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Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People

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dc.contributor.author Levy, Neil
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-04T10:51:30Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-04T10:51:30Z
dc.date.issued 2021-12
dc.identifier.isbn 9780192895325
dc.identifier.uri http://111.93.204.14:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/649
dc.description.abstract Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher- order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Oxford University Press en_US
dc.subject Philosophy Open Access ebook en_US
dc.subject Belief en_US
dc.subject Evidence en_US
dc.subject Rationality en_US
dc.subject Autonomy en_US
dc.title Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People en_US
dc.type Book en_US


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