders 'swiftly and visibly', 'especially when the reason for the decision is not immediately obvious'.<sup>77</sup> Karl A. Otto has described this organizational regime as 'authoritarian' and thus implicitly linked these policies to specifically German traditions of political culture. Unlike *CND* and the later West German 'extra-parliamentary opposition', he argues, the Easter Marches lacked an 'emancipatory' potential.<sup>78</sup> But, in comparative perspective, *CND* as an organization had far more problems with grass-roots politics than the West German Easter Marches. The West German Easter Marches had much more in common with the loose structure of the *C100* and the British New Left.

The Easter Marches did not have a federal executive, but merely a 'Central Committee' (*Zentraler Ausschuss*), which had been set up provisionally at a meeting in Bergen in early November 1960 and formally **(p.145)** constituted itself in late January 1961.<sup>79</sup> The Central Committee (CC) brought together the various regional sections of the campaign and its supporters and discussed the 'political thrust of the campaign', particularly with regard to speeches, slogans, and leaflets; it set the guidelines for organizational planning, represented the

campaign on a federal level, and administered the everyday business.<sup>80</sup> The CC's decisions were definitive and did not require the consent of other campaign bodies, but local and regional committees could make suggestions for their slogans.<sup>81</sup>

The main purpose of this organization was not, as in Britain's CND and in the SPD's Campaign, primarily to control and to restrict information flows. Its aim was in this, 'a loose unit of action of citizens with similar ideas', to allow such information flows to occur in the first place, thus making it possible for the activists to regard themselves as supporters of a sustained movement, rather than of isolated protest events.<sup>82</sup> In line with the growth of the Campaign after the huge success of the 1962 Marches, the CC set up an executive office in September 1962. The executive office's responsibility was the financial and organizational running of the campaign as well as public relations.<sup>83</sup> From May 1963 onwards, the executive office published a campaign newsletter in order to maintain an interest in the campaign while no demonstrations took place: the *Informationen zur Abrüstung* (Disarmament Information), primarily directed at march participants rather than the general public, appeared in ten to twelve issues per year and contained 'factual knowledge'.<sup>84</sup> After much discussion, the CC also decided to launch a 'press service' (*Pressedienst*), compiled by the Bochum activist Christel Beilmann, who had close links to the Catholic *Werkhefte* group. The 'press service' was to be sent to West German newspapers, journals, and the local and regional committees. More than CND, the Easter Marches made use of a systematic analysis of opinion poll data and of the press reports in order to determine how to focus its campaign about security.<sup>85</sup>

**(p.146)** Yet, despite the importance of the federal organization for the campaign as a whole, the local and regional committees were responsible for the practical aspects of the organization. Unlike in Britain, there was no single national protest event in the Federal Republic. The regional and local committees emerged out of the interaction of the original coordinating committee's attempts to spread the march across the Federal Republic after the relative success of the first march in 1960. In autumn 1960, the initial Easter March coordinating committee wrote to potential allies, mostly through pacifist networks, and asked for cooperation.<sup>86</sup> These groups then contacted potential participants in the regions and in the localities and encouraged the foundation of local committees.<sup>87</sup> There were initially four regional committees: north (for Hamburg and surroundings), west (for the Ruhr area), south-west (for Baden-Württemberg), and south (for Bavaria). In 1963, a 'central' regional committee (for the Frankfurt/Offenbach region) was set up.<sup>88</sup>

To a much greater extent than in CND, discussions—often endless—became the trademark of the West German Easter Marches. Indeed, while they had initially been a measure to prevent the split of the campaign,<sup>89</sup> 'talking about' and

'discussing' issues soon became deeply entrenched in the habits of the organizers and the participants. Indeed, 'discussion' was soon used to advertise the marches as a truly democratic venture and became a hallmark of West German extra-parliamentary culture.<sup>90</sup> The different shape of the committee minutes underlines the importance of discussions. While CND and C100 minutes merely showed the results of meetings, Easter March committee minutes documented the debates extensively.

Paradoxically, therefore, anti-communism helped bolster, rather than weaken, the chances for extra-parliamentary protests. The dominance of the East-West conflict in West German politics thus prevented the infighting we could see in the British case. It explains both why the *SPD* so easily rid itself from the Campaign and why its supporters continued the grass-roots work in other movements.

### **(p.147)** Beyond Borders: Transnational Movement Organizations

The British and West German movements claimed that they represented global interests. But the differences in organizational cultures seriously hampered the organization of communications about 'security' across national borders.<sup>91</sup> The communications between the two movements were fraught with problems. These problems of establishing and sustaining transnational bodies reflect the difficulties of a politics of communication between two movements that operated in two very different political contexts in the cold war and that had to appeal to very different audiences.

