Resilience to Violent Extremism and Terrorism

A Multisystemic Analysis

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Introduction

This chapter explores the ways in which concepts and discourses of resilience have been taken up and deployed in scholarly and policy work focused on understanding, preventing, and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). It places particular emphasis on the construct of resilience as a multilevel, multisystemic process demonstrating the capacity to adapt successfully to challenges that threaten systems function, viability, or development of systems (Masten, 2016; Ungar, 2018). From the outset, it is worth noting that violent extremism and terrorism[1] are themselves multisystemic phenomena. Terrorist and violent extremist movements, actors, and events are embedded within deeply complex and highly networked co-occurring systems and scales that interact with one another at different levels to support and enable violent extremist narratives, behaviors, actions, and outcomes. They can pose significant challenges and threats to the function and viability of multiple nested and interconnected human (and at times natural) systems.

Studying violent extremism and terrorism thus involves analysis and understanding of how complex multilevel factors (e.g., individual, family, community, national, and transnational) intersect and converge with multiple co-occurring systems (e.g., psychological, educational, social, cultural, local, economic, legal, political, institutional, media, environmental, and global) to create conditions that facilitate and legitimize the use of ideologically based instrumental violence to achieve transformative change in the social and political order.

While Islamist-inspired or -based violent extremist movements have dominated the international policy and political agenda since 9/11 across diverse countries and regions

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including Europe, North America, Africa, the Asia-Pacific, North Africa, the Middle East, and both South and West Asia, other modes of violent extremism are now emerging that complicate further the landscape in which governments and civil society are attempting to prevent or counter violent extremism. These modes include resurgent transnational right-wing violent extremist movements (Froio & Ganesh, 2018; Hutchinson, 2017; Jones, 2018) that capitalize on the extent to which democracies around the world are increasingly experiencing social and political polarization, "a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of 'Us' versus 'Them' " (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018, p. 16). Although such polarization attempts to reject or flatten the nature and impacts of globalized, heterogeneous social and political systems and increased human and cultural diversity and mobility, from a terrorism analysis perspective, the emergence of multiple, co-occurring vectors and flashpoints of violent extremist ideation and action merely emphasizes the way in which terrorist threats, as well as solutions to these, are now more multisystemic and multiscalar than ever.

Consequently, efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism—which generally adopts "soft power" (Keohane & Nye, 1998, p. 86) models of community and regionally based policy and programming to prevent or address conditions that may enable the take-up or spread of violent extremism (Rosand, Winterbotham, Jones, & Praxl-Tabuchi, 2018)—have increasingly had to develop complex systems-based approaches in tackling radicalization to violence. Violent radicalization feeds on a matrix of social, political and economic influences, networks, resources, and challenges (in different contexts and combinations, and with varying emphases) that are leveraged by violent extremist movements in their recruitment and propaganda strategies.

This has generated increasing recognition in successive iterations of both counterterrorism (CT) and P/CVE[2] theory and policy that co-occurring, multilevel systems across governments, communities, law enforcement, civil society, and the private sector must work collaboratively to develop whole-of-society (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018; Rosand et al., 2018) or whole-of-community (Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, 2015; Snair, Nicholson, & Giammaria, 2017) approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism at both individual and community levels. The whole-of-society approach moves well beyond the whole-of-government models that were a mainstay of earlier efforts to develop joined-up countering violent extremism (CVE) frameworks (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2011) and explicitly distances itself from the more securitized focus of law enforcement and intelligence agencies on detecting, disrupting, and pursuing terrorist actors and plots (Grossman, 2015; Hardy, 2015).

Not all terrorism researchers and analysts support the whole-of-society approach to preventing or countermanding violent extremism. Berger (2016, p. 8), for example, argues against what he terms the "unreasonably wide scope of activity characterized as CVE," suggesting that its lack of definitional clarity and miscellaneous character has weakened the ability of societies to take P/CVE seriously. Instead, he suggests, the field needs to see violent extremism as a narrow problem and, accordingly, limit its efforts to "a narrow process of

disrupting extremist recruitment and radicalisation efforts" rather than attempting to engage in broad-scale " 'social engineering' that can produce unintended consequences" (p. 34).

How Research and Policy Defines Resilience to Violent Extremism

Berger's argument remains, however, a minority perspective in the current research and policy environment, especially when it comes to the concept of resilience to (or sometimes, against) violent extremism. Identifying and building resilience to violent extremism has for some time been a key concept and key term in both CT and P/CVE research, discourse, and policy (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016; Grossman, Peucker, Smith, & Dellal, 2016; Longstaff, Armstrong, Perrin, Parker, & Hidek, 2010; Spalek & Davies, 2012; Ungar, Hadfield, Amarasingam, Morgan, & Grossman, 2017; Weine, Henderson, Shanfield, Legha, & Post, 2013). The international policy focus on resilience as a core feature of CT and P/CVE strategies has developed significantly in particular over the last decade, so much so that resilience is now considered a "key ingredient to effectively manage terrorism" (Dechesne, 2017, p. 414).

Resilience in CT contexts tends to think about resilience in line with models of disaster and crisis recovery. It prioritizes infrastructure defense, target-hardening, and urban design (Coaffee, Moore, Fletcher, & Bosher, 2008; Sampaio, 2017), along with victim, general population, and systems recovery following a terrorist attack. It is also concerned with the resilience of emergency and first-response workers and organizations that are on the front lines in the immediate aftermath of a critical or catastrophic event (Ranstorp, 2018). However, the centrality of resilience as a P/CVE "keyword" in the sense used by the eminent cultural studies critic Raymond Williams (Bracke, 2016; Williams, 1976) is more pervasive, demonstrated in part by the number of national and international P/CVE policy frameworks that have explicitly referenced *resilience* as a constitutive element of their approach over the last several years. These include Public Safety Canada's (2013) *Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy*; the Council of Australian Governments'(2015) *Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening our Resilience*; the U.S. Strategic Implementation Plan, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2011); and the UK's focus on resilience as a foundational organizing concept (Hardy, 2015) in both the Prepare and Prevent streams of its broader antiterrorism CONTEST strategy (HM Government, 2018).

Beyond these nation-specific frameworks, multilateral international bodies and institutions such as the European Commission's (n.d.) Radicalisation Awareness Network, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (2017), and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (2012) have all adopted explicitly resilience-based or focused frameworks and strategies in seeking to prevent and counteract terrorist ideology and action in various global regions and settings.

