9

The Challenge of Measuring Well-Being as Philosophers Conceive of It

Anne Baril

Abstract

Many philosophers find the prospect of working with researchers in the social and behavioral sciences exciting, in part because they hope that these researchers might be able to measure well-being as the philosopher conceives of it. In this chapter, I consider how the measurement of well-being, as it is conceived of by philosophers, might feasibly be facilitated. I propose that existing scales can be employed to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it. I support this conclusion through an in-depth discussion of an example. I explain how the scale of psychological well-being developed by Carol Ryff and validated in more than 750 empirical studies (Ryff, 2016, 2018) may be employed to measure the extent to which a person has realized an ostensible basic good. This discussion will be illustrative of the general method that may be employed to bring empirical researchers and philosophers into contact in a way that will facilitate the measurement of well-being as philosophers conceive of it.

Many philosophers find the prospect of working with researchers in the social and behavioral sciences exciting, in part because they hope that these researchers might be able to measure well-being as the philosopher conceives of it. Yet there are challenges of measuring well-being as philosophers conceive of it, challenges serious enough to make one wonder whether such hopes can be fulfilled. In this chapter, I review some of these challenges and consider whether the measurement of well-being as philosophers conceive of it might yet be facilitated. Dovetailing with recent work by Margolis, Schwitzgebel, Ozer, and Lyubomirsky (Chapter 13, in this volume), I propose

that existing scales can be employed to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it. I support this conclusion through an in-depth discussion of an example. I explain how the Psychological Well-Being Scale (PWBS) developed by Carol Ryff may be employed to measure well-being according to just one philosophical account of well-being (an "objective list theory" of well-being; see later discussion). This discussion will be illustrative of the general method that may be employed to bring measures of well-being developed by empirical researchers—those of psychologists as well as others in the social and behavioral sciences—into contact with philosophical conceptions of well-being in a way that will facilitate the measurement of well-being as philosophers conceive of it.

It is too much to expect that a psychological measure (or a set of such measures) will provide us with an *infallible test* for well-being as philosophers conceive of it.[1] The relevant question, I propose, when it comes to the measurement of well-being as philosophers conceive of it, is not whether a measure will provide us with an infallible test for well-being as philosophers conceive of it, but whether there is something meaningful to be gained by such measurement. I argue that there is.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review some of the main philosophical approaches to well-being and some of the main challenges that arise when attempting to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it. Through discussion of the example of the PWBS and an objective list theory of well-being, I will show how items from an existing scale may be used to measure the extent to which a person has realized an ostensible basic good. I'll then briefly indicate how this same method might be used in connection with other measures and other basic goods. Finally, I will review some limitations of the proposed method and argue that, despite these limitations, there is good reason to attempt to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it.

Philosophical Approaches to Well-Being

Philosophers who research well-being are interested in what benefits us or harms us, in what makes our lives go better or worse. Of course, there are many things that benefit us, not all of which are especially interesting to philosophers. Brooms, for example, benefit us by helping us clean the floor; cars benefit us by helping us get where we want to go (or achieve status or

express ourselves through quirky bumper stickers). Brooms and cars are examples of things that are frequently of *instrumental value*: they can *benefit us indirectly* in virtue of serving as means to achieving something else that benefits us, such as having clean floors or arriving at our desired destinations. The primary object of philosophical investigations of well-being, however, is not what is of merely instrumental value (nor what is merely indicative of, or correlative with, value), but what is of *final value*: that which *benefits us directly*; that which, in itself, makes us better off.[2] Brooms and cars are instrumentally valuable, but, intuitively, they are not finally valuable. We can see this by engaging in a simple thought experiment: we can ask ourselves whether we can imagine circumstances in which having a broom or a car *doesn't* benefit a person. It seems as though we can. We can, for example, imagine circumstances in which a person doesn't benefit from having a broom: circumstances in which she has another, better way to clean the floor, such as a vacuuming robot, for example, or circumstances in which she doesn't care whether the floor is clean (e.g., because her house is going to be demolished the following day). We can, it seems, imagine circumstances in which having a broom doesn't benefit a person in any way. This little thought experiment gives us evidence that it's not the broom, itself, that benefits a person, but these other things, such as having a clean floor—evidence, in other words, that the broom is only instrumentally valuable, not finally valuable, or valuable in itself: that it doesn't benefit us directly, only indirectly, via its connection to other goods.

Other things, by contrast, are finally valuable: good for us, just in themselves, even when they do not help us secure anything else.[3] Pleasurable experiences, for example, seem to make a person's life go better quite independently of any other effects they may have. Intuitively, the pleasure of basking in the sun or playing a favorite sport makes a person's life go better even if it doesn't help her achieve some further end, such as getting a suntan or lowering her blood pressure. If so, then pleasurable experiences are among what philosophers call *basic goods*: things that benefit us directly; things that are good for us, just in themselves.[4,5]

A central task of philosophers who investigate well-being is to establish what the basic goods are. Some philosophers are monists, arguing that there is just one basic good—that is, one general type of thing that directly benefits a person. *Experientialists*, for example, argue that it is experiences of some specified sort (e.g., pleasurable ones) that directly benefit a person (Feldman, 2004). *Preferentists*, on the other hand, argue that it is having one's

preferences or desires satisfied (Brandt, 1979, pp. 126–129; Railton, 1986; Sidgwick, 1907).[6] Other philosophers are pluralists, arguing that there are a plurality of basic goods. *Objective list theorists*, for example, argue that there are a number of things that directly benefit a person.[7] Friendship, knowledge, happiness or pleasure, aesthetic experience, and achievement are a few of the items that frequently appear on pluralistic lists of basic goods (Finnis, 1980/ 2011; Fletcher, 2013; Hooker, 1998; Moore, 2000; Murphy, 2001; Rice, 2013). This tripartite division of theories of well-being is traditional, following Parfit (1984); there are also a number of theories that do not fit neatly into any of these categories, including value fulfillment theories (Raibley, 2010; Tiberius, 2018), hybrid theories (Kagan, 2009; Lauinger, Chapter 8, in this volume), and L. W. Sumner's account of well-being as authentic life satisfaction (Sumner, 1996; see later discussion). This short survey of philosophical accounts of well-being demonstrates the extent of disagreement that exists among philosophers about the essential nature of well-being.[8]

The Challenges of Measuring Well-Being as Philosophers Conceive of It

Philosophers strive to improve our understanding of the fundamental nature of well-being through philosophical reflection, including the use of thought experiments like the one discussed earlier. For the most part, philosophical research does not address questions that can be answered through empirical research—questions like: Who actually *is* well off? Are there things individuals can do to make their lives better? What public policies will best help individuals improve their lives? Yet the interest of most philosophers in well-being is not merely theoretical, but practical. Philosophers who investigate well-being often do so, in part, because we hope that by better understanding the fundamental nature of well-being, we will be better positioned to improve our lives and the lives of others. Many philosophers find the prospect of working with researchers in the social and behavioral sciences exciting, in part because they hope that these researchers, with their expertise at measuring well-being, might be able to measure well-being *as the philosopher conceives of it* and, ultimately, to tell us how we can make people's lives better (again, on the philosopher's conception of "better").