There were very few direct connections between CND and its West German counterparts, the Campaign against Atomic Death and the Easter March Committee, apart from the regular exchanges of a few marchers. During the first phase of the protests between 1958 and 1960, the transnationalization of the protests was hampered by the different positions of the *SPD* and the British Labour Party towards the protests. This meant that the traditionally strong bonds between German and British Labour and the organizational structure of the Socialist International could not be used to support the protests.<sup>92</sup> Although the British and West German parties' executives agreed on the importance of multilateral efforts for disarmament, this meant different things in each national context. In Britain, the Labour executive's emphasis on *multilateral* disarmament was diametrically opposed to CND's agenda of *unilateral* nuclear disarmament. In the Federal Republic, the *SPD*'s opposition to the arming of the *Bundeswehr*, the West German army, with nuclear-capable equipment implied a general opposition to Adenauer's 'policy of strength' and conditioned its launch of the 'Campaign against Atomic Death'.<sup>93</sup> The contacts between the British and West German movement were, apart from the rare exchanges of speakers, rather thin.

The West German campaign headquarters did not even seem to have been aware of the existence of a counterpart in Britain until the summer **(p.148)** of 1958,



almost half a year after both campaigns had been founded. Thus, when the *SPD*-run Campaign received a letter from *CND* asking for some information about it, the West German campaign office tried to secure information about its counterpart's credentials by writing to the International Department of the Labour Party. The Labour Party, in turn, was not keen to help, since *CND* was regarded by Transport House, the Labour headquarters, as a divisive force. As a result, the party warned the *SPD* to avoid cooperation. The *SPD*, in turn, misunderstood Labour's political language, and classified *CND* as Communist.<sup>94</sup>

The first contacts between *CND* and parts of the West German movements were not established between the *SPD*-run Campaign and *CND*, but by the Munich Committee against Nuclear Armaments, run by the German writer and intellectual Hans Werner Richter and very similar to *CND* in organizational structure and social composition.<sup>95</sup> The contact was facilitated by the BBC journalist Christopher Holme, whom Richter knew from one of the *Gruppe 47* conferences. Richter had written to him and asked him to be put in touch with Bertrand Russell and Canon Collins in order to establish a more 'international' form of protest.<sup>96</sup>

Even these contacts between two organizations with very similar outlooks proved very cumbersome. Richter initiated the European Federation against Nuclear Weapons (EF), which was founded in London and Frankfurt in early 1959. The EF aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation and to achieve general nuclear disarmament and it sought to campaign for the civilian use of atomic energy. The EF's London headquarters, in *CND*'s offices, was supposed to coordinate joint campaigns in the future.<sup>97</sup> In striking contrast to its rhetoric of a 'world community', however, participants at EF meetings insisted that the Federation should not undermine the national positions of the individual movements and be sensitive of different national issues.<sup>98</sup> The EF's successor organization, the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP), was not very successful in creating an international community of protesters either. It was founded at a conference in Oxford in January 1963 with the goal of **(p.149)** creating a non-aligned equivalent to the communist World Peace Council. Again, the aims were high: 'to demand and foster a fundamentally new way of thinking and to use new forces and means to counter the arms race in order to build an international community of values.'<sup>99</sup> But the ICDP's programme pointed out that the 'different views and sovereignty [*sic* !] of the member organizations should not be infringed'.<sup>100</sup>

The problems of coordination has already started before the conference. Hans Werner Richter, who had always supported a strong non-aligned nuclear weapons movement, was against the participation of members of the World Peace Council as observers.<sup>101</sup> Canon Collins had invited the delegates anyway—with the result that the group around Hans Werner Richter did not attend the conference. Discussions about the prudence of inviting communist delegates

also took place among British activists and greatly hampered the reputation of the newly founded ICDP.<sup>102</sup>

Established institutions, by contrast, offered a better environment for direct transnational communications. Hence, the War Resisters' International (WRI) turned into the key transnational organization for the British and West German anti-nuclear-weapons protests. The WRI had been founded by radical—that is, non-bourgeois—pacifists in the early 1920s. It was through this organization and its journals that the first group of protesters in northern Germany established contact with its British counterparts and, indeed, with pacifists from all over the world who thought along similar lines. In the 1920s and 1930s, the WRI had been primarily concerned with assisting conscientious objectors. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, it was instrumental in spreading the ideas linked to non-violent civil disobedience and non-violent direct action. The WRI's headquarters at the time was in Enfield (Essex), near London. The headquarters was dominated by the British peace movement around the PPU with its journal *Peace News* and had strong links with the C100. Tony Smythe, the WRI's director in the early 1960s, was also a prominent C100 activist.

Through its West German branches (the *Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner—Deutscher Zweig (IdK)* and, from the early 1960s, the *Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer (VK)*), the WRI was able to distribute information, **(p. 150)** much more efficiently than the EF and the ICDP. The publications carried reports from conferences, advice on reading, and registration forms for conferences in a form that was accessible to all supporters. The WRI's West German journal, the *Friedensrundschau*, published a 'Letter from England' in every issue, informing West German readers of the most recent developments in Britain. The journal frequently carried articles that discussed different forms of protest, most importantly non-violent civil disobedience. In particular, the German WRI branch and the VK publications could tap the particular West German and British conditions by relying on local authors, who translated the message into the local political and protest traditions.<sup>103</sup>