All of these strategies identify building both individual and community resilience as a critical conceptual and practical element in P/CVE. They also reflect an earlier reorientation

of the CT and P/CVE field toward what Coaffee (2006) called "a new lexicon to make sense of the counterterrorist challenge" (p. 389) in which counter-terrorism specialists "adopt[ed] a new vocabulary—centred on *resilience*—which is at once proactive and reactive, with an in-built adaptability to the fluid nature of the new security threats challenging states and their urban areas in 'the age of terrorism' " (p. 397).

In practical terms, this pivot has at times meant that the idea of resilience to violent extremism has been reduced to equivalence with P/CVE initiatives in ways that have sometimes harmed efforts to engage communities and desecuritize the language associated with counter-terrorism thinking and practice (Hardy, 2015). To the extent that efforts to rebadge CVE as *resilience* signaled a strategic interest by governments and law enforcement authorities in making P/CVE strategies more palatable and less threatening to communities (and Muslim communities in particular) who felt chronically stigmatized and besieged by conventional CT discourse, the concept of resilience as a desirable social good suffered because it came to be seen as mere camouflage for more sinister, securitized agendas in relation to the monitoring and surveillance of targeted communities. As a consequence, government-led community resilience strategies aimed at countering terrorism have in some contexts come to be perceived as a Trojan horse or proxy for other agendas related to government concerns with security and control, rather than serving to build genuine community resilience to harms and threats in their own right (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015; Council on American-Islamic Relations Minnesota, 2016; Hardy, 2015).

This is of a piece with what some analysts have seen as a more insidious "emergence and proliferation of security-driven resilience logics," which captures a series of intersecting processes and discourses in which "resilience policy becomes increasingly driven by security concerns and, at the same time, security policy adopts the language of resilience" (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p. 98). This leads to resilience to violent extremism becoming equated by targeted communities with coercive, opaque, and profiling government measures designed to "hitchhike" onto a broader community safety agenda (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015, p. 98). Others have reached similar conclusions in exploring the resilience dimensions of the Prevent and Prepare strands of the UK's CONTEST strategy, for example, suggesting that resilience remains a "contested and divisive concept . . . in counterterrorism" (Hardy, 2015, p. 84) and that "understandings of resilience cannot be readily separated out from these contexts" given their mobilization within the broader apparatus of the security state (Walklate, Mythen, & McGarry, 2012, p. 185).

However, such security-driven logics and the political exigencies that inform them are not the sole reason for the prominence of resilience concepts within P/CVE discourse. There has also been genuine interest on the part of governments, policymakers, researchers, practitioners, and communities to think creatively about what genuine and effective extremist violence prevention efforts might look like, and whether and how constructs of both individual and community resilience can contribute to this. Some of the thinking about what "resilience to violent extremism" might mean in theory and in practice has been explored through the lens of public health models (Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012; Challgren et al., 2016; Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2015; Weine, Eisenman, Kinsler, Glik, & Polutnik, 2017), while others have turned to theories of resilience and disaster or crisis

recovery to start thinking about what paradigms of resilience could mean to communities experiencing the profound stressors of either the aftermath of a terrorist attack or a heightened securitized environment for daily life in the context of intensified terrorist risks and threats (Ranstorp, 2018).

Perhaps because of this multisited genealogy, the deployment of resilience as a concept in the context of P/CVE policy and programming remains polysemous (Bracke, 2016). A pervasive understanding of violent extremism as comprising multilevel and systemic risks, vulnerabilities, and threats, and the need to prepare for and defend against risks and threats by remediating vulnerabilities and strengthening protections, has found a highly resonant correlate in the general emphasis in cross-disciplinary resilience theory on risk and protective factor relationships—what Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum (2008) call "resilience as a metaphor" (p. 127).

In some instances, this perceived correlation has resulted in *resilience* becoming a taken-for-granted term with no effort to define or operationalize it other than as a weak byword for P/CVE-think. In others, there has been a conflation of meanings in advancing competing definitions of resilience (e.g., resilience as a simple case of "bouncing back" to a recovered state of equilibrium vs. resilience as a complex process of adaptation and transformation in the context of adversity)—sometimes within the same argument—which has hampered an understanding of the efficacy of resilience theories for P/CVE modeling and practice. However, in more nuanced applications of various resilience constructs to P/CVE, scholars have drawn on existing definitions of resilience from across the interdisciplinary literature and worked critically with these in developing field-specific definitions and meanings.

Resilience to Violent Extremism: Prevention, Resistance, and Recovery

Resilience in CT and P/CVE contexts can mean resilience as resistance, resilience as prevention, resilience as adaptation, or resilience as recovery. All of these dimensions are present in various research articles, policies, programs, and strategies, sometimes in conjunction with one another in either complementary or contradictory ways. As Hardy (2015) notes, two prevailing yet competing paradigms for resilience to violent extremism that feature in different pillars of the UK's CONTEST strategy are resilience as community *recovery from a crisis or disaster* (albeit focused on "reinstating normality" after an attack rather than "transforming in response to crisis"; Hardy, 2015, p. 90), and resilience linked to *community resistance to terrorist ideology*.

The most common construct of resilience for many P/CVE scholars, analysts, and program developers is, however, a concept of resilience allied to *prevention of* and *resistance to* violent extremism. In its simplest form, resilience-as-resistance can mean both "withstand[ing] violent extremist ideologies" and also "challeng[ing] those who espouse them" (Public Safety Canada, 2013, p. 11). Doosje et al. (2016) observe that resilience to violent extremism can mean something similar up until the point that someone becomes radicalized to violence; thereafter, resilience retains its core meaning of "resistance" but the force being resisted

shifts, so that the radicalized individual, embedded within ideological frameworks and social networks that reinforce and nurture her or his world view now becomes resilient or resistant to being challenged about or disengaged from violent extremism.

For the most part, definitions of violent extremism focused on resilience as prevention or resistance tend to be very strongly grounded in the social-ecological resilience model (Bronfenbrenner, 1988; Hunter, 2012; Liebenberg, Ungar, & Van de Vijver, 2012; Masten, 2014; Stokols, 1992, 1996; Stokols, Lejano, & Hipp, 2013; Ungar, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018; Yates & Masten, 2004), which understands resilience as the ability to thrive in contexts of adversity or challenge through positive, prosocial adaptation; the presence and mobilization of protective factors that can offset risks and vulnerabilities; and the ability to access and navigate resources in culturally meaningful ways—all of which rely on complex interrelationships, dynamics, and trade-offs between different levels and systems of humans and their social and natural environments The work of Norris et al. (2008) on resilience in the context of disaster recovery as a "process linking a set of networked adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation" (p. 1321) following a crisis has also been influential.