Yet measuring well-being as philosophers conceive of it proves challenging. For one thing, as we have seen, philosophers are interested in identifying the

basic goods—the things that directly benefit a person—but there is disagreement among philosophers about what are the basic goods. Accordingly, there are a number of philosophical conceptions of well-being, and a measure of well-being on one philosophical conception cannot be expected to be a measure of well-being on another philosophical conception. For example: a measure comprising items concerning the quantity and quality of a person's positive experience may measure well-being as an experientialist conceives of it; its relationship to well-being as the preferentist or objective list theorist conceives of it will be less clear. Likewise for measures that would satisfy the preferentist or objective list theorist.

Furthermore, each of these general types of theory includes a number of individual theories. For example, historically there have been experientialists who have held that the prudential value of pleasure is a function not only of its intensity and duration but its "quality," while other experientialists have denied this (Bentham, 1789/1907; Mill, 1861/2001). Thus a measure of well-being as one experientialist conceives of it will not necessarily be a measure of well-being as another experientialist conceives of it. Given the diversity of philosophical positions, developing a measure that would satisfy the curiosity of all, or even a majority of, philosophers quickly becomes an unwieldy task. Any manageable measure of well-being can be expected to satisfy the curiosity of defenders of just one or at most a few of the many philosophical accounts of well-being. And since no single theory of well-being has garnered the support of more than a small percentage of the philosophers investigating well-being, it would be only a small percentage of philosophers whose curiosity is satisfied, no matter which theory it is.

Moreover, well-being as philosophers conceive of it is not something that can easily be measured. We may illustrate with just one type of philosophical account, a standard version of preferentism.[9] According to preferentists, what directly benefits a person are not mental states of the person, such as the state of *believing* that her desires are satisfied or the state of *taking pleasure in thinking* that they are satisfied; what directly benefits a person is for her desires to actually *be* satisfied; that is, for the state of affairs she desires to actually obtain, whether the person knows it or not.[10]

An example may help illuminate this point. Imagine a woman who has anonymously given up a child for adoption and now, many years later, desires that the child was placed with a loving family. According to preferentists, this woman is better off if this desire is satisfied—if the child was, as a matter of fact, placed with a loving family—even if the woman never learns that this is

the case. In a case like this one, determining whether the desired state of affairs obtains through empirical investigation is at the very least infeasible; in other cases it will be impossible. Imagine, for example, that a person desires a relationship with a Higher Power. It may be possible to determine through empirical investigation whether the person *believes* she has a relationship with a Higher Power, but this is not what, according to preferentists, benefits her: what benefits her is for the state of affairs she desires to *actually* obtain— for her to *actually* have a relationship with a Higher Power. And this is not something that can be established through empirical investigation.[11]

Well-being, then, will be difficult to measure even as conceived by defenders of the simplest form of preferentism. And most philosophical accounts of well-being are far more complex, in ways that make well-being as it is conceived of by defenders of these theories still more difficult to measure. For example, we saw in the previous section that mental states such as desires or pleasurable experiences play an important role in well-being as many philosophers conceive of it. Many of these philosophers do not think that *every* mental state of the relevant sort (or, in the case of preferentists, its realizer[12]) benefits a person, only those that meet certain conditions. A common condition imposed is an epistemic one: it is often held that a mental state of the relevant sort (or its realizer) directly benefits a person only if it is one the person would have were she appropriately epistemically positioned—for example, if she were "fully informed, duly reflective, perfectly rational, free of prejudice and bias" (Kagan, 2009, p. 254) or if she "knew and vividly appreciated all of the non-evaluative facts" (Heathwood, 2015, p. 139). See also Brandt (1979, p. 126–129), Dorsey (2010), Griffin (1986, p. 11), Kauppinen (2012, pp. 366–368), Kraut (1994, p. 40), Raibley (2010, pp. 606–607), and Sumner (1996).

A thought experiment can help us understand why many philosophers believe some such condition exists. Consider a troubling instance of adaptive preferences in which a person has been subjected to abuse and has, over time, internalized the attitudes of her abusers, such that she now desires only to serve them. Intuitively, having *this* desire—the desire to serve her abusers— satisfied does not make this person better off. By restricting the desires, satisfaction of which directly benefit a person, to desires that meet some epistemic condition, preferentists are able to deny that having this kind of adaptive preference satisfied directly benefits a person.[13]

We can see that, in order to accurately measure an individual's well-being as such philosophers conceive of it, it would not be enough to measure the

degree to which her desires were satisfied; it would also be necessary to evaluate what we might call the epistemic quality of these desires. This is just one example to illustrate the kinds of condition that some philosophers claim that mental states must meet in order to directly benefit a person, but it is illustrative of how philosophical accounts of well-being can be complex in ways that make well-being, as defenders of these theories conceive of it, difficult to measure. And since we must first measure well-being in order to answer other empirical questions about it, such as how we might promote it, overcoming these difficulties in measurement is a necessary step toward answering these other questions as well.[14]

There are, then, challenges that arise when we attempt to bring together empirical researchers, with their expertise measuring well-being, and philosophers, with their expertise reflecting on well-being. Philosophers can feel frustrated that what empirical researchers wind up measuring is not, in the end, well-being, because their measures can be insensitive to the distinctions that philosophers think are so important. Empirical researchers, in turn, may reason that developing a measure that is sensitive to these distinctions would be infeasible and that it is better to have a measure of well-being we can actually implement, even if in certain cases—such as the case of someone whose well-being is improved by unknowingly having a desire satisfied—the measure will not be perfectly accurate.