The ideas for Easter Marches outside Britain first emerged in WRI networks. The links between the later organizers of the Easter March, Hans-Konrad Tempel, and his fiancée, Helga Stolle, started in the early 1950s. It was at the WRI's eighth Triennial Conference, which took place in July 1954 in Paris, that Tempel became acquainted with activists from the British peace movement such as April Carter, Stuart Morris, and Fenner Brockway.<sup>104</sup> The conferences not only contributed to the formation of a transnational network of protesters, but were also instrumental in bringing together the dispersed activities of the West German movement. At the 1954 conference, Tempel met Ingeborg Küster, the later organizer of the Munich Easter Marches.<sup>105</sup> The circles around the WRI and its West German branches were also important in linking the Hamburg group around Tempel, which organized the first Easter Marches, to a wider

circle around Andreas Buro, then an official in the youth department at Kassel city council, later one of the main organizers of the Easter Marches.<sup>106</sup> Through his job, Buro was in touch with representatives of various groups around the emerging New Left in West Germany, such as Klaus Vack of the youth organization of the 'Friends of Nature' and Herbert Faller of the socialist youth organization the 'Falcons', who were both to become important organizers for the national and Hessian regional campaigns.<sup>107</sup>

At the WRI conferences, activists from the US civil rights movements acquainted West Europeans with the practice of Gandhian-type civil disobedience, thus reinvigorating the theoretical discussions about these forms of protest, a debate whose origins can be traced back to the 1920s. **(p.151)** The WRI's 1957 conference in London was attended by Bayard Rustin, later the organizer of Martin Luther King's civil disobedience campaigns in the United States, and by Christopher Farley, later a C100 activist, who was among the first to transfer sit-downs and the occupation of military bases and government buildings systematically to a West European setting.<sup>108</sup>

The conferences were mostly elite and middle-class affairs. The costs of travelling at the time were still significant and at least a rudimentary knowledge of foreign languages was required. Although meetings mainly took place in the summer months, it is probable that they primarily appealed to full-time activists, students, academics, and others who could afford the time and the money.<sup>109</sup> One could, therefore, argue that these contacts did not really matter as they concerned the networks of a particular minority. However, it is important to see that the participants in the WRI conferences acted as multipliers of information in their local war resisters', Easter March, or student movement groups, wrote articles in the relevant journals, and thus helped to spread information. Through their contacts with British protesters and through the news reports, they showed other protesters what forms of protests were possible. The exchange of marchers, often through local affiliates, was important in this context.<sup>110</sup>

### Mass Media and Organizational Communications

In both countries, the media played an important role in framing the movement organizations. The media functioned as intermediaries. Reports in the media allowed the movements to reach beyond different and separate public spheres. Thus, the media provided notional links between activists across the country, and they connected the internal movement organization, on the one hand, and 'the public', on the other. It was primarily through media reports that national protest *events* came to be connected to a national and even international *movement* against nuclear weapons.<sup>111</sup> **(p.152)** For the movement organizers, 'media' meant primarily printed sources. The radio was important, but, because of the absence of images, could not directly convey the marchers' commitment. Television, albeit of rising importance in both countries, carried almost no

reports on the marches, even though both CND and the Easter Marches produced films showing the marching experience.<sup>112</sup>

In order to facilitate communications among activists, the British and West German movements set up their own papers. Rather than address a wider audience, they mainly served to structure movement discussions, inform the readers of events, and provide them with information about the political background to the campaign as well as about the scientific and ethical questions related to nuclear weapons. The national and regional CND executives published a monthly *Bulletin*, which informed supporters about the events of the campaign. *Peace News*, the PPU's paper, also came to function as CND's journal: it provided a mix of information and reports, book and music reviews, as well as a calendar of events. In January 1961, CND replaced its monthly *Bulletin* with the more ambitious journal *Sanity*.<sup>113</sup> By September 1961, *Sanity* had a print run of around 15,000; by May 1962, it fluctuated 'about the 30,000 mark'. By 1963, sales of *Sanity* were at about 40,000.<sup>114</sup>

The SPD and the DGB primarily used their own papers, such as *Vorwärts* and *Welt der Arbeit*, as well as several regional newspapers run under SPD auspices for this purpose. They also set up a journal called *atomzeitalter* (atomic age), which was to foster 'rational and enlightened debate' about atomic energy. Unlike CND with *Sanity* and the pre-existing *Peace News*, the Easter March committee did not launch its own journal. It relied substantially on journals of the Christian and labour movement groups that participated in the movement. The committee also resorted to producing a monthly ten-page newsletter to supplement its pamphlets and flyers, which contained more factual information and much less essayistic material than the British counterpart.<sup>115</sup> This material was focused on 'objective' and primarily textual reporting in order to provide its supporters with arguments for the cause. Some sympathetic student papers, such as *pläne* (plans) and *konkret*, also featured reports on the Easter Marches. Information on the print runs of these journals is not **(p.153)** available, but they were likely to have been substantially lower than *Sanity*'s. However, the broad spread of reports on the Easter Marches in journals of interested social groups provided the West German campaigns with a far more substantial audience in the long run.

