Abstract:
We use evaluative terms and concepts every day, in talk of ethics, aesthetics, politics, and when we discuss common-or-garden issues. We call actions right and wrong, teachers wise and ignorant, and children annoying and angelic. Philosophers place evaluative concepts into two camps. Thin concepts, such as goodness and badness, and rightness and wrongness have evaluative content, but they supposedly have no or hardly any nonevaluative, descriptive content: they supposedly give little or no specific idea about the character of the person or thing described. In contrast, thick concepts such as kindness, elegance, and wisdom supposedly give a more specific idea of people or things, yet given typical linguistic conventions thick concepts also convey evaluation. Kind people are often viewed positively while ignorance has negative connotations. The distinction between thin and thick concepts is frequently drawn in philosophy and is central to everyday life, but is rarely discussed in detail. In this full-length study, Simon Kirchin discusses the distinction, highlighting key assumptions, questions, and arguments, many of which have gone unnoticed. He argues for a ‘nonseparationist’ account of thick concepts: although they may have different aspects, such concepts cannot be split into separate component parts of thin evaluation and nonevaluative content as many suppose. In doing so Kirchin argues for a novel account of evaluation itself.