A Method for Measuring Well-Being as Philosophers Conceive of It: An Illustration

In light of these challenges, some may conclude that attempts to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it should be abandoned. However, in light of how much there is to be gained from philosophers and researchers in the social and behavioral sciences working together to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it, it's well worth proceeding with such attempts so long as we do so with sensitivity to the preceding challenges. This means, first, making every effort to develop a measure that is sensitive to the nuances of the philosophical conception, and, second, in the event that one's measure is less than perfectly accurate, being transparent about the ways in which it falls short. Such transparency is important not only for the sake of honesty, but to help pave the way for future efforts to measure well-being as the philosopher conceives of it more accurately.

This chapter represents one philosopher's attempt to say, a little more clearly, what it would look like to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it in a way that is sensitive to the preceding challenges. I'll begin with an illustration: I will show how one might use just one existing psychological scale—the PWBS—to measure well-being according to just one philosophical account of well-being—objective list theory. In this section, I focus on making the positive case in support of the conclusion that existing scales may be adapted to measure well-being as it is conceived of by philosophers; then I will consider the particular challenges that confront attempts to measure well-being on this philosophical conception.

Friendship

As noted earlier, objective list theorists are pluralists, often including friendship, knowledge, happiness or pleasure, aesthetic experience, and achievement among the things that directly benefit a person. For the sake of illustration, I will isolate just one item on the list—just one (ostensible) basic good—and explain how the PWBS could be adapted to measure the extent to which a person has realized it in her life.

Consider a kind of deep, rich personal relationship that it is plausible to think is an important part of what makes our lives go well.[15] Philosophers who count some such relationship among the basic goods typically call it "friendship." Here I will offer a characterization of friendship that includes many of the features that philosophers have proposed are characteristic of it (Helm, 2013) and then consider the extent to which the PWBS can serve as an instrument for measuring the extent to which a person has realized friendship on this philosophical conception.

For simplicity, I will refer to friendship on this philosophical conception simply as "friendship." Of course, there are many kinds of relationships we casually call friendships, not all of which are plausible candidates for a basic good. I don't wish to engage in a dispute about whether the kind of relationship I will describe here merits the term "friendship" more than any of these other relationships. The aim here is to give an account of the kind of deep, rich personal relationship that is the best candidate for being a basic good. The term "friendship" is merely a convenient label. As an initial characterization, we may say that friendship is

> A distinctively personal relationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other's sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy (Helm, 2013, n.p.).

There are many kinds of personal relationships that can be friendships in the present sense, including familial relationships, romantic relationships and even some working relationships, such as relationships involving extended, intimate collaboration on a creative or research project. Friendships are characterized in large part by deep-seated dispositions of the friends. Friends are disposed to care about each other for their own sakes. They are disposed to consider one another's feelings: to take joy in their successes, share in their disappointments, and so on. Friends are disposed to act on their friends' behalf—to promote their welfare, to support them in their pursuit of their aims, and so on, not for any ulterior motive, but just for the friend's own sake. Friends love each other for who they are, esteem each other for their merits (Stroud, 2006). A friend is committed to reminding her friend "of what's really valuable in life and to foster within her a commitment to these values so as to prevent her from going astray" (Helm, 2013, n.p.; Whiting, 1991). Friends trust one another in a way that makes true intimacy possible, sharing thoughts or experiences they wouldn't share with other more casual acquaintances. Friends take each other seriously, in such a way that their values, interests, reasons, and so on provide one another with *pro tanto* reasons to value and think similarly. Moreover, the relationship is *dynamic*—friends mutually influence each other's sense of value in a way that supports intimacy (Friedman, 1989; Helm, 2013). Friends have a sense of solidarity premised on the sharing of values and a sense of what is important. They feel empathy toward one another, even to the point of sharing in one another's pride and shame (Helm, 2013; Sherman, 1987; Taylor, 1985). Finally, and perhaps most simply, friends spend time together, not only in the sense that they are in one another's presence, but in the sense that they partake in shared activities in an engaged way.[16]

The PWBS

The PWBS is a prominent multidimensional measure of psychological well-being that has been especially influential in elucidating the eudaimonic

aspects of this larger construct (Ryff, 1989, see also Ryff et al., Chapter 4, in this volume). At a time when empirical research concerned with well-being focused mainly on reports of happiness, and life satisfaction, the PWBS was developed to probe what it is to be "self-actualized, individuated, fully functioning or optimally developed" (Ryff, 2013, pp. 11–12). The scale distinguishes six key dimensions of what has since been called "eudaimonic" well-being: autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. I refer the reader to the chapter by Ryff et al. (Chapter 4, in this volume), and in particular to Box 4.2, "Definitions of Theory-Guided Dimensions of Eudaimonic Well-Being," which gives, for each factor, a description of a high and low scorer and a sample item of measurement.

Friendship and the PWBS

How does friendship, so understood, relate to the PWBS? Can the PWBS serve as a measure of the extent to which a person has realized friendship in her life—as "a measure of friendship"?

When considering the prospects for the PWBS as a measure of friendship, a natural place to begin is with the positive relations with others (PR) factor. Many of the items of measurement that are part of the PR factor seem to correspond, in the relevant way, to friendship (where, to remind the reader, by "friendship" I mean friendship *on the preceding philosophical conception*). For example, consider the following items (from Ryff's 54-item scale, see Ryff (1989), Ryff and Keyes (1995), and Ryff, Boylan, and Kirsch (Chapter 4, in this volume); unless otherwise noted, all items of measurement that I discuss are from this scale):

PR7. People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time
    with others.
PR1. Most people see me as loving and affectionate.
PR9. I know that I can trust my friends, and they know that they can trust me.

Based on the preceding account of friendship, we can say that a friend is one who is willing to spend time with her friend, who is empathetic, and who cares about her friend for her own sake. We can expect this kind of person to be described by others (at least her friends) as "a giving person, willing to

share her time with others." Friends love and care for one another; thus they will be—and will be seen as—loving and affectionate (at least, in their capacity *as* friends—a point to which I shall return later). Finally, friends trust one another. Thus we can expect friends to score highly on PR7, PR1, and PR9. (Some readers may have concerns here, e.g., about the limitations of self-reported measures, but—to remind the reader—I am deferring a discussion of limitations to the approach I am outlining here until later in the chapter.)

PR1, PR7, and PR9 relate relatively directly to some of the features of friendship. There are also others that relate less directly. Consider, for example,

PR4. I enjoy personal and mutual conversations with family members or friends.