Media reports were not only important to provide activists with information about the campaign. They also made it possible that activists who attended a meeting in one geographical area could feel themselves as part of a movement that embraced the whole country, if not the globe. As the audiences at public meetings and demonstrations were rather limited, the British and the West German movement organizations relied on reports about these in the press, the radio, and on television in order to make themselves heard. In Britain, organizers faced fewer obstacles. The centralized character of the campaign and the location of the final rallies in London from 1959 onwards ensured a modicum

of press interest. The emergence of an increasingly nationalized press market in the late 1950s and early 1960s bolstered this further.<sup>116</sup>

The situation in the Federal Republic was initially more problematic, particularly after the *SPD* had withdrawn its support network of party and regional newspapers, but it resulted in an eventually far more elaborate organization of movement-media relations. The West German press landscape was more regionalized and thus made federal-wide reporting more unlikely, particularly when the protests took place in smaller towns in the countryside. Apart from some regional, and often communist-leaning newspapers, there were initially few reports of the early Easter Marches in the German national press. Ironically, some press reports stated dryly that there was nothing to report.<sup>117</sup>

These problems, in conjunction with the constant stream of accusations of communist subversion, made West German activists much keener than their British counterparts to find out what the press and 'the public' thought about them. The West German activist Hans Magnus Enzensberger even called for the 'most cool-blooded and fantasy-driven exploitation of all psychological opportunities' in order to advertise the campaign.<sup>118</sup> While both movements sought to make use of opinion polls to show that 'the public' was on their side,<sup>119</sup> the Easter March organizers (**p.154**) went further and placed increased importance on the ways in which they were seen in the media: they sent out briefing material to the press and analyzed press reports far more systematically than their British counterparts. From the beginning, the Easter March organizers analyzed press reporting systematically. In 1960, they identified around 134 reports on the Easter March with 17 photos, though this was disappointing, given that there were around 1,500 newspapers in West Germany at the time. In 1961, the observers counted 956 press reports with 170 pictures. In 1962, the Easter March observers counted 1,163 press reports, while reporting was restricted to March and April. In 1963, the period of reporting started in January and carried on until June, indicating the expansion of interest in 'the movement', rather than in protest events.<sup>120</sup> From the mid-1960s, 'advertisement' became even more important for the West German campaign, while it was never as professionally organized by the British one.<sup>121</sup> CND's attempt to mobilize 'public opinion' remained rather rudimentary. Its 'Tell Britain' campaign did not lead to any significant results, as no detailed reports were sent back to CND's head office. And its attempt to use sociology students living in caravans to poll the residents of Welwyn Garden City in order to determine the Campaign's social support base remained rather haphazard.<sup>122</sup> The British and West German governments sought to counter the campaigns with their own public-relations campaigns, and thus helped to confirm the boundary between movements and their environment.<sup>123</sup>

In Britain, by contrast, very few CND protesters were as cynical about employing the media to spread the cause as Mabel Murgatroyd in P. G. Wodehouse's short story 'Bingo bans the Bomb'. Mabel, daughter of an aristocrat, persuades her old school friend Bingo Little to stage an impromptu protest on Trafalgar Square and argues: 'The papers feature it next morning, and that helps the cause. Ah, here comes the rozzer now, just when we need him.'<sup>124</sup> Such a media-conscious attitude was more characteristic of the C100 than of CND. The supporters of civil disobedience (**p.155**) used the media as an argument for their form of protest. Bertrand Russell himself mentions the importance of the media for this kind of protest in his *Autobiography*:

so long as constitutional methods were employed, it was very difficult—and often impossible—to cause the most important facts to be known. All great newspapers are against us. Television and radio gave us only grudging and brief opportunities for stating our case ... It was very largely the difficulty of making our case known that drove some of us to the adoption of illegal methods. Our illegal actions, because they had sensational news value, were reported, and here and there, a newspaper would allow us to say why we did what.<sup>125</sup>

Russell's observations after a sit-down in front of the British Ministry of Defence was true for the West German movement as well: 'Our movement depends for its success on an immense public opinion and we cannot create that unless we raise the authorities to more action than they took yesterday ...'.<sup>126</sup> Even in CND, internal movement organization and 'public opinion' remained directly connected. Once this connection was severed, the movement would lose its momentum, and would reveal to the outside world the many discordant voices within it.<sup>127</sup>

The dynamic nature of these processes of organizing people with many different experiences highlights that it makes little sense to fault political movements like CND for their lack of organizational strength.<sup>128</sup> The problem was rather that CND's existing organization did not manage to mediate between activists and the general public, as it remained focused on face-to-face contacts and political meetings, rather than addressing 'the public' as a whole.<sup>129</sup> Because of the fluid nature of these discussions about organization, 'organizational structure' was never a 'collective identity'. Organization was crucial for turning the various protest events into identifiable political movements and seemingly homogeneous political entities. But the presence of activists' experiences meant that the extra-parliamentary politics of security was never stable or static and always remained on the move.

### Notes:

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. Roland Roth, 'Kommunikationsstrukturen und Vernetzungen in neuen sozialen Bewegungen', in Roth and Dieter Rucht (eds), *Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt and New York, 1987), 68–88.

<sup>(2)</sup> Elisabeth S. Clemens, 'Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the American Labor Movement, 1880–1920', in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge, 1996), 205–26.

<sup>(3)</sup> Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA, 1978), 1.

<sup>(4)</sup> Belinda Robnett, 'African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965: Gender, Leadership, and Micromobilization', *American Journal of Sociology*, 101 (1996), 1661–93, here 1667.