Individual Resilience to Violent Extremism

Within the prevention/resistance framework of resilience to violent extremism, there has been a focus on both individual and community level features. In terms of individual resilience, P/CVE scholars have concentrated on identifying individual-level social-psychological resilience traits and processes that may serve as protective factors in relation to violent extremism. These include, for example, empathy (Aly, Taylor, & Karnovsky, 2014; BOUNCE, 2018; Lösel, King, Bender, & Jugl, 2018; Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier, 2019; Taylor, Taylor, Karnovsky, Aly, & Taylor, 2017; Van Brunt, Murphy, & Zedginidze, 2017), self-regulation/self-control and value complexity (Lösel et al., 2018; Sieckelinck & Gielen, 2017), self-esteem and assertiveness (BOUNCE, 2018), intercultural tolerance of diversity (Ellis & Abdi, 2017), and the ability to "overcome a terrorist attack or reject extremist messages" (Ranstorp, 2018, p. 9). While many of these resilience features apply to all forms of violent extremism across an ideological continuum, some research identifies two further individual resilience characteristics related specifically to right-wing extremists: levels of perceived personal discrimination and subjective deprivation, that is, a negative evaluation of one's own socioeconomic status relative to others (Lösel et al., 2018). The European Commission–funded BOUNCE program, which from 2013 to 2015 delivered training and tools to youth, family members, community educators, and youth workers, focuses primarily on individual youth resilience to violent extremism using what they term a "synthesized definition of resilience, including seven elements: (1) self-knowledge, (2) social skills, (3) knowing and understanding others, (4) self-confidence, (5) an open view, (6) making choices and following them, (7) handling diverging situations," as well as aiming to "increase critical thinking, tolerance and empathy" (BOUNCE, 2018, p. 41).

Some definitions of individual resilience to violent extremism, however, share an understanding of the individual-in-context that is more socially-ecologically oriented, seeing individual capacities for development, coping strategies and adaptation taking place within

dynamically interactive settings and systems including families, schools, places of employment, communities, and the broader society (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). For example, Sieckelinck and Gielen (2017) identify 10 features of individual-level resilience protections against violent extremism, almost all of which involve interactions with and interdependencies on multilevel and multisystemic social, political, and institutional processes. These 10 resilience protections include social coping skills through anger management and conflict resolution; democratic citizenship; religious knowledge; counternarratives; internet safeguarding measures; (social and civic) participation; trauma therapy; supportive and warm family environment; autonomy, self-esteem, and sense of self-control (agency); and social and emotional well-being and life skills.

Similarly, Taylor et al. (2017), analyzing an education-based model for building resilience to violent extremism that draws on moral disengagement and moral agency theory, see the program under review as potentially "transformational because it approaches building resilience to violent extremism both externally—through the curriculum materials and community engagement—and internally—through engagement in moral learning" (p. 199). Related to the focus on education, a strong emphasis also emerges on the importance of critical thinking (sometimes referred to as *critical literacy*) as a key feature of individual resilience to violent extremism (BOUNCE, 2018; GCERF, 2017; Ghosh, Chan, Manuel, & Dilimulati, 2017; Royal United Services Institute, 2015; Stephens et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2017), gesturing toward the multisystemic relationship between resilience, cognition, and education, on the one hand, but also toward the increasingly complex and highly mediated information and discursive environments in which social, political, and cultural messaging and influences are now navigated and negotiated.

Community Resilience to Violent Extremism

Such theorizations and definitions of individual resilience to violent extremism do not, however, reflect the dominant trend within the P/CVE field to the same extent as constructs of community resilience. In many ways, this reflects four continuing emphases in how P/CVE analysts think about resilience:

1. The extent to which terrorist and violent extremist trajectories themselves have been conceptualized as group-level rather than individual-level processes, involving an understanding of individuals who radicalize to violence as embedded within group-level socio-ideological processes and networks of various kinds and to various degrees.
2. Following from this, the extent to which social-ecological paradigms of resilience, which stress the complex interdependency between individuals and their collective social systems, have resonated most strongly in P/CVE thinking and programming to date.
3. The responsiveness of CT and P/CVE scholars to the needs of policymakers and security agencies, which have been interested in what building collective resilience to social harms such as violent extremism might look like in terms of programming, planning, and resourcing by governments.

4. The problematic tendency to attribute terrorist and violent extremist ideologies and behaviors to *communal identity* structures (e.g. Muslims, Whites, men) rather than to *communal ideological or belief* structures (e.g. right-wing, Islamist, ecological, misogynist).

The emphasis on community-level resilience to violent extremism and terrorism is thus driven by a convergence of conceptual, pragmatic, and problematic assumptions that both help and hinder understanding of how multilevel and multisystemic resilience processes in relation to violent extremism may play out in practice. Explorations of community resilience to violent extremism may define *community* as either or both "a physical or geographical area" but also as the "relational aspects of community—the ways in which one's perception of similarity to others or belongingness can provide a psychological sense of community" (Ellis & Abdi, 2017, p. 291; Anderson, 1983). The meanings of community in the context of violent extremism-related resilience discourse thus accommodate strategies and paradigms for community resilience that can be applied both spatially—for example, in geographical areas like Minneapolis-St. Paul (Weine & Ahmed, 2012) or New South Wales, Australia (Multicultural New South Wales, n.d.)—and/or ethnoculturally, for example, among both diaspora and national-majoritarian Muslim communities from diverse ethnic backgrounds in a wide range of countries; Somali diaspora communities in Canada, the United States, Kenya, and Australia (Grossman, Tahiri, & Stephenson, 2014; GCERF, 2017; Weine & Ahmed, 2012), or low socioeconomic status White communities in the United Kingdom (Warrell, 2019).

However, there are both conceptual and practical risks in treating either spatially or relationally constructed communities as homogenous entities, whether in P/CVE or other contexts. As Weine et al. (2013) observe, different communities "often have leadership rivalries and contested meanings, as well as different political, religious and ethnic subgroups" and this means recognizing and engaging with a plurality of local community contexts and partnerships (p. 330).