Based on the preceding account of friendship, friends spend time together, "partake in shared activities in an engaged way." Presumably this includes having conversations. Moreover, since friends esteem one another for their merits and are disposed to share in one another's joys and disappointments, the parties to these conversations will not ignore what the other person says or engage in self-indulgent monologues. Rather, conversations among friends will be characterized by active and empathetic listening; the mutual sharing of thoughts, feelings, experiences; and so on. Thus we can expect friends to score highly on PR4.

Some features of friendship, so understood, are apparently not captured by the items in the PR factor, either individually or taken together. Take, for example, the way friends are committed to reminding one another of what's valuable and to help keep each other from going astray. Friends are willing to challenge one another and, in turn, are receptive to each other's challenges. This element of mutual challenge does not seem to be captured by the items of that are part of the PR factor.

The element of mutual challenge characteristic of friendship may, however, be captured when we broaden our scope to include other factors on the PWBS. Consider, for example, the following items that are part of the autonomy (A) factor:

A1. I am not afraid to voice my opinions, even when they are in opposition to the opinions of most people.

A7. It's difficult for me to voice my own opinions on controversial matters. (rs)
A9. I judge myself by what I think is important, not by the values of what others think is important.

A person who scores highly on this factor will presumably be the kind of person who will, in conversation, be willing to speak up and challenge her friend when she seems to be straying from her value commitments.

Being the kind of person who is able to challenge friends when appropriate is just one side of mutual challenge. The other is being the kind of person who will, in conversation, be open to a friend's suggestion that there is room for her to improve. This may be at least partially captured by items such as the following, from the Personal Growth (PG) factor:

PG6. I do not enjoy being in new situations that require me to change my old familiar ways of doing things. (rs)
PG7. For me, life has been a continuous process of learning, changing, and growth.
PG8. I gave up trying to make big improvements or changes in my life a long time ago. (rs)

The upshot, I propose, is that when a person scores highly on the A and PG factors, *in conjunction with* the preceding personal relations factors, it is reasonable to expect that her friendships *are* ones that have the element of mutual challenge that is a part of friendship.

Friendship, on the preceding conception, is—like many ostensible basic goods—a complex entity that is difficult to measure. Given its complexity, no single item taken alone can measure it. Yet the present discussion provides an illustration of the way in which items of measurement, even items from different factors, can, in conjunction, form a system that can provide a measure of, if not all, at least many of the features of friendship.

A Method for Measuring Well-Being as Philosophers Conceive of It: Further Examples

In the previous section, I gave an extended illustration to show how items from an existing scale may, in conjunction, provide a measure of the extent to which a person has realized an ostensible basic good. Here I will give a couple

more examples to illustrate the proposed method involving other philosophical accounts of well-being and other measures before turning to a discussion of some of the limitations of the proposed method.

Other Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being

The extended example of the previous section shows how it is possible for items of measurement to be constructed into a web that can serve as a measure of a basic good. While only one such good—friendship—was discussed, the same general formula may be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, to measure other basic goods.

For example, one of the items frequently included on objective list theorists' lists of basic goods is rational agency (though they do not always use this term; e.g., Finnis [1980] includes "practical reasonableness," Griffin [1986] includes "components of human agency," Murphy [2001] includes "excellence in agency," and Parfit [1984] includes "rational activity"). Philosophers give different accounts of what exactly rational agency consists in, but items such as the following, from the environmental mastery (EM) and purpose in life (PL) factors of the PWBS, are promising as partial measures of the extent to which a person has realized the basic good of rational agency:

EM4. I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my daily life.
EM6. I generally do a good job of taking care of my personal finances and affairs.
EM8. I have difficulty arranging my life in a way that is satisfying to me. (rs)
PL4. I don't have a good sense of what it is that I am trying to accomplish in my life. (rs)
PL6. I enjoy making plans for the future and working to make them a reality.

As another example, consider L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being, according to which well-being is identified with "authentic life satisfaction" (Sumner, 1996). Life-satisfaction, according to Sumner, has both a cognitive aspect and an affective aspect: the person who is satisfied with her life both has a positive evaluation of the conditions of her life (e.g., judges that it is a good one) and experiences her life in a certain way (e.g., as enriching, rewarding, satisfying, fulfilling). However, intuitively, merely being satisfied with one's life does not make one well off. (Recall the troubling case of

adaptive preferences discussed earlier.) Thus Sumner imposes conditions that an individual's satisfaction with her life must meet if it is to represent a genuine benefit to her. One such condition is an autonomy condition: the person's values (at least insofar as they bear on her satisfaction with her life) must be "in some important sense, *her own*" (Sumner, 1996, p. 167). If a person's satisfaction with her life is based on values that she doesn't endorse, or if they were formed by a process that undermined her capacity to critically assess her own values, then, even if she is satisfied with her life, she is not—on Sumner's view—well-off.

A review of the details of Sumner's account is outside the scope of this chapter, but the following items, from the EM and the self-acceptance (SA) factors of the PWBS, appear indicative of the cognitive aspect of life-satisfaction, on Sumner's view.

EM9. I have been able to build a home and a lifestyle for myself that is much to my liking.

EM8. I have difficulty arranging my life in a way that is satisfying to me. (rs)

SA1. When I look at the story of my life, I am pleased with how things have turned out.

SA5. I made some mistakes in the past, but I feel that all in all everything has worked out for the best.

SA8. The past had its ups and downs, but in general, I wouldn't want to change it.

Regarding the autonomy condition on an individual's satisfaction with her life, there are two aspects of autonomy worth mentioning in connection with the measurement of authentic life-satisfaction using items from the PWBS. First, if a person is highly susceptible to social pressures, this can inhibit the formation of values that are truly her own (Sumner, 1996, pp. 168–171). Items like the following, from the A factor of the EBWS, can measure a person's susceptibility to social pressures:

A3. I tend to worry about what other people think of me. (rs)

A6. I have confidence in my opinions, even if they are contrary to the general consensus.

Second, if a person's range of experience is highly curtailed, this can potentially undermine a person's autonomy, in Sumner's sense. If a person has a

very limited set of experiences, she will be unlikely to develop the perspective needed to engage in the critical assessment of her values that is necessary if these values are to be truly her own (Sumner, 1996, p. 170). Items like the following, from the PG factor of the EBWS, can measure the degree to which a person is open to having new experiences and enjoys being in novel situations and thus may give an indication of whether she has had the kind of experience in virtue of which she is well-positioned to critically assess her values:

PG1. I am not interested in activities that will expand my horizons. (rs)

PG3. I think it is important to have new experiences that challenge how you think about yourself and the world.