<sup>(5)</sup> John D. May, 'Democracy, Organization, Michels', *American Political Science Review*, 59 (1965), 417–29.

<sup>(6)</sup> *Peace News*, 17 November 1961, 5; *Peace News*, 20 September 1963, 1.

<sup>(7)</sup> MALSU, M11 8/9A: 'What Next?', *Bulletin of the North-West CND* (November 1959), 1.

<sup>(8)</sup> Bertrand Russell writing in *Encounter*, 16 (1961), 93.

<sup>(9)</sup> Cf. Brian Harrison, 'A Genealogy of Reform in Modern Britain', in Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher (eds), *Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey* (Folkestone and Hamden, CT, 1980), 119–48.

<sup>(10)</sup> Driver, *The Disarmers*, 31; Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 7–9.

<sup>(11)</sup> Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 3–9.

<sup>(12)</sup> Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 156–67.

<sup>(13)</sup> *Manchester Guardian*, 12 April 1957; MRC, MSS 181: Executive Committee, minutes, 25 September 1958; Frank Allaun to *Peace News*, 9 January 1959, 2; *Peace News*, 18 April 1959, 1.

<sup>(14)</sup> Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 12–14.

<sup>(15)</sup> John Callaghan, *Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: The CPGB 1951–68* (London, 2003), 141–51.

<sup>(16)</sup> Canon John L. Collins, *Faith under Fire* (London, 1966), 303.

(<sup>17</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: Executive Committee, minutes, 21 January 1958; Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 16–20; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 43.

(<sup>18</sup>) Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 23–5.

(<sup>19</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 28 January 1958.

(<sup>20</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 2 January 1959.

(<sup>21</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 25 May 1959, 11–12 April 1959.

(<sup>22</sup>) Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain 1850–1930* (Oxford, 1991).

(<sup>23</sup>) BLPES, CND/1/1: Jim Roche (Leeds), 'Annual Conference, 1958', report.

(<sup>24</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 17 November 1958; Richard Taylor, *Against The Bomb*, 28–9.

(<sup>25</sup>) A. J. P. Taylor in conversation with Richard Taylor, quoted in Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 60.

(<sup>26</sup>) Letter to Jacquetta Hawkes, 16 February 1958, quoted in Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 47.

(<sup>27</sup>) MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 5 October 1958.

(<sup>28</sup>) 'Christians Confer on the Bomb', *Sanity* (November 1961), 1; MRC, MSS 181: National Executive, minutes, 30 June 1961.

(<sup>29</sup>) BLPES, CND/7/17/8: Mailing list for *Rushlight*, n.d. (c.1962).

(<sup>30</sup>) Cf. Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951* (Oxford, 1998), 528–36.

(<sup>31</sup>) BLPES, CND/1/2: Annual Conference, Report, 1959.

(<sup>32</sup>) Ralph Schoenman, 'Preface', in Schoenman (ed.), *Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century* (New York, 1967), 1; Nicolas Walter, 'Non-Violent Resistance: Men against War', *Non Violence*, 63 (1963), 31.

(<sup>33</sup>) This modifies the views in Collins, *Faith under Fire*, 318.

(<sup>34</sup>) 'Letters to the Editor', *Daily Telegraph*, 23 June 1962, 8; John Morris, 'Civil Disobedience: 1962', *Peace News*, 7 September 1962, 4.

(<sup>35</sup>) IISG, C100 papers: Minutes, 27 May 1961 (comment by John Morris).



<sup>(36)</sup> IISG, C100 papers: Peter Cadogan, 'Memo on the Problem of Initiative' circular, 13 December 1962; East Anglia C100, *Newsletter*, 2 (June 1962), 3.

<sup>(37)</sup> Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 155.

<sup>(38)</sup> BLPES, CND/1/3: National Executive, minutes, 30 April 1961.

<sup>(39)</sup> BLPES CND/1/4: 'Annual Report, 1960-61'.

<sup>(40)</sup> BLPES CND/1/3: National Executive, minutes, 30 April 1961.

<sup>(41)</sup> Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 85; Labour Party, *Proceedings of the 59th Annual Conference* (Scarborough, 1960), 76-242.

<sup>(42)</sup> MRC, MSS 181: National Council, minutes, 28 May 1961.

<sup>(43)</sup> Duff, *Left, Left, Left*, 225.

<sup>(44)</sup> Cf. Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* (Oxford, 1990).

<sup>(45)</sup> AdsD: Parteivorstand, minutes, 20 November 1957.

<sup>(46)</sup> Cf. the interpretation by Jost Dülffer, 'The Movement against Rearmament 1951-55 and the Movement against Nuclear Armament 1957/59 in the Federal Republic: A Comparison', in Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), *Le Pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950* (Brussels, 1993), 417-34, here 434.

<sup>(47)</sup> AdsD, 2/PVAJ000305: Werbe- und Propaganda-Ausschuß, minutes, 1957-1958, 10 January 1958; Detlef Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei 1848-1983* (Frankfurt/Main, 1983), 186.

<sup>(48)</sup> On the connection to electoral considerations within the SPD, cf. AdsD, Bruno Gleitze papers: 'Werbe-Ausschuss, Meinungsforschung,—, 1954-1957'.