The Importance of Social Capital to P/CVE Resilience Models

Nevertheless, scholars and practitioners continue to grapple with the concept of community resilience to generate useful policy tools and guidance for understanding and assessing community resilience in various contexts (Grossman et al., 2016; Hardy, 2015; Longstaff et al., 2010; Walklate et al., 2012). Policy guidance in the P/CVE field has most frequently centered on an understanding of community resilience to violent extremism that stresses the relationship between resilience and social capital (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016; Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Grossman et al., 2014, 2017).

For instance, resilience to "militant Islamist" violent extremism has been conceptualized in Denmark as the capacity to "leverage social capital," which has been defined as "stable trust-based relationships and networks among actors (civil society, local government, local businesses)" in addition to resilience at the levels of families, peer and social networks (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016, p. 312). Ellis and Abdi (2017), as do Grossman et al.

(2014), draw on the interrelationship between bonding, bridging, and linking social capital in fostering prosocial engagement and partnerships between both intercultural “others” and also between communities and the systems of regulatory and institutional power and governance in which they are embedded. Weine et al. (2013) propose that the social capital dimension of community resilience to violent extremism involves shared problem-solving, safe community spaces for youth, and investment in community-building activities such as “after school programs, mentoring programs, community policing [and] opportunities for civic dialogue” (p. 331), while Lösel et al. (2018) see basic attachment to or integration into society, informal social control and social bonding as constituent protective factors linked to social capital influencing resilience to violent extremism, along with a variant of linking capital conceived of as “an accepting attitude toward law, society and police legitimacy” (Lösel et al., 2018, p. 98).

Paradigms of community resilience to violent extremism also draw implicitly or explicitly on the social capital dimensions of resilience related to disaster recovery, in particular through the work of Norris and colleagues (2008). Norris et al.’s report on resilience and disaster readiness, which builds its analysis through the critical review of a wide range of theoretical and applied resilience literature (p. 128), emphasizes the importance of social connectedness for resilient communities and proposes three dimensions of community resilience-oriented social capital: sense of trust and community belonging, sense of attachment to place, and civic participation. This framework has informed analyses of resilience that straddle preparedness for crises, resistance to resilience-eroding phenomena, adaptation in the face of adversity, and recovery from disturbances to systemic functioning.

This nexus between social capital and resilience nexus is responsive to an understanding of violent extremism itself as a complex, dynamic, multisited ideological, and behavioral matrix in which multilevel and multisystemic influences, networks, capacities, resources, and vulnerabilities converge to enable a distinctive form of violent social and political threat or attack. If the drivers and attractors of violent extremism are bound up with social conditions, protections, dynamics, and adversities, in whatever proportion, then so too must be the solutions that seek to prevent, divert, or rechannel these factors (Day & Kleinmann, 2017). Community resilience paradigms thus offer a socially attractive, policy-, and investment-friendly way forward in relation to conceptualizing what an integrated multisystemic social and political response might look like, one that draws individuals, communities, governments, and sometimes the private sector together in new collaborative relationships and partnerships.

The social capital–resilience nexus has influenced P/CVE thinking about resilience not only in relation to taking a less securitized, more prosocial approach to anti-violent radicalization agendas. It also has more pragmatic utility as a political project in two ways. First, it helps provide a clear and relatively accessible roadmap for government agencies tasked with developing extremist violence prevention responses who may be familiar with resilience theory and practice from other policy areas such as disaster preparedness and recovery or public health. This offers prospects for synthesizing and streamlining whole-of-government and whole-of-community approaches to policymaking and resource allocation—an especially desirable benefit in times of limited social funding or investment by governments.

Second, it diverges, at least in theory, from more securitized approaches nourished by "risk society" assumptions that target entire communities as suspect, vulnerable, or deficient (Kundnani, 2012; Spalek, 2010; Vermeulen, 2014), moving toward more holistic assessments of sociocultural resilience capital (Grossman et al., 2014) that communities can bring to the challenge of preventing, resisting, or recovering from the influence or impact of violent extremist ideologies and behaviors.

Nevertheless, the models of community resilience taken up by P/CVE scholars and practitioners in different countries reflect uneven awareness that while community resilience can be built or strengthened, it may also be weakened or undermined if risk factors accumulate in the absence of offsetting protective factors or trade-offs (Evans et al., 2013; Obradovic, Shaffer, & Masten, 2012; Wright & Masten, 2015). As Grossman et al. (2016) observe, "this highlights the need for a cumulative and contextual approach to assessing resilience risks at community level" in which a distinction is drawn between "communities that experience acute adversity against the backdrop of persistent resilience threats (such as chronic social conflict, discrimination or lack of resources)" (p. 48) and those that experience acute resilience challenges in an otherwise well-resourced and well-functioning setting (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016).

Is There a Difference Between Community Resilience and Resilience to Violent Extremism?

Such analyses continue to highlight the question of whether we can distinguish readily between more generalized theories or models of community resilience on the one hand and specific theories or models of community resilience to violent extremism on the other. Do the general protective features of social-ecological resilience, for example, guarantee strengthened resilience to violent extremism in particular? Are healthy, functioning communities that are sufficiently resourced, open, dynamic, trusting, and stable the best prophylactic against the appeals of violent ideology and action? Or does the focus on resilience genuinely indicate "a change in paradigms" in the study of terrorism and violent extremism (Weine et al., 2013, p. 28) in which particularized meanings and outcomes for resilience to violent extremism have emerged?

There is no field-based consensus on this issue, but the question has been addressed explicitly within recent terrorism prevention scholarship. Responses include an explicit emphasis in defining resilience to violent extremism as a process of "detect[ing] radicalization risks, prevent[ing] the recruitment of community members into violent extremism, and bounc[ing] back after instances of recruitment via learning and adaptability that permits the community to better limit future recruitment" (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016, p. 312), a definition echoed by Weine et al. (2013). Alternatively, Ellis and Abdi (2017) suggest that resilience specifically to violent extremism leverages social capital capacities to help resolve identity tensions, remediate disadvantage, and build trust to offset vulnerabilities amongst marginalized or fragile individuals and communities. Along similar lines, two studies that explored resilience to violent extremism in Canada (Ungar et al., 2017) and Australia

(Grossman et al., 2014) using a strengths-based, social-ecological approach were used as a springboard to develop a standardized and validated five-factor, 14-item measure of youth resilience to violent extremism. These five factors are cultural identity and connectedness, bridging capital, linking capital, violence-related behaviors, and violence-related beliefs (Grossman et al., 2017, 2020).