PG6. I do not enjoy being in new situations that require me to change my old familiar ways of doing things. (rs)

The preceding items from the A and PG factors may, then, give an indication of whether a person is autonomous, in Sumner's sense, and thus an indication of whether her satisfaction with her life is authentic. In conjunction with the items measuring a person's satisfaction with life, they can serve as the basis of a measure of the extent to which a person is authentically satisfied with her life. For example: if a person expresses high satisfaction with her life but has a low score on the preceding items from the A and PG factors, we might have reason to doubt she is autonomous, in Sumner's sense; we would then have less reason to think that her satisfaction with her life is authentic and, accordingly, less reason to think that she is well-off, in Sumner's sense, than if she were to score highly on the A and PG factors.

Other Measures

I have illustrated how one might measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it with items from the PWBS, but one might use items from other scales, or even multiple scales in conjunction. For example, the following items from the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Deiner, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) may serve as a measure of life-satisfaction on Sumner's view:

"In most ways my life is close to my ideal."
"I am satisfied with my life."

And the following items from the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980) may be used to measure the extent to which a person has realized (or failed to realize) friendship, in the preceding sense:

"I have nobody to talk to."
"I feel as if nobody really understands me."
"My social relationships are superficial."

These items may be used to measure life-satisfaction and friendship, respectively, either on their own or, conceivably, in combination with items from the PWBS or other scales.

The items that can help us measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it needn't come from measures of well-being or qualitative aspects of life; they can also come from other kinds of measures. Consider the way in which the A and PG factors were used to indicate whether a person is the kind of person to bring an element of challenge to her friendships and to indicate whether a person's life satisfaction is authentic. It may be that there are items from other kinds of measures that can play this role as well. For example, it may be that items from the openness factor of the Five Factor Model of Personality are indicative of the degree to which a person is open to having the kind of aesthetic experiences that, according to some objective list theorists, directly benefit a person (McCrae & Costa, 1987).

These examples are suggestive of the possibilities that exist for adapting existing scales to measure well-being as it is conceived of by philosophers.

Limitations of the Proposed Method

Up to this point I have emphasized the positive case to be made in support of the conclusion that existing scales could be adapted to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it. Now I will mention a few of the limitations of the proposed method, illustrating with the example discussed (of the PWBS and friendship) before turning to a consideration of the prospects for measuring well-being as philosophers conceive of it.

Items of Measurement Only Evidence the Realization of Basic Goods When They Logically Relate to It in the Right Way

I have argued we could expect friends to score highly on PR7, PR9, PR1, and PR4: that is, *if* a person has realized friendship in her life, *then* we can expect her to score highly on these items. But this doesn't imply that *if* a person scores highly on these items we *then* can expect her to have realized friendship. To illustrate, consider PR7: "People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time with others." I argued earlier that if someone is a friend, then we could expect her to score highly on PR7 because, given the above characterization of friendship, one cannot be a friend (on that characterization) without, in at least some contexts, being a giving person, willing to share her time with others.[17] However, the (loose) implication does not work the other way around: one could score highly on PR7 *without* being engaged in friendships. This is because there are many ways of "being a giving person, willing to share our time with others" other than through close personal relationships; one could, for example, share one's time with others by volunteering in ways that don't bring one into personal contact with others, such as collecting litter from a community park or sewing colorful pillowcases to brighten children's hospital rooms.

The upshot is that scoring highly on PR7 should not, in itself, be regarded as evidence of friendship; rather it must be treated as part of a body that, taken together, evidences friendship. For example, there are items on the PWBS that mention personal relationships explicitly. PR2, for example, elicits a response about whether the respondent has close friends with whom to share her concerns. Scoring highly on these items, then, *does* imply that an individual has close personal relationships. When an individual scores highly on these items, we can infer that she does have close personal relationships; when she also scores highly on PR7, we can posit the assumption that she exercises her willingness to share her time with others not only in impersonal ways, but also in the context of these personal relationships and thus that these relationships have at least this one feature characteristic of friendships. (Even this, of course, would only give us evidence that the individual's personal relationships have this one feature of friendship; we would need other measures to determine whether they have the other features characteristic of friendship.)

A *low* score on PR7, by contrast, *may* apparently be regarded as evidence of a lack of friendship: if a person is *not* the kind of person who is willing to share her time with others, this would seem to pretty directly evidence the conclusion that she does not have friendships, in the above sense. (Again, I am assuming the accuracy of self-reports; I'll return to this issue momentarily.)

The general point is that even when we see a link between an item of measurement and an ostensible basic good, we must be clear about what kind of link it is. It will not always be the case that a high score on some item of measurement, taken in isolation, gives us evidence—even *prima facie* evidence—concerning the extent to which the respondent has realized a basic good. Individual items will provide such evidence only when they are logically related to the realization of a basic good in the proper way.

The Limitations of Self-Reported Measures

A feature of many measures of well-being, including the PWBS, that many philosophers will be inclined to see as a serious limitation is the fact that the data generated by such measures are self-report data. Psychologists have developed various strategies for counteracting a number of the biases and limitations to which self-reports can be subject (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Hart, Ritchie, Hepper, & Gebauer, 2015; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972; Wojcik, Hovasapian, Graham, Motyl, & Ditto, 2015), but there is a feature inherent to self-reported measures that will be of concern to philosophers: the fact that, even in the best-case scenario, the data generated by self-reported measures are data about the subject's good-faith representations of states of affairs rather than the states of affairs themselves. Consider, for example, PR7: "People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time with others." To score highly on this item, the individual must "strongly agree" with this statement. When she does, the information gleaned from this item is not, strictly speaking, information that the subject *is* "a giving person, willing to share her time with others" or even that people *would in fact* describe her in this way; at best, the information gleaned is that the subject *sincerely believes* that people would describe her in this way. But she could of course be wrong. Indeed, it would seem that any given person in the normal course of events actually has very little evidence about how others would describe her and so, even setting aside the possibility of bias, could

quite *easily* be wrong. And a person's *wrongly* believing that people would describe her as "a giving person, willing to share her time with others" is not evidence that she enjoys positive relations with others.

Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being Are Often Fine-Grained in Ways It Would Be Difficult for a Measure to Capture

Finally, as discussed, many philosophical accounts of well-being have nuances that make well-being according to these accounts difficult to measure. Considering objective list theory in relation to the PWBS gives us the opportunity to make this point more concretely. I'll mention two kinds of nuances that raise difficulties for the measurement of friendship.