<sup>(49)</sup> AdsD, 2/PVAM000013: Axel Eggebrecht to Alexander Maaß, 22 November 1960; *EMNID-Informationen* (February 1961), 6; AdsD, 2/PVAM000030: Alexander von Cube to Alexander Maaß, 24 June 1960.

<sup>(50)</sup> AdsD, DGB Archives, Abt. Organisation, 24/2194: 'Volksbewegung Kampf dem Atomtod, Arbeitsausschuß Hessen', circular, 19 December 1958.

<sup>(51)</sup> Cf. Paul Nolte, *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft: Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung* (Munich, 2000), 197-207.

<sup>(52)</sup> AdsD, 2/PVAM000031: DGB Bundesvorstand (Georg Reuter) to Heinrich Ihrig, 25 June 1958; AdsD, IG Metall archives, G1010: Walter Menzel to Willi Richter, 5 October 1961.

(<sup>53</sup>) AdsD 2/PVAM000031: North Rhine Westphalian Regional Committee of Campaign against Atomic Death, minutes, 8 May 1958. On the counter-campaign by the CDU in the context of the CDU's general communication policies, cf. Frank Bösch, *Die Adenauer-CDU: Gründung, Aufstieg und Krise einer Erfolgspartei (1945-1969)* (Stuttgart, 2001), 237-67.

(<sup>54</sup>) AdsD, Menzel papers: circular by the SPD's *Kommunalpolitische Zentralstelle*, 17 March 1958; AdsD, 2/PVAM00008: Alexander von Cube (*Vorwärts*) to Maaß, 23 December 1958; AdsD, Parteivorstand, minutes, 25 April 1958; Minutes of the meeting of the *DGB's* executive committee, 4 March 1958, in Klaus Schönhoven and Hermann Weber (eds), *Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert* (13 vols, Bonn, 2005), xii. 263-5.

(<sup>55</sup>) Cf., for example, the minutes of the *DGB* executive committee meetings, 28 March 1958 and 1 April 1958, in Schönhoven and Weber (eds), *Quellen*, 273 and 280-5.

(<sup>56</sup>) Heinrich Hannover, *Politische Diffamierung der Opposition im freiheitlich-demokratischen Rechtsstaat* (Dortmund-Barop, 1962), 121-3; Werner Hofmann, *Stalinismus und Antikommunismus: Zur Soziologie des Ost-West-Konflikts* (Frankfurt/Main, 1967), 152-4.

(<sup>57</sup>) AdsD, 2/PVAM000024: Manfred Regin to Alexander Maaß, 7 April 1959. On the background, cf. Wolfgang Buschfort, *Das Ostbüro der SPD: Von der Gründung bis zur Berlin-Krise* (Munich, 1991).

(<sup>58</sup>) HWR, 1.43.507: 'Seminar in Feldafing', 6-9 November 1958, 17. On the background, cf. Wolfgang Buschfort, *Geheime Hüter der Verfassung: Von der Düsseldorfer Informationsstelle zum ersten Verfassungsschutz der Bundesrepublik (1947-1961)* (Paderborn, 2004).

(<sup>59</sup>) AdsD: Präsidium, minutes, 20 February 1961.

(<sup>60</sup>) HWR, 72.86.512: Hans Werner Richter to John Collins, 24 April 1960.

(<sup>61</sup>) Cf. Kurt Klotzbach, *Der Weg zur Staatspartei: Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945-1965* (Bonn, 1996), 570-8.

(<sup>62</sup>) AdsD, 3/BEAB000557: SPD Berlin, minutes, 13 October 1958.

(<sup>63</sup>) *Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst*, 1 August 1958; *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, 106 (14 June 1958), 1065-6, 1068; BAK, B106/2437: 'Zur Frage der Verfassungsmäßigkeit von

Volksbefragungen. Rechtsgutachten der Verfassungsabteilungen des BMI und BMJ' [n.d., c. May 1958].

(<sup>64</sup>) Cf. *Protokoll 5. Ordentlicher Bundeskongress, Stuttgart, 7.-12. September 1959*, ed. Bundesvorstand des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Düsseldorf, n.d.), 707-10; minutes of the 8th meeting of the DGB federal executive, in Schönhoven and Weber (eds), *Quellen*, 4 February 1959, 431-5, here 432.

(<sup>65</sup>) AdsD: Präsidium, minutes, 23 January 1961, 3; AdsD: DGB Archives, Abt. Organisation, 24/9006: 'Pressemitteilung der SPD, betr.: Ostermarsch-Bewegung', 7 November 1963; AdsD, 2/PVAM000033: Maaß to Ollenhauer, 22 March 1962; AdsD, IG Metall Archives, G1285: Maaß to Brand, 25 January 1962.

(<sup>66</sup>) AdsD: Präsidium, minutes, 20 February 1961, 1-2; AdsD, DGB, Abt. Organisation, 24-2215: 'Information für den BV des DGB über die Vorbereitung zum "Ostermarsch 1963"', 31 January 1963.

(<sup>67</sup>) *Die Welt*, 14 April 1958, 5; *Berliner Tagesspiegel*, 15 April 1958, 3; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 26-27 April 1958, 3; AdsD, ASAF000177: Circular by the 'Studentenausschuß gegen Atomrüstung', Berlin, 2 July 1958.