Important insights for resilience to violent extremism have also come from the work of Luthar, Cicchetti, and Becker (2000), who move beyond the familiar binary structure of resilience as comprising risk versus protective factors to distinguish between resilience risks, vulnerabilities, and protections. They define risks as adverse circumstances or environments that affect entire groups or communities, vulnerabilities as specific challenges or difficulties that can enhance risks, and protection as factors that can mitigate either or both vulnerabilities and risks. Applied to the P/CVE field, this tripartite structure helps organize an understanding of community resilience to violent extremism that locates broad community-strengthening measures designed to address systemic or group-level challenges under "risks" (building prevention capacity), targeted interventions to address specific identified community-level challenges or adversities under vulnerabilities (building resistance capacity), and harnessing or strengthening existing community assets and resources that redress or mediate risks and vulnerabilities under protection (identifying, creating, or extending resilience capital). As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the risk–vulnerability–protection framework is evident at a number of levels in how P/CVE research, policy and practice has defined and mobilized definitions of resilience. These definitions and mobilizations are, for the most part, social-ecologically attuned and cognizant of both multisystemic and multiscalar complexity. For example, Grossman, Carland, Tahiri, and Zammit (2018) found that in working with young women to build their resilience to online violent extremist social influence, identifying, and building their resilience capacities would involve addressing *risks* related to gender-based lack of self-esteem, social connection, and public voice; *vulnerabilities* related to social influence by others and seeking freedoms online from real-world gendered constraints; and *protections* such as strong relationships with mothers, strong intercultural relationships with peers, and critical literacy in relation to online narratives and propaganda.

Resilience to Violent Extremism: Conceptual Gaps

However, a critical gap in how P/CVE research conceptualizes and applies resilience to violent extremism is its tendency to advance resilience analyses and models that largely stop at the door of individuals and communities, without contemplating the presence or nature of resilience risks, vulnerabilities, and protections at the level of policy and governance. As we have seen, scholarship on resilience to violent extremism and terrorism has tended to focus intensively on mesolevel community level resilience and to a lesser extent on microlevel psychosocial resilience, but hardly at all on the macrolevel resilience of national or international systems (Dechesne, 2017).

This means that risk and vulnerability, especially in First World settings, are often conceptualized and applied only in relation to communities or subsections of communities, with no reference to the risks or vulnerabilities that may be features of government or institutional systems such as those relating to law and justice, education, health, employment, or the media. While the negative impacts of broader systemic social phenomena such as biased global media reporting about Muslims, hostile political and policy environments for immigration and refugees, underfunded and unevenly distributed education and employment opportunities, or the ghettoization of minorities in socially and economically disadvantaged enclaves are often widely discussed as elements that can influence the taking up of violent extremist attitudes and support, there has been no systematic effort to address how these phenomena register within a social-ecological resilience framework as risks or vulnerabilities when it comes to counter-terrorism policy responses.

In effect, this means that the conceptualization of resilience to violent extremism is only partially multisystemic. It accounts for some but not all the co-occurring systems that make up the P/CVE resilience matrix, overprivileging community resilience at the expense of considering other systems that are crucial to the prevention (or alternatively the taking up) of violent extremism but remain exempted from resilience analyses. While these other systems have in some cases been exhaustively studied (e.g., the role and impacts of CT policing models on P/CVE), they have not been studied through a systems-based resilience lens.

How Multisystemic Is Resilience to Violent Extremism?

Terrorism and violent extremism are exemplars of communal stressors with multilevel and multisystem impacts—psychological, social, economic, cultural, and environmental, among others—that can create enormous strain, disturbance, and adversity for individuals, communities, and societies that are exposed to or affected by such movements or events. Stressors at this level can be simultaneously chronic and acute. For example, a terrorist attack and its attendant death, chaos, fear, resource strain, and uncertainty would clearly register as an acute stressor. But living in a more routinely securitized environment—for example, where rubbish bins have been removed from public thoroughfares because of fears they might hide improvised explosive devices, in which random stop-and-search exercises by police routinely occur in local neighborhoods and at airports, where civil liberties have been curtailed, or where both public and private surveillance mechanisms and intrusions have increased—can create an environment characterized by chronic stressors, shifting daily life into a paradoxically less secure, confident, and stable state. Living with the threat and reality of terrorism, in other words, can create both chronic and acute forms of adversity.

It is an axiom of resilience studies across disciplines that resilience becomes activated in contexts of adversity (Ungar, 2018). When thinking about this in the context of violent extremism, it is critical to consider not only the interaction between multiple systems but also the presence and impacts of multiple intersecting adversities. "Adversity" as a singular construct is insufficient to describe the dynamic interplay *between* adversities within different

systems and at different levels that can help sustain or erode resilience to violent extremism. Terrorism and violent extremism represent challenges that are scaled all the way from the erosion of individual mental health, social belonging, and the fraying of family and community security and cohesion to trauma experiences (for victims, first responders, and often the families of violent extremists); overtly securitized social policies, information and communication uncertainty or breakdown, collisions between law enforcement responses and human rights, political instability, and systems compromises or failures in health, education, the economy and emergency services, transport, communications, energy, border management, trust, democratic procedures, and the rule of law.

However, these adversities—prospective or actualized—can intersect with a range of co-occurring sociopolitical adversities such as political or economic oppression and disadvantage, social marginalization, and ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious discrimination and victimization that much prevention work in building resilience to violent extremism aims to address. These sociopolitical adversities can prime the pump for the emergence and uptake of violent extremist narratives that offer seemingly definitive solutions to social and political grievances. They are in some sense “enabling” multisystemic adversities that are seen as influential (although not directly causative) in fostering increased vulnerability to violent extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts.

As a result, many government-led resilience strategies accordingly focus simultaneously on three or four multisystemic elements in their approach to tackling terrorism and violent extremism. One example would be the UK’s CONTEST strategy, with its four pillars of “Pursue” (investigate and disrupt violent extremist criminal behavior through policing, intelligence, and the courts), “Prevent” (social and government programming and referral through schools, clinics, and local council authorities, sometimes in partnership with civil society), “Protect” (safeguarding human, built environment and infrastructure systems), and “Prepare” (mitigation strategies for recovery after a terrorist attack). Another would be Australia’s tripartite Living Safe Together strategy, which advocates prevention, diversion, and disengagement through a combination of preventive resilience-building activities focused on social cohesion (community, social, and political systems); diversion through targeted intervention programs managed by government agencies, including police (law enforcement and social service and welfare systems) (Cherney et al., 2018) and the disengagement from and reintegration of convicted violent extremists when possible (legal, social welfare, and informal community systems).

Yet it is also the case that sometimes programs or policies designed to build resilience to violent extremism can constitute new adversities that undercut the very resilience such strategies are trying to promote. For example, a number of governments have pushed out national or area-based antiterrorist hotlines, sometimes supplemented by web-based reporting systems (e.g., the National Security Hotline in Australia, Anti-Terrorism Hotlines in the United Kingdom and Pakistan, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service telephone and website reporting mechanisms, and the Public Security Tips Hotline in New York City). These are designed to provide confidential, easy-to-access routes for the reporting of information or suspicions concerning violent extremism that will make it easier for law enforcement and security agencies to investigate, disrupt, or prevent terrorist activity.

However, reporting on terrorism is itself a complex, multisystemic process. As work by Grossman (2015, 2018) and Thomas, Grossman, Miah, and Christmann (2017, 2020) has shown, if the hotline is perceived to be little more than a cipher for security and intelligence gathering, those who may be in the best position to come forward, such as family and close friends, will be reluctant to do so because they fear criticism or shunning by others within their communities; are uncertain or fearful of the consequences of reporting because they do not know what will happen (to them or to the person they are concerned about) after sharing information; and are unlikely to be referred to support structures following what is by any measure a very difficult and confronting disclosure process. Moreover, even when reports are initiated, if the triaging systems that receive such information from communities are unclear about where that information should go or how it should be handled, then the systems cluster involved in the reporting process displays what Grossman (2015, 2018) calls the "leaky pipeline" of P/CVE reporting, in which both people and information drop out of co-occurring systems at various points because of inappropriate or unclear procedures and messaging related to the violent extremism reporting process.

Sustaining resilience in times of adversity also relies on systems' capacity for persistence, resistance, recovery, adaptation, and transformation (Ungar, 2018). Of these, *persistence* can be a double-edged sword when it comes to resilience to violent extremism. In terrorism contexts, persistence may mean maintaining sociopolitical cohesion, functioning systems of civil and human rights, and equitable access to social and economic resources so that social and political systems do not require change, even when faced with the risk of alienated individuals or groups who may advocate or conduct ideologically based violent attacks or when social cohesion fragments because social tensions mount. To a large extent, such persistence is a core feature of government strategies designed to prevent the risk or threat of violent extremism from overwhelming co-occurring government and civil society systems.

However, persistence can have a deleterious impact on resilience to violent extremism when there are legitimate social demands for change—for example, when agitating for violations of human rights or procedural fairness—that are ignored or dismissed by the state. An intriguing example arises in this regard. A number of European countries, including France, Denmark, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium, have between 2003 and 2018 enacted various bans on Muslim women's culturally prescribed attire, including bans on full or partial facial and body covering such as the niqab, the burqa, and the burkini (a "modesty swimsuit" enabling Muslim women to swim at the beach in public). The burkini ban in France, beginning in 2014 and upheld by many local provincial governments from 2016 onward, is a case in point from a multisystemic resilience perspective.

Originally designed and marketed in Australia (Gerrand, 2016), the burkini (a portmanteau of "burqa" and "bikini") was designed to allow Muslim women who adhered to traditional cultural dress codes to access the public spaces of beaches—which serve as both material and symbolic signifiers in Australian culture—in ways that did not violate these codes. The burkini provided opportunities for Muslim women to feel like they belonged to broader Australian society without creating cultural conflict over issues of dress and modesty; facilitated civic participation and interaction with cultural others through the culturally democratic spaces of beach-going leisure in Australian communities, where many civic as

well as recreational activities occur; and provided opportunities for Muslim women to educate others about their cultural and religious beliefs and practices through informal dialogue about the burkini with non-Muslims.

All of these features—civic participation, sense of belonging, and intercultural dialogue—are benchmarks in the literature for building and sustaining resilience to violent extremism—and in general—in culturally pluralist settings. The creation of the burkini still arguably contributes to these outcomes in Australia because it is not banned. In France, however, the banning of the burkini and other elements of Muslim women's visible choices of attire based on the persistence of French *laïcité* (and despite the surmised rise[3] in numbers of practicing Muslim French citizens over recent decades) has not only eroded these opportunities, but created significant angst and alienation among Muslim women who feel they are being discriminated against not as potential security risks (it would be very difficult to hide a weapon or a bomb while wearing a burkini, for instance), but simply as Muslims. In this case, a sociopolitical system (state-based secularism) has undermined the resilience of cultural and social co-occurring systems (leisure in shared public spaces, intercultural contact, religio-cultural diversity) that might otherwise have thrived in this context. In so doing, it creates low-hanging fruit that can be easily plucked by terrorist narratives seeking to escalate a range of sociocultural grievances.

In a related vein, responses to coping with the risks and threats of violent extremism and terrorism have to some extent revealed the limits in how well various social and political systems are able to tolerate heterogeneity, a key feature of multisystemic resilience. Social and cultural heterogeneity is a basic feature of all P/CVE systems, which frequently bring together different sectors (government, community), cultures (religious, secular, ethnic), and social strata (e.g. youth, community leaders, authorities). However, such heterogeneity within P/CVE contexts can be adversely affected by lack of tolerance for heterogeneity at the level of broader social and cultural systems that then adversely impact P/CVE relationships. For example, the current fragility of community cohesion signaled by the rise of and enhanced tolerance for illiberal and far-right political responses to immigration and refugee mobility in pluralist democracies across Europe and North America shows that "sunny days" multiculturalism can fray under conditions of political stress or uncertainty. This then weakens community trust in institutions and authorities who are seen as aligned with political statements that are hostile to the presence of sociocultural diversity.

However, P/CVE can also demonstrate key resilience features such as optimal openness to new information, capacity to integrate environmental shocks and the initiation of new behavioral regimes (Ungar, 2018). P/CVE is inherently built on the basis of complex, reciprocal relationships between different social and institutional domains that seek to strengthen resilience across systems through new (or enhanced) behavioral regimes. Such regimes might include partnerships or programs for reducing social marginalization, creating more opportunities for cross-cultural contact and understanding, or retraining police to think and behave differently in their community engagement roles.

Nevertheless, the same may also be said for various terrorist movements themselves. They have demonstrated their capacity over time to integrate environmental shocks (e.g., financial or territorial losses), initiate new behavioral regimes (e.g., shifting from large-scale

high-tech attack strategies to small-scale, low-tech domestic attacks; developing new or adapted digital behaviors and strategies), integrate both internal and co-occurring system stressors (e.g., internal competitions for movement control; military assaults); and negotiate new resources to accommodate these stressors through complex, reciprocal relationships (e.g., decentralizing a terrorist movement's resource base by creating local franchises in a range of different regional and national locations).

Thus the multisystemic resilience of P/CVE must not only contend with its own cross-system dynamics and complexities; it also needs to continuously adapt to and transform its strategies in relation to the resilience demonstrated by the co-occurring systems that nourish and sustain the violent extremist and influences it is attempting to combat and remediate. In this sense, the systems dynamic for P/CVE is always an interaction between both its own cluster of co-occurring systems and also between its own systems and the systems of its opponents, which can both overlap and diverge.

Principles for the Future Study of Multisystemic Resilience to Violent Extremism and Terrorism

As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, both violent extremism and resilience to violent extremism are complex, multilevel, multisystemic processes. The study of resilience to violent extremism to date has tended to focus primarily on community level resilience, with a less dominant focus on individual resilience. The dominance of community-sited models of P/CVE recognizes and works with the multisystemic nature of risk, vulnerability and protective factors involved in preventing and intervening in radicalization to violence at many different levels and across many co-occurring systems.

But the predominant focus on community-level resilience has also arisen as a response to pragmatic demands from governments that want rapid, actionable knowledge that sometimes limits the complexity and nuance required to move beyond what is known about resilience to violent extremism and instead start to explore what may be possible. An intriguing observation in this regard comes from the study of ecological resilience, where a distinction is drawn between "fast" and "slow" variables in relation to feedback loops that influence the growth or degradation of an environment (Walker & Salt, 2012).

A full-blown terrorist event would be an example of a fast variable that produces significant change in a system's regime, as we saw after 9/11 in the United States or in New Zealand following the Christchurch attack. By contrast, P/CVE is a slow variable. Its emphasis on building individual, social, and community resilience through strengthening social cohesion; tackling areas of social disadvantage and marginalization; enhancing the capacity for critical thinking and analysis; developing sustainable and meaningful partnerships at local, regional, and national systems levels; and maintaining democratic openness and responsiveness are all processes that both take time and require longitudinal assessment. Preventing a specific terrorist attack can occur in a highly compressed period of time with intensive resource distribution. P/CVE, on the other hand, spreads out over time, over place, and with a much more diffused resource and investment base. It might be years before the outcomes of

a particular P/CVE initiative can be effectively assessed, but the political and funding cycles by which many P/CVE programs and models are framed are often inhospitable to this reality. The result can be superficial or premature assessments of theoretical, program and policy efficacy that do not serve longer-term interests or goals in building multisystemic resilience.

A few principles emerge from this that may serve as guides for future studies of multisystemic resilience to violent extremism:

1. The study of resilience to violent extremism should be able to clearly define the co-occurring systems, the multiple levels—and, where applicable, the scalar implications of how genuinely multisystemic resilience is built, demonstrated, or eroded—and the specific adaptations and transformations that do or don't enable this to occur. This means moving beyond the idea that only communities need to be resilient to violent extremism and including institutional and governance systems within the frame of resilience-based analysis and assessment.
2. In both conceptual and pragmatic terms, however, there is no P/CVE without communities. This means that wherever possible, communities should be engaged and involved as co-researchers when developing, investigating or assessing specific P/CVE initiatives in the context of resilience building (and beyond).
3. Triangulation is essential for the study of multisystemic resilience to violent extremism. The data points available for the study of resilience to violent extremism may be either limited or incomplete for a variety of reasons, making triangulation all the more important to develop a deepened contextual understanding of how resilience can be manifested in diverse ways, and with diverse meanings, across different systems and at different levels.
4. There is a tendency to develop short-term studies of resilience to violent extremism because of policy and funding constraints. However, longitudinal studies of multisystemic resilience to violent extremism are critical if we are to assess capacities and behaviors linked to persistence, adaptation, and transformation across systems in particular.
5. The meanings of “resilience to violent extremism” need to continue to be explored, diversified, and contested. Resilience has been shown to vary its meanings not only across disciplines but also across cultural, organizational, institutional, and ideological systems. The study of resilience discourse in the context of violent extremism is in continuous need of refinement and elaboration.
6. The ways in which resilient systems cope with the risks and threats of violent extremism need to be investigated in tandem with the multisystemic resiliency of violent extremist and terrorist movements themselves. Failing to understand how resilient systems can compete as well as cooperate with each other will result in suboptimal analyses of what resilience means in conflict-defined settings.
7. The reliable measurement of resilience to violent extremism is in its infancy. While a number of measures exist for assessing indicators of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, very few studies have attempted to develop or validate measurements of resilience to violent extremism. Exploratory work in this regard has been conducted by Weine and Ahmed (2012) through the DOVE tool, and Grossman, Ungar, and their colleagues (Grossman et al., 2017, 2020) through the BRAVE measure, but further work to extend

and refine the measurement of resilience to violent extremism in multisystemic and diverse contexts is needed.

8. Finally, the study of multisystemic resilience to violent extremism is already embedded within a co-occurring system of multiple studies drawn from a range of different disciplines and branches of knowledge. The study of resilience to violent extremism should draw creatively and innovatively on multidisciplinary knowledge of how multisystemic resilience functions outside the sphere of violent extremism—as in fact a number of studies have already done—to continue to refresh and expand understanding of what resilience capacities may look like, or need to look like, in relation to violent extremism and terrorism.