First, there are nuances of the account of friendship itself: of what, specifically, friendship involves. The preceding characterization of friendship included many features of friendship, but it was only a sketch. Even if two philosophers agree that among the basic goods are personal relationships perfectly fitting that description, there is plenty about which they may yet disagree. For example: according to the preceding characterization of friendship, friends trust one another. But we have not yet said what, more specifically, this trust involves. Does trust among friends extend to helping one another commit immoral acts (Cocking & Kennett, 2000)? Does it require believing the best about one's friend even against the evidence—that she couldn't possibly be guilty of a crime, for example, even if all the evidence points in that direction (Keller, 2004; Stroud, 2006)? These may be details, but they are details that make up a full-blooded philosophical account of the kind of trust that is part of friendship. Without some such details, the claim that friends "trust" one another lacks meaningful content. The PWBS doesn't probe for those details. Indeed, it's hard to see how a measure *could* probe for such details and stay manageable. But, unless it does, we will be limited in how far we can establish whether the individual's relationships *are* characterized by trust and, to that extent, limited in how far we can establish whether the individual has realized friendship.

Second, there are nuances of the account of how friendship contributes to well-being. Any theory of well-being, if it is to be complete, must give an account not only of what the basic goods are, but how these goods contribute to well-being. A hedonist about well-being, for example, must give an account of whether each and every pleasure contributes equally to well-being

or if the way in which pleasure contributes to well-being is—to put it one way—subject to a law of diminishing returns, such that the more pleasure one already has, the less any additional instance of pleasure contributes to one's well-being. Likewise for friendship. One might hold that no matter how many friendships a person already has, more friendship always makes her better off. (Call this the maximizing view.) But this is somewhat counterintuitive. Intuitively, even if it benefits a person to have friends, it doesn't follow that it always benefits her to have *more* friends. There may, for example, be a threshold beyond which more friendships don't benefit a person any further. (Call this the threshold view.) Some of the items on the PWBS are worded in such a way that they appear to measure friendship on the maximizing view, rather than the threshold view. For example, PR5 asks about how *many* people the respondent has to listen when she needs to talk.[18] Likewise, PR6 asks whether it seems to the respondent that other people have *more* friends than she does.[19] If what directly benefits a person is having high-quality friendships—even if only a few—then items like PR5 and PR6 will give a false negative, counting respondents as not realizing the basic good of friendship simply because they only have a modest number of friends.

The Prospects for Measuring Well-Being as Philosophers Conceive of It: Conclusion

I have proposed that there are ways in which existing scales might be adapted to measure ostensible basic goods; alternatively, one might develop entirely new scales, tailored to measure well-being on some philosophical conception (see Chapter 8, in this volume, p. 234), or one might do both (see Chapter 13, in this volume). Whether one adapts existing scales to this purpose or develops an entirely new scale, there are a number of challenges to which one must be sensitive. Given that there are in fact a number of philosophical conceptions of well-being and that we cannot expect a measure of well-being on one conception to serve as a measure of well-being on another, I have proposed that ostensible basic goods must be treated individually. The discussion of the preceding examples has shown how this might be done; however, the discussion of the limitations of the proposed method in the previous section suggests that optimism should be tempered. Of all extant scales, the PWBS seems most well-suited to the purpose of measuring friendship; even so, the items on the PWBS do not provide a measure of

friendship, as the philosopher conceives of it, that will enable us to identify, with perfect accuracy, who among respondents has realized the basic good of friendship and who has not. The nuances of the philosophical account of friendship and of how it contributes to well-being are difficult to capture with extant items of measurement; the connections between the individual items of measurement and the actual presence of friendship in a person's life are often indirect; and, given the nature of self-reported measures, the data gathered through these items will be, at best, data about the respondent's good-faith representations of states of affairs rather than the states of affairs themselves. And this is not to mention that friendship, according to pluralistic objective list theorists, is just one *element* of well-being; even if we could establish that a person has realized the basic good of friendship, we will only have part of the answer to the question of whether she has realized *well-being*. These are some of the challenges that arise for the measurement of friendship. They may not be exactly the same set of challenges we encounter when we attempt to measure well-being as it is conceived of by other philosophers, but they are indicative of the kind of limitations we may expect to encounter when we engage in such attempts.

In light of these limitations, what conclusions we should draw about the prospects for measuring well-being as philosophers conceive of it?

Let us grant that it will not be possible to develop, for every philosophical account of well-being (what we may call) a perfectly accurate measure: a measure that will identify, with perfect accuracy, subjects' levels of well-being on some philosophical conception. Let us grant, in other words, that for many philosophical accounts of well-being there will inevitably be a cleavage, even a systematic cleavage, between the measure and that which it purports to measure (as illustrated in the example of measuring well-being as it is conceived of by preferentists using self-reported measures—see Note 11). Philosophers who typically conduct their research from the armchair may be inclined to regard any systematic cleavage between a measure and that which it purports to measure as a failure, but this would be a mistake. There is often something to be learned from a measure, even when it is less than perfectly accurate. Return to the example of using self-reporting measures to measure well-being as conceived by preferentists (Note 11). I have noted how such a measure cannot be trusted to give a perfectly accurate measure of each individual's level of well-being, since (for example) a given individual's ignorance or false beliefs can result in a score that is higher or lower than her actual levels of well-being, on this account. It is nevertheless

possible, however, that with a large enough sample, we will get meaningful data—data that will help us see a pattern, for example. Philosophers should keep in mind that there are many different kinds of things to be learned from such measures, not all of which are undermined by a cleavage—even a systematic cleavage—between a measure and that which it purports to measure. Evaluating a measure is not something that is properly done, unilaterally, by the philosopher from the armchair; psychologists have well-established methods of evaluating the quality of psychological measures. A degree of interdisciplinary deference is in order in regards to which ways of a measure's falling short of perfection are troubling and which are within an acceptable margin of error.[20,21]