(<sup>68</sup>) Röhl, *Fünf Finger sind keine Faust*, 90-2.

(<sup>69</sup>) AdsD: Parteivorstand, minutes, 9-10 January 1961, 8-9; Präsidium, minutes, 20 February 1961, 837-8.

(<sup>70</sup>) HIS, TEM200,03: 'Wie soll es weitergehen?', Central Committee, minutes, 6/7 May 1961.

(<sup>71</sup>) AdsD, 2/PVAM000033: Alexander Maass to Walter Menzel (KdA), 22 March 1962; Siegward Lönnendonker (ed.), *Linksintellektueller Aufbruch zwischen 'Kulturrevolution' und 'kultureller Zerstörung': Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS) in der Nachkriegsgeschichte (1946-1969). Dokumentation eines Symposiums* (Opladen, 1998), 80-1.

(<sup>72</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 6/7 May 1961.

(<sup>73</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Tempel to the conscientious objectors' groups in Braunschweig, Bremen, and Hanover, n. d. [c.14 or 15 January 1960]. On the background, cf. Rolf Seeliger, *Die außerparlamentarische Opposition* (Munich, 1968), 125.

(<sup>74</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 6-7 May 1961.

(<sup>75</sup>) Cf., for this wording, Harold Mah, 'Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking Habermas for Historians', *Journal of Modern History*, 72 (2000), 153-82.

(<sup>76</sup>) HIS, TEM 400,01: circular regarding libel cases against claims of communist subversion, 27 November 1961.

(<sup>77</sup>) HIS, TEM 100, 04: 'Ratschläge für Teilnehmer' [n.d., c.1961]; Central Committee, minutes, 3 July 1960; Horst Bethge, ' "Die Bombe ist böse": Wie der Ostermarsch in Hamburg entstand', in Jörg Berlin (ed.), *Das andere Hamburg: Freiheitliche Bestrebungen in der Hansestadt seit dem Spätmittelalter* (Cologne, 1981), 357-68.

(<sup>78</sup>) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 73-4.

(<sup>79</sup>) HIS, TEM 100,04: Central Committee, minutes, 5-6 November 1960; 21-22 January 1961.

(<sup>80</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: 'Grundsätze des Ostermarschs der Atomwaffengeegner', 14-15 October 1961.

(<sup>81</sup>) HIS, WOL: Regional Committee West, minutes, 21 March 1963; AT: Central Committee, directive, March 1963; Central Committee, minutes, 2-3 March 1963.

(<sup>82</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: 'Grundsätze'; Dr Schulze and Dieter Simon to the local members of these associations, 5 December 1960; IfZ, ED702/53: ICDP circular (c.1963).

(<sup>83</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Buro to Central Committee, 28 July 1963; Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 210.

(<sup>84</sup>) HIS, TEM 300,06: Central Committee, minutes, 22/23 September 1963.

(<sup>85</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Buro to Tempel, 5 March 1962.

(<sup>86</sup>) HIS, TEM 100,04: Tempel to Stubenrauch, Head of the Wuppertal VK group, November 1960.

(<sup>87</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Regional Committee West, minutes, 30 March 1962.

(<sup>88</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Stubenrauch circular, 28 January 1961; 'Arbeitsordnung', Regional Committee West, 26 October 1962; Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 87, 211-12.

(<sup>89</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Vack to Tempel, 13 June 1961.

(<sup>90</sup>) Nina Verheyen, *Diskussionslust: Eine Kulturgeschichte des "besseren Arguments" in Westdeutschland* (Göttingen, 2010).

<sup>(91)</sup> These findings contradict the arguments by Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002), 6.

<sup>(92)</sup> AdsD, 2/PVAM000020: Menzel to Albert Carthy (Socialist International, London), 25 November 1959.

<sup>(93)</sup> AdsD: Parteivorstand, minutes, 24 January 1958; for Britain: Archives of the British Labour Party, Series One: National Executive Committee Minutes, part 5: 1956–9 inclusive: 'Summary Report of the meeting between the International Committees of the Labour Party NEC and the TUC General Council held in Transport House at 10.30 a.m. on Thursday', 6 March 1958.

<sup>(94)</sup> AdsD, 2/PVAM000007: folder 'Tarnorganisationen'; PolArchAA, B31/247: German Embassy London to Foreign Office, Bonn, 'Betr.: Labour Partei und SPD', 30 April 1963; BLPES, CND/7/24: Duff to Menzel, 17 May 1958; CND/1/45: Report on the Moscow Conference, 1962.

<sup>(95)</sup> HWR, 72.86.511: 'Mitgliederliste', 'Verfassung', n.d. [c.1958].

<sup>(96)</sup> HWR, 72.86.512, fo. 55: Christopher Holme to Hans Werner Richter, 2 April 1958.

<sup>(97)</sup> HWR, 72.86.512, 20: Statutes of the European Federation against Nuclear Arms, n.d. [c.1959].

<sup>(98)</sup> HWR 72.86.512, 158: Report about the European Congress against Nuclear Armaments, 6 February 1959.

<sup>(99)</sup> IfZ, ED702/52: ICDP, Constitution, n.d. [c. January 1963].