Conclusion

The field of resilience has been defined since its inception by multiple genealogies in terms of its disciplinary coordinates, beginning with its elaboration in the fields of engineering and materials sciences through to the human sciences of psychology and the environmental study of ecological systems. The legacy of these multiple genealogies has both enlivened and complicated theoretical and empirical research on resilience in different contexts, largely in exciting ways. Increasingly, resilience as an interdisciplinary field has come to see resilience as a process of adaptation and transformation, in which multiple systems interact, influence, and, at times, compete with, trade off against, or resist one another. The classical idea of resilience as a process of "bouncing back" from trauma or adversity and returning to a state of equilibrium has been superseded by more complex analyses that ask us to think about the different dimensions of resilience capacity and function within complex, messy, dynamic, uncertain, and often volatile multi-system environments.

The study of resilience to violent extremism shares this complexity and uncertainty. The ways in which resilience to violent extremism have been studied to date reflect important advances in understanding the features and dynamics of multiple human, social, technological, cultural, political, and environmental systems as these influence and are in turn shaped by nonstate movements that seek to use violence against populations to achieve ideological or political outcomes. The focus within the field of P/CVE in particular has been alert to the relevance of aspects of resilient systems drawn from outside an immediate concern with social or political violence, such as social capital and connectedness, and the strength of social support and development systems such as the education, health, social welfare, and human rights sectors.

However, the predominant emphasis on community resilience to violent extremism has come at the expense of exploring the dynamics of resilience at the level of those systems of power that govern the way in which policies and practices of building resilience to violent extremism are developed and enacted. These power systems are by and large driven by governments and their institutional coordinates, such as law enforcement and a variety of government-supported or -enabled civil society institutions and systems. To provide a quick concluding example: trust is considered a highly salient variable in the context of resilience to

violent extremism (Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016; Grossman et al., 2014; Spalek, 2010). Yet the capacity and level of trust in the context of preventing or countering violent extremism tends to be explored only in terms of how much or how little communities experience trust in government; the reverse question, of whether, why, and how much or how little governments trust communities, and the consequences of this, is not canvassed. When we stop thinking about "trust" as a static variable and start thinking about it instead as a multisystemic and dynamic process of flows, what might this tell us about how to advance multisystemic resilience to violent extremism through building transformative relationships that understand the dynamics and distribution of reciprocal trust in new ways?

The emphasis on understanding and sustaining community resilience to violent extremism has also come at the expense of exploring in greater depth the resilience of the very phenomena such approaches are trying to mitigate: violent extremist and terrorist movements and actors themselves. Building resilience to violent extremism means understanding the particular resilience features and capacities of violent extremism itself. For societies and communities it also means a whole-of-systems approach that encompasses all the systems and actors involved in the P/CVE matrix—and not just communities. Responsibilizing communities for demonstrating resilience capacity in this way (Bottrell, 2013; Thomas, 2017) excludes the state from accounting for its own resilience protections and vulnerabilities both within its own co-occurring systems and also in relationship with independent community-based systems.

This goes against the grain of what Gunderson and Holling (2002) describe as "panarchy," a phrase used in the context of resilience in the built environment to denote interconnectedness in the way that systems at different spatial and temporal scales are dynamically influenced by systems at other scales. Working with this fundamental interconnectedness between the scales of individual, community, government, and institutional systems means acknowledging that neither communities nor the state are wholly responsible for P/CVE; it is a shared responsibility. It follows that the task of understanding, building, and assessing multisystemic resilience capacity to violent extremism and terrorism must also be undertaken together as a meaningfully shared and mutually negotiated enterprise, one in which all elements of this complex landscape are able to recognize and strengthen their adaptive and transformative interdependence.

Key Messages

1. The study of resilience to violent extremism needs to move beyond the idea that only communities need to be resilient to violent extremism by including institutional and governance systems within the frame of resilience-based analysis and assessment.
2. There is no P/CVE without communities. This means that wherever possible, communities should be engaged and involved as co-researchers when developing, investigating or assessing specific P/CVE initiatives in the context of resilience-building (and beyond).
3. There is a tendency to develop short-term studies of resilience to violent extremism because of policy and funding constraints. However, longitudinal studies of multisystemic

resilience to violent extremism are critical if we are to assess capacities and behaviors linked to persistence, adaptation, and transformation across systems.

4. The ways in which resilient systems cope with the risks and threats of violent extremism need to be investigated in tandem with the multisystemic resiliency of violent extremist and terrorist movements themselves. Failing to understand how resilient systems can compete as well as cooperate with each other will result in suboptimal analyses of what resilience means in conflict-defined settings.
5. In the context of terrorism and violent extremism, a singular construct of "adversity" when considering how resilience emerges and can be mobilized is insufficient. Multiple, co-occurring adversities need to be understood and addressed if the complex nature of building resilience to violent extremism is to advance both conceptually and empirically.

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Notes

1. *Violent extremism* and *terrorism* are often used interchangeably but they have slightly different meanings. The distinction between these terms that informs the current discussion is as follows: terrorism refers to ideologically based or inspired violent *acts and events* by nonstate actors that are designed to coerce, intimidate, or create fear in populations to achieve particular political or social outcomes. Terrorists are those who plot or commit such acts. Violent extremism, by contrast, is more broadly defined because it can include not only ideologically based acts of nonstate violence themselves, but also the *attitudes*, *beliefs*, *and orientations* that justify and legitimate the use of violence to achieve social and political outcomes. Terrorism can be a subset of violent extremist thinking and movements, although not all terrorists are extremists in the way that extremism tends to be defined (Berger, 2017, 2018). Resilience is particularly meaningful in relation to the broader parameters of preventing and addressing violent extremism rather than the narrower phenomenon of terrorism.
2. *Counterterrorism* and *preventing/countering violent extremism* are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature and in public commentary. However, the terms bear different signals in relation to antiterrorism policy and practice. CT tends to align more closely with "hard power," securitized approaches taken by law enforcement and intelligence agencies that focus on investigation, disruption and interdiction of terrorist actors and events. P/CVE, on the other hand, distinguishes itself from CT approaches by adopting "soft power" models that seek to engage, involve, and, at their best, empower communities and civil society in the effort to prevent violent extremist ideologies and narratives from gaining a foothold. CT focuses on preventing actors, networks, plots, and attacks; P/CVE focuses on preventing or addressing the sociocultural drivers and "push" or "pull" factors than serve as enabling conditions for violent extremism to develop and thrive.
3. "Surmised" because, as part of its commitment to *laïcité*, France does not collect any census or other official data on religious beliefs or adherence. For a recent discussion of *laïcité* and Muslim communities in France, see https://www.thenation.com/article/french-secularism-is-in-crisis-what-does-that-mean-for-muslim-youth/.

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