This is one reason why it would be a mistake for philosophers to give up on attempts to measure well-being on philosophical conceptions on the grounds that there will be a cleavage between a measure and that which it purports to measure. There is another, more pragmatic, reason as well: if philosophers are unwilling to accept a degree of such cleavage, it is unlikely that they will be invited to participate in the further development of measures of well-being. Philosophers can learn a lot from such participation even if, at present, the measures of well-being fall short of their hopes for measuring well-being as they conceive of it. Moreover, if philosophers bow out of the discussion now, they forego opportunities to shape the empirical measurement of well-being in ways that make measures more sensitive to the nuances of philosophical accounts of well-being—something in which, as I have said, many philosophers have a vested interest. Consider again the example of using self-reporting measures to measure well-being as conceived by preferentists. It may be impossible to accurately measure each individual's level of well-being, on this conception. (Recall the example of the individual who desires a relationship with a Higher Power.) Yet there are ways of designing measures that can measure a given individual's level of well-being on this conception *more* accurately. The subject's self-reports could, for example, be supplemented with the reports of others (e.g., reports about whether the subject's desires are satisfied or about how trustworthy the subject is concerning whether her desires are satisfied) or with direct measures confirming whether the state of affairs the subject desires really does obtain (e.g., measures that confirm whether the subject who desires to have children, or live in a safe neighborhood, does indeed have children or live in a safe neighborhood, see also Chapter 8, especially pp. 235–236, and Chapter 13, especially p. 401, both in this volume). In some cases, an item of measurement

could be made more sensitive to the nuances of some philosophical account of well-being through some simple adjustments in wording. (For example, an item like PR7 could be made into a more accurate measure of friendship by replacing "people" with "my friends.") By participating in research measuring well-being on philosophical conceptions, even when the measure is not as accurate as a philosopher might wish, the philosopher helps create opportunities for philosophers—herself or others who come after—to help shape measures in a way that will make them more sensitive to the nuances of philosophical conceptions of well-being—and, to the extent that these nuances in conceptions of well-being track genuine nuances in well-being, an opportunity to help advance research on what makes our lives go better or worse.

There is much to be gained when researchers from the humanities and the social and behavioral sciences engage in meaningful collaboration with the mutual aim of understanding and measuring well-being. By considering how existing psychological scales may be adapted to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it and discussing the challenges that confront such attempts—as well as attempts to create new measures designed with philosophical conceptions of well-being in mind—I hope to have helped facilitate such collaboration.

Notes

1. Indeed, psychological measures, like scientific measures generally, do not generally give an *infallible* test for that which they measure. Consider a thermometer: it is easy to imagine a situation in which a thermometer reads 60° when the temperature is not, in fact, 60°. Likewise for psychological measures: it is easy to imagine situations in which an individual's score according to some measure of well-being does not represent her actual level of well-being.

2. By "instrumental value" and "final value," then, I mean what philosophers would call "instrumental prudential value" and "final prudential value (Kauppinen, 2012); likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for "instrumentally valuable" and "finally valuable."

3. Indeed, if nothing were finally valuable, it would be puzzling how things could be instrumentally valuable: there must, it seems, be something of value to which the item in question relates in virtue of which it is instrumentally valuable (Aristotle, 2000, book I, chapter 2).

4. This way of using the term "basic goods" differs from the way it is used in certain global policy contexts in which the term "basic goods" is sometimes used to refer to goods and services such as clean water, housing, and electricity. These things are unlikely

candidates for "basic goods" in the present terminology. (For example, having electricity is not good in itself; it's good in virtue of the quality of life it facilitates.)

5. Not all philosophers would use the *term* "basic good" to refer to that which directly benefits a person; it is commonly associated with objective list theories. For simplicity's sake, I will use the term to refer to any (ostensible) direct contributor to well-being, such as having one's desires satisfied on certain preferentist accounts.

6. Note that what directly benefits a person, according to preferentism, is not being or feeling satisfied, but having her preferences or desires satisfied (or "fulfilled" as it is sometimes put—see Chapter 13, in this volume); that is, for the state of affairs the person desires or prefers to obtain. I will return to this point later.

7. By "objective list theorists" I will mean *pluralistic* objective list theorists and thus contrast (pluralistic) objective list theory with monistic experientialist theories such as hedonism. This way of organizing philosophical theories of well-being is traditional, following Parfit (1984), but cf. Fletcher (2013).

8. This categorization of philosophical accounts of well-being is similar to that offered by Margolis et al. (Chapter 13, in this volume). Note that I will understand "objective list theorists" as including defenders of what Margolis et al. call "eudaimonic" theories, as well as "non-eudaimonic objective-list" theories; indeed, since items like wealth and beauty are virtually never regarded as basic goods by full-fledged philosophical accounts of well-being, it is so-called eudaimonic theories that will be the paradigm examples of objective list theories in the present terminology.

9. To simplify, I'll hereafter restrict my discussion of preferentism to a version of preferentism according to which what directly benefits a person is the satisfaction of her desires; what I say of this view will also be true, *mutatis mutandis*, for versions of preferentism according to which what directly benefits a person is the satisfaction of preferences.

10. A nonstandard version of preferentism, according to which a person is directly benefited by *believing* that she is getting what she wants, is discussed in Heathwood (2006).

11. Given these points, there will be a systematic cleavage between self-reported measures of well-being as it is conceived of by the preferentist (see Chapter 13, in this volume) and that which it purports to measure: in cases in which a subject believes a desire has been satisfied when it hasn't, her score will be too high, and in cases in which she believes a desire hasn't been satisfied when it has, her score will be too low.

12. To speak carefully, in the case of desires, it's not the mental state—the desire—itself that is held to benefit a person, but its *realizer:* the desired state of affairs.

13. For some other objections to preferentist or experientialist theories of well-being, see Brandt (1982, p. 179), Griffin (1986, pp. 16–17), Lauinger (Chapter 8, in this volume), Nagel (1979, p. 4), and Nozick (1974, pp. 44–45).

14. It may be rejoined that there are other ways in which empirical researchers can measure well-being on philosophical conceptions apart from measuring the extent to which a person has realized an (ostensible) basic good; for example, perhaps there are ways to measure things that do not, according to philosophers, benefit a person directly but which *correlate* to that which *does* benefit a person directly, on all the major

philosophical conceptions. (For example, perhaps having a sense of belonging to a community is pleasurable *and* satisfies a desire we all have, and so on.) This rejoinder, however, only pushes the problem one step back, since to establish a correlation to a basic good one would still need to measure that basic good.

15. Philosophers who suggest that close personal relationships of some sort are among the basic goods include Finnis (1980), Fletcher (2013), Griffin (1986), Lauinger (2013), Murphy (2001), and Rice (2013).

16. "He ought therefore at the same time to perceive the being of his friend, and this will come about in their living together and exchanging words and thoughts; this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of people and not, as in the case of cattle, grazing in the same place" (Aristotle, 2000, p. 1170b).

17. This assumes that the individual's self-reports are accurate, an issue to which I will return momentarily.

18. PR5. I don't have many people who want to listen when I need to talk. (rs)

19. PR6. It seems to me that most other people have more friends than I do. (rs)

20. Philosophers who are reluctant to defer to psychologists in this way should remember the limitations of their own methods of research. All philosophers, for example, construct arguments that include premises which, in turn, rest on assumptions that the philosopher is not in a position to adequately support through argument; we all must take certain things as given. This feature of philosophical practice (and, indeed, inquiry in general) is so entrenched that philosophers may not be inclined to see it as a limitation, but, of course, that's exactly what it is. Without establishing the truth of every background assumption we depend on, we cannot be said to have definitively proved our conclusion. Yet, despite this, we don't conclude that we should give up altogether on giving arguments in support of our conclusions.

21. This isn't to say that psychologists' standards are immune to challenge from outsiders to the discipline. It is rather to say that the role of the philosopher is as a participant in deliberation, including deliberation about the validity of measures. It's only when researchers from different disciplines come to understand the others' standards and the reasons for them that they are in a position to be helpful participants in the kind of collective deliberation that will result in methodological improvement.

About the Author

Anne Baril is Lecturer in Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. She has research interests in ethics, epistemology, and their intersection. Her work appears in such journals as *Synthese*, *Episteme*, and the *Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Currently she is writing a book in which she argues that epistemic virtue is integral to the development of moral character and a constitutive contributor to well-being.

Author Note

References

Aristotle. (2000). *Nicomachean ethics*. R. Crisp (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bentham, J. (1789/1907). *An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Brandt, R. (1979). *A theory of the good and the right*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Brandt, R. (1982). Two concepts of utility. In H. B. Miller & W. H. Williams (Eds.), *The limits of utilitarianism* (pp. 169–185). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Cocking, D., & Kennett, J. (2000). Friendship and moral danger. *The Journal of Philosophy, 97*(5), 278–296.

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. *Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24*(4), 349–354.

Deiner, E., Emmons R. A., Larsen R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale. *Journal of Personality Assessment, 49*(1), 71–75.

Dorsey, D. (2010). Three arguments for perfectionism. *Noûs, 44*(1), 59–79.

Feldman, F. (2004). *Pleasure and the good life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finnis, J. (1980/2011). *Natural law and natural rights*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Fletcher, G. (2013). A fresh start for the objective-list theory of well-being. *Utilitas, 25*(2), 206–220.

Friedman, M. (1989). Friendship and moral growth. *Journal of Value Inquiry, 23*, 3–13.

Griffin, J. (1986). *Well-being: Its meaning, measurement, and moral importance*. New York: Clarendon.

Hart, C. M., Ritchie, T. D., Hepper, E. G., & Gebauer, J. E. (2015). The balanced inventory of desirable responding short form (BIDR–16). *SAGE Open*, October–December, 1–9.

Heathwood, C. (2006). Desire satisfactionism and hedonism. *Philosophical Studies, 128*, 539–563.

Heathwood, C. (2015). Desire-fulfillment theory. In G. Fletcher (Ed.), *The Routledge handbook of philosophy of well-being* (pp. 135–147). Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

Helm, B. (2013). Friendship. In E. Zalta (Ed.). *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/.

Hooker, B. (1998). Does moral virtue constitute a benefit to the agent? In Crisp, R. (Ed.). *How should one live?: Essays on the virtues* (pp. 141–156). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kagan, S. (2009). Well-being as enjoying the good. *Philosophical Perspectives, 23*(1), 253–272.

Kauppinen, A. (2012). Meaningfulness and time. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84*(2), 345–377.

Keller, S. (2004). Friendship and belief. *Philosophical Papers, 33*(3), 329–351.

Kraut, R. (1994). Desire and the human good. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 68*, 39–54.

Lauinger, W. (2013). The missing-desires objection to hybrid theories of well-being. *Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51*, 270–295.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across instruments and observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*(1), 81–90.

Mill, J. S. (1861/2001). *Utilitarianism*. G. Sher (Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Hackett.

Moore, A. (2000). Objective human goods. In R. Crisp & B. Hooker (Eds.), *Well-being and morality: Essays in honour of James Griffin* (pp. 75–89). New York: Clarendon.

Murphy, M. (2001). *Natural law and practical rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nagel, T. (1979). *Mortal Questions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.

Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. New York: Clarendon.

Raibley, J. (2010). Well-being and the priority of values. *Social Theory and Practice, 36*(4), 593–620.

Railton, P. (1986). Facts and values. *Philosophical Topics, 14*(2), 5–31.

Rice, C. (2013). Defending the objective list theory of well-being. *Ratio, 26*, 196–211.

Russell, D., Peplau, L. A., & Cutrona, C. E. (1980). The revised UCLA Loneliness Scale: Concurrent and discriminant validity evidence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39*(3), 472–480.

Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 1068–1081.

Ryff, C. D. (2013). Psychological well-being revisited: Advances in the science and practice of eudaimonia. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 83*(1), 10–28.

Ryff, C. D. (2016). Eudaimonic well-being and education: Probing the connections. In D. W. Harward (Ed.), *Well-being and higher education: A strategy for change and the realization of education's greater purposes* (pp. 37–49). Washington DC: Bringing Theory to Practice.

Ryff, C. D. (2018). Well-being with soul: Science in pursuit of human potential. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13*(2), 242–248.

Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*(4), 719–727.

Sherman, N. (1987). Aristotle on friendship and the shared life. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47*, 589–613.

Sidgwick, H. (1907). *The methods of ethics* (7th ed.). London: MacMillan.

Sumner, L. W. (1996). *Welfare, happiness and ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strahan, R., & Gerbasi, K. C. (1972). Short, homogeneous versions of the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28*, 191–193.

Stroud, S. (2006). Epistemic partiality in friendship. *Ethics, 116*, 498–524.

Taylor, G. (1985). *Pride, shame, and guilt: Emotions of self-assessment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tiberius, V. (2018). *Well-being as value fulfillment: How we can help each other to live well*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whiting, J. (1991). Impersonal friends. *Monist, 74*, 3–29.

Wojcik, S. P., Hovasapian, A., Graham, J., Motyl, M., & Ditto, P. H. (2015). Conservatives report, but liberals display, greater happiness. *Science, 347* (6227), 1243–1246.