<sup>(100)</sup> IfZ, ED702/52: 'Statement of the Aims of the ICDP', n.d. [c. January 1963].

<sup>(101)</sup> HWR, 72.86.512: Christian Mayer-Amery to Hans Werner Richter, 15 July 1959; Hans Werner Richter to Siegfried Bußjäger, 17 April 1960.

<sup>(102)</sup> Diana Collins to *Peace News*, 29 March 1963, 5; Judith Cook to *Peace News*, 1 March 1963, 3; Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU) MfS-Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, no. 193, 000162-000168: 'Einzelinformation über die Tätigkeit der Europäischen Föderation gegen Atomrüstung und die "Internationale Konferenz für allgemeine Abrüstung und das Verbot aller Atomwaffen"', n.d.

<sup>(103)</sup> Cf., for example, Hilda von Klenze, 'Brief aus England', *Friedensrundschau*, 14 (1960), 15; Klenze, 'Brief aus England', *Friedensrundschau*, 17 (1963), 15–16.

<sup>(104)</sup> IISG, WRI-7: Reports from the 8th Triennial Conference, Paris 1954.

---

(<sup>105</sup>) IISG, WRI-7: List of conference participants at the WRI's 8th Triennial Conference, Paris, 1954.

(<sup>106</sup>) IISG, WRI-226: Andreas Buro to Tony Smythe, 3 September 1960.

(<sup>107</sup>) On these traditions, cf. Zimmer, 'Das Abseits als vermiedener Irrweg'.

(<sup>108</sup>) IISG, WRI-7: Complete lists of those attending the 1957 conference, London.

(<sup>109</sup>) IISG, WRI-63: Details for the WRI Study Conference at Blaricum near Amsterdam, 12–19 August 1961.

(<sup>110</sup>) IISG, C100-2: George Clark, 'Convenor's Notes', 27 March 1962; IISG, WRI-226: Andreas Buro to Tony Smythe, 2 November 1960.

(<sup>111</sup>) Karl Christian Führer, Knut Hickethier, and Axel Schildt, 'Öffentlichkeit—Medien—Geschichte: Konzepte der modernen Öffentlichkeit und Zugänge zu ihrer Erforschung', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 41 (2001), 1–38, here 6.

(<sup>112</sup>) Cf. Knut Hickethier, 'Medien', in Christoph Führ and Carl-Ludwig Furck (eds), *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte* (6 vols, Munich, 1998), vi. 1, 602–10; Martin Harrison, 'Television and Radio', in Butler and King (eds), *The British General Election of 1964*, 156–84.

(<sup>113</sup>) Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 73.

(<sup>114</sup>) BLPES, CND/1/4: CND annual reports 1961–2 and 1962–3.

(<sup>115</sup>) HIS, TEM 200,03: Central Committee, minutes, 14–15 October 1961.

(<sup>116</sup>) A. J. Beith, 'The Press', in Butler and King (eds), *The British General Election of 1964*, 185–203.

(<sup>117</sup>) 'Ostermärsche wurden kaum beachtet', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5 April 1961.

(<sup>118</sup>) Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Einige Vorschläge zur Methode des Kampfes gegen die atomare Aufrüstung', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 4 (1958), 410–14.

(<sup>119</sup>) BLPES, CND/1/56: 'Public opinion', draft, c.1960; Driver, *The Disarmers*, 99; AdsD, Parteivorstand, minutes, 23 October 1958; BAK, ZSg. 1/E-70: 'Informationen für die Presse, April 1963'.

(<sup>120</sup>) Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, 140–2.

(<sup>121</sup>) HIS, Ostermarsch Nord, folder 1: Leaflet, Regional Committee South, 26 August 1965.

(<sup>122</sup>) BLPES, CND/1/24: 'Campaign Caravan', leaflet, c.1962, and CND/1/65: 'Tell Britain', pamphlet c.1961.

(<sup>123</sup>) TNA PREM 11/2778: Macmillan to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 24 March 1958; Detlef Bald, 'Die Atombewaffnung der Bundeswehr in den fünfziger Jahren: Öffentlichkeit und die Kontrolle der Militärpolitik', in Jost Dülffer (ed.), *Parlamentarische und öffentliche Kontrolle von Rüstung in Deutschland 1700-1970* (Düsseldorf, 1992), 203-17, here 210-11.

(<sup>124</sup>) P. G. Wodehouse, 'Bingo Bans the Bomb', in Wodehouse, *Plum Pie* (London, 1966), 119-36, here 122.

(<sup>125</sup>) Speech to a Youth CND conference in Birmingham, 15 April 1961, quoted in Bertrand Russell, *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell* (3 vols, London, 1978), iii. 139.

(<sup>126</sup>) Quoted in Brian Masters, *The Swinging Sixties* (London, 1985), 206.

(<sup>127</sup>) Frank Allaun, 'In with a Bang, Out ... ', in John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (eds), *The CND Story: The First 25 years of CND in the Words of the People Involved* (London, 1983), 56-7.

(<sup>128</sup>) This is the argument in Chun, *The British New Left*, xvi; in Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, *passim*, and in Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO*, *passim*.

(<sup>129</sup>) Cf. the criticism by Stuart Hall, 'Peace Politics', *Sanity* (May 1963), 5.

Access brought to you